Altruism is the unselfish concern for or devotion to the welfare of others,
acting in their best interest even at a personal cost or risk. It is a form
of prosocial behavior often motivated by empathy and a desire to help, and
can range from small acts like holding a door open to larger sacrifices,
such as donating time or money to charity. The principle of altruism holds
that right action is that which produces the greatest benefit for others.
tasmāt sarveṣu kāleṣu mām anusmara yudhya ca | —Gītā (8.7).
"Therefore, at all times, remember me and fight."[1]
Whether one considers the continuity of the various chapters of the
Gītā, or analyses all the various subject-matters dealt with in it
according to the logical method of the Mīmāṃsā school, it follows clearly
that
(i) the various interpretations, which have been put on the
Gītā by doctrine-supporting commentators, who have looked upon the
Karma-Yoga as inferior, are not correct; and that
(ii) (ii) harmonising the Monistic (advaita) Vedānta of the
Upaniṣads with the Philosophy of Devotion, and in that way accounting for
the mode of life of great and noble people, or, to mention the matter
briefly, Karma-Yoga fused with Spiritual Knowledge and Devotion, is the
true purpose of the Gītā. Although performing the ritual prescribed in the
Śrutis and the Smṛtis throughout life, as directed by the Mīmāṃsā, may be
following the injunctions of the Śāstras, yet, this mechanical ritual,
which is devoid of Spiritual Knowledge, can never satisfy an intelligent
person; and if one considers the philosophy of the Upaniṣads, not only is
it difficult to grasp for people of ordinary intelligence, as it is based
purely on Reason, but the Saṃnyāsa or Renunciation, advocated by it,
conflicts with universal benefit (lokasaṃgraha). Therefore, the Blessed
Lord has preached in the Gītā the philosophy of life-long Desireless
Action, based on Spiritual Knowledge, and in which the highest importance
is given to Devotion, so as to effect a fusion between Intelligence
(Jñāna), Love (Devotion), and physical capacity (kartṛtva), and so as to
enable the ordinary affairs of the world to be carried on satisfactorily,
without prejudicing Release; and it follows from the Commencement
(upakrama) and the Conclusion (upasaṃhāra) of the Gītā, that this advice
covers the entire sum and substance of the philosophy of the Doable and the
Not-Doable, and that the disquisition on the Doable and the Not-Doable was
the true reason for preaching this religion to Arjuna. Which Action is
righteous, meritorious, just, or beneficial, and which, on the other hand,
is unrighteous, improper, unjust or harmful, can be explained in two ways.
The one way is not to explain the inherent reason or the justification for
the advice, but merely to say that if a particular thing is done in a
particular way, it is right, and if done in another particular way, it is
wrong.
Injunctions like 'Do not cause death', 'Do not steal', 'Speak the truth'
(satyaṃ vada), Act righteously (dharmaṃ cara) etc. are of this kind. These
injunctions or courses of conduct are definitely laid down in the
Manu-Smṛti, and other Smṛtis, and in the Upaniṣads. But as man is a
rational animal, he is not satisfied with such didactic injunctions, and he
naturally feels a desire to understand the true reason why they were laid
down; and he naturally thinks over and finds out the eternal and
fundamental principle at the bottom of these rules of conduct.
Going to the bottom of worldly morality in this way, and finding
out the underlying fundamental principles, is the purpose of PHILOROPHY
(Śāstra); and merely putting together and mentioning the rules, is known as
ĀCĀRA-SAṂGRAHA. The code of rules of conduct (ācāra-saṃgraha) relating to
the Path of Action is to be found in the Smṛti texts; and the Bhagavadgītā
contains a conversational or Paurāṇika, but philosophical (śāstrīya)
disquisition on the fundamental principles of that code. Therefore, it is
more proper to say that the subject-matter of exposition in the Gītā is THE
SCIENCE OF KARMA-YOGA (Karma-Yoga-Śāstra), instead of saying that it is
KARMA-YOGA; and this word, that is, SCIENCE OF YOGA (YogaŚāstra) has been
used in the Gītā in the concluding portion of every chapter showing the end
of the chapter. This Science of Karma-Yoga in the Gītā has been called the
Science of Proper Conduct (sadvartana), the Science of Good Behaviour
(sadācāra), Philosophy of Ethics, Critique of Ethics, Elements of Ethics,
the Science of Duty, the Discernment of Right and Wrong, or the Science of
Sociology, by Western philosophers, who either do not believe in the life
after death, or consider it as inferior. These are merely Materialistic
names; and their way of criticising is also a purely Materialistic way.
Therefore, the majority of the persons who have read the books of such
Western writers think that Morality or Ethics has not been dealt with in
any work in Sanskrit literature.
The most profound philosophy in India is the Vedānta philosophy;
and if one considers our modern Vedānta works, they are seen to be
principally indifferent about worldly affairs. Then, how can we find in
them any consideration of Karma-Yoga or of Ethics? This subject-matter
cannot be dealt with in books on Grammar, or on Logic; and in the Smṛti
texts, one cannot find anything more- than a code of religious precepts.
Therefore, it is the common belief of many persons, that our ancient
writers, being steeped- in the deep contemplation of Release, have
forgotten to deal) with the subject-matter of Morality or Ethics. This
misunderstanding will be removed if one carefully considers the Mahabharata
or the Gītā. But, as the Mahābhārata is a very extensive work, it is very
difficult to read the whole of it and to give careful thought to the
subject matter in it; and: although the Gītā is small, yet, there is a
strong belief, that it deals only with the question of Release, on account
of the doctrine-supporting commentaries on it. But no one has taken the
trouble to think that the Path of Sanyasa and the Path of Karma-Yoga were
both in vogue in India from Vedic times; that the numbers following the
Path of Karma-Yoga were a thousand times greater than of those following
the Path of Sanyasa; and that the great and noble persons, whose lives have
been described in the Purāṇas, were supporters of Karma-Yoga. Then, was not
even one of these persons inclined to vindicate the Path of Karma-Yoga
followed by him? If it is said that there are no works on Karma-Yoga,
because all Spiritual Knowledge is confined to the Brahmin caste, and the
Vedāntist Brahmins are apathetic towards Action, that statement too would
be incorrect. Because, in the times of the Upaniṣads, and also afterwards,
there were Jñānins like Janaka and Śrī Kṛṣṇa among the Kṣatriyas; and even
learned Brahmins like Vyāsa, have written the biographies of great
Kṣatriyas. In writing these biographies, would, it not be necessary to
explain the key-note of the character and lives of those men? This key-note
was Karma-Yoga or the philosophy of worldly life; and in order to explain
this principle, subtle points of righteous or unrighteous conduct have been
dealt with in several places in the Mahābhārata, and ultimately the Gītā
has dealt with those principles of Ethics, which have been responsible for
the maintenance of the world, consistently with the view-point of Release.
There are also many such instances in the other Purāṇas. But, as all
other expositions on the subject turn pale by the side of the brilliance of
the Gītā, the Bhagavadgītā has become the most important work on the
philosophy of Karma-Yoga. I have dealt with the true nature of this
Karma-Yoga in the foregoing chapters. Yet, it cannot be said that this
exposition of the doctrine of the Gītā is complete, unless one compares the
ethical principles propounded by Western philosophers with the fundamental
spiritual principles of the Doable and the NotDoable enunciated in the
Gītā. In making this comparison, it is also necessary to compare the
Philosophy of the Absolute Self in the East with such philosophy in the
West. But the knowledge of the Absolute Self in the West has not gone much
beyond our knowledge. As this fact is commonly accepted, there is not much
of a necessity to compare the- Eastern metaphysical philosophy «with the
Western metaphysical philosophy;[2] and the only thing which remains is the
comparison of the Eastern with the Western science of Ethics or Karma-Yoga,
which science according to many has not been expounded by our philosophers.
But, the consideration of even this one subject is so comprehensive, that
it will be necessary to write an independent treatise in order to deal with
it exhaustively. Yet, as I did not consider it proper to omit this matter
altogether from this book on that account, I have touched upon only the
most salient and important points in that subject in this concluding
chapter.
As the words 'Righteousness' and 'Unrighteousness', or 'Morality'
and 'Immorality', can, strictly speaking, be applied only to the Actions of
intelligent beings, it can be realised, after even a little consideration,
that Morality does not rest only on Action, but rests on Reason. This is
what is meant by saying: "dharmo hi teṣāṃ adhiko viśeṣaḥ", i.e., "knowledge
of Right and Wrong is the specific quality of man, that is, of intelligent
beings". It is true that we refer to a bullock or to a river, as
mischievous or terrible respectively, having regard to the effect their
action or activity has on us; but if a bullock gives us a push, no one
files a suit against him; and if a river gets flooded and crops are washed
away, and thereby "great wrong to a great many persons" is caused, no one
on that account calls the river bad, or refers to it as a marauder. In
answer to this position, many object: once it is admitted that the rules of
Right and "Wrong apply only to the affairs of men, what is the objection to
considering the rightness or wrongness of the Action of men, merely from
the point of view of the Action? But even this question is not difficult to
answer. Because, even if one leaves aside lifeless objects or animals born
in the unenlightened species of birds or beasts, and considers only the
actions of human beings, yet, in as much as the wrongs committed by men in
a moment of insanity or unknowingly, are considered forgivable by people,
or even according to law, one has necessarily to consider, in the first
instance, the Reason of the doer, that is to say, the motive with which he
did the act, and whether or not he had realised the consequences of the
act, when one is determining the righteousness or the unrighteousness of
the doer. It is not difficult for a rich man to give large sums of money in
charity as he wishes. But although this his act may be 'good', yet, when
one has to decide the true moral value of it, such value cannot be
determined merely by considering the fact of this gift made in an off-hand
way. One has to consider whether or not the Reason of that rich person was
governed by religious faith (śraddhā); and, though, there may be no other
evidence except this off-hand charitable gift for coming to a decision on
that point, yet, the fact remains that no one looks upon this gift as of
the same moral value as another gift made by a person with religious faith;
at any rate there is room for doubt. At the end of the Mahābhārata, after
the entire question of righteousness and unrighteousness has been dealt
with, there is a story which very well brings out this position. In the
Aśvamedha sacrifice (yajña) made by Yudhiṣṭhira, when he ascended the
throne, millions of people were satisfied, and began to sing his praises
for the munificent gifts of food and other objects made by him. Then a
lustrous mongoose (nakula) came there and said to them: "All your praises
are useless. However great the Yajña made by Yudhiṣṭhira may be, it cannot
be equal in merit to that sacrifice which was made for a guest in former
days, in this very Kurukṣetra, by a poor Brahmin, who lived by uñchavṛtti,
that is, by gleaning grain left in the fields, and who gave all the sattu
food, which was spread out before himself and his wife and children, to a
hungry mendicant, who suddenly came to beg for alms, just when they were
about to start to eat, notwithstanding that he and they had been without
food for many days". (Śriman Mahābhārata Aśva. 90) The mouth and half the
body of this mongoose was of gold; and the reason given by him for saying
that the merit of the Yajña performed by Yudhiṣṭhira was less than the
merit acquired by the poor Brahmin, who had given one seer of sattu grain
to a mendicant was as follows: "I rolled about in the remnants of food left
over in the house of that Brahmin after the mendicant had partaken of it,
and on that account my mouth and half of my body has become golden; but
although I rolled about in the remnants of food left over after eating in
the pandal erected by Yudhiṣṭhira for the Yajña, the rest of my body has
not become golden". In this case, if one sees only what leads to 'the
greatest good of the greatest number', by taking into account only the
external effects of the Action, one will have to come to the conclusion,
that the merit of satisfying one hundred thousand mendicants is a hundred
thousand times more than the merit of satisfying one beggar.
But, will this conclusion be correct, not from the point of view of
religion merely, but even of morality? Acquiring a large amount of wealth,
or getting an opportunity of performing big acts for the benefit of others,
does not depend merely on anybody's virtuous conduct; and if one has to
consider the small act performed by the poor Brahmin according to his means
as of little ethical or religious merit, because it was not possible for
him to perform a large Yajña for want of money, one will have to come to
the conclusion that the poor need never entertain the hope of becoming
religious or moral like the rich. According to the principle of Freedom of
Will, keeping his mind pure was a matter within the control of the poor
Brahmin; and if there is no doubt that his charitable instinct was as pure
as that of Yudhiṣṭhira, then, notwithstanding the smallness of the act
performed by him, the ethical merit of this Brahmin and of the small act
performed by him, must be considered to be the same as that of Yudhiṣṭhira
and of the magnificent Yajña performed by him. Nay; from the fact that he
made a self-sacrifice by making. a gift of food in order to save the life
of a mendicant, not- withstanding that he himself was poor and without food
for many days, it follows that his Reason was purer than that of
Yudhiṣṭhira; because, it is a universally accepted fact that purity of
mind, like courage and other qualities, is truly proved only in times of
adversity; and even Kant has, in the beginning of his book on Ethics,
expressed an opinion that that man whose moral rectitude does not flinch
even in times of adversity is the truly moral man. The same thing is
conveyed by what was said by the mongoose. But the purity of the heart of
Yudhiṣṭhira had been tested not only by the Yajña performed by him after he
had ascended the throne, that is, in times of prosperity, but also before
that, that is, on many trying occasions, in adverse circumstances, just as
in the case of the Brahmin; and as the proposition of the writer of the
Mahābhārata was, that Yudhiṣṭhira was morally great, even according to the
subtle law relating to righteous and unrighteous conduct laid down above,
he has called the mongoose a 'reviler'. Still, from the statement in the
Mahābhārata that that Brahmin attained the same final state which is
reached by people who perform the Aśvamedha Yajña, it follows that though
the merit of the act of the Brahmin might not, in the opinion of the writer
of the Mahābhārata, have been greater than that of the Yajña of
Yudhiṣṭhira, yet, he certainly looked upon the ethical or religious merit
of both as at least the same. Even in ordinary life, we follow the same
principle, and consider the moral merit of a millionaire giving a thousand
rupees for a pious object, as the same as that of a poor man who gives one
rupee by way of subscription.
It is likely that this illustration might be considered by some as new, on
account of the use of the word 'subscription'; I, therefore, say that in
the exposition of Morality and Immorality made in the Mahābhārata, while
the story of the mongoose was being told, it is said:–
sahasraśaktiś ca śataṃ śataśaktir daśāpi ca |
dadyād apaś ca yaḥ śaktyā sarve tulyaphalāḥ smṛtāḥ ||
(Śriman Mahābhārata Aśva.90.97),
That is, "a man who owns a thousand giving a hundred, a man who owns a
hundred giving ten, or someone according to his ability giving only a drink
of water, all these (acts) are of the same merit, and equally beneficial";
And the same is the purport conveyed by the sentence,
patraṃ puṣpaṃ phalaṃ toyaṃ etc. (Bhagavadgītā 9.26),
I.e., "a leaf, a flower, a fruit, or even water"—(Translator.), in the Gītā.
This principle has been adopted not only in our religion but also in the
Christian religion. The Lord Christ has said in one place that: "For unto
whomsoever much is given, of him shall be much required" (Luke. 12.48); and
there is a statement in another place in the Bible, that one day, when the
Lord Christ had gone to church and the work of collecting funds for
charitable purposes was going on, He said:–"Verily I say unto to you, that
this poor widow hath cast more in, than all they, which have cast into the
treasury" (Mark. 12.43 and 44), on seeing an extremely poor widow giving
both the pice which she had, in charity. This clearly proves that even the
Lord Christ had accepted the position that the merit of an act has to be
determined by reference to the Reason of the doer; and that when the Reason
of the doer is pure, even a small act is very often of the same ethical
merit as a larger act. If one considers the effect of the impurity of the
Reason on the moral merit of an Action, in the opposite case, that is, when
the Reason is not pure, it will be seen that killing in self-defence a man
who has attacked you for murdering you, and killing a rich traveller for
the sake of his money, are ethically entirely different, though the act of
killing is the same in both the cases. The German poet Schiller has
described a similar incident towards the end of his drama William Tell; and
the distinction which has been made by him there between two externally
exact actions, on account of the purity or the impurity of the Reason, is
the difference between the 'abandonment of self- interest' (svārtha-tyāga)
and the 'destruction of self-interest' (svārthahatyā). This shows that
whether the two acts are unequal or are equal to each other, the difference
between them, from the point of view of Morality, arises from the
difference between the motives of the doers. This 'motive' is also known,
as 'Intention', 'Desire', or 'Reason'; because, although the scientific
meaning of the word 'Reason' is the 'Discerning, organ', yet, as
'Knowledge', 'Desire', and 'Intention' are all the results of the activity
of this mental organ, it is usual to also refer to all these as 'Reason';
and as has been stated before, the Equable Reason of the Sthitaprajña is a
combination of the steadiness of Pure Reason and the purity of Practical
Reason. The Blessed Lord did not ask Arjuna to consider how many persons
would be benefited or how many persons ruined by the war being carried on.
On the other hand,. the Blessed Lord has said, "Whether Bhīṣma will die or
Droṇa will die as a result of the carrying on of the war, is a minor
consideration; the principal question is with what frame of Reason you are
going to enter the fight; and if your Reason is like that of a
Sthitaprajña, you will incur no sin if Bhīṣma and Droṇa are killed while
you are performing your duty with that pure and untarnished Reason. You are
not fighting with a Hope of Fruit in the shape of causing the death of
Bhīṣma. You have only asked for a share of that kingdom to which you have
acquired a right by birth; in order to avoid the war, you, have not failed
to take it lying down as much as possible, and have even tried conciliatory
ambassadors; but when you saw that this course of propriety and of
gentleness was of no avail, you have started the war, as there was no other
alternative. For this, you are not to blame at all; because, it is your
duty, to acquire these rights ultimately by fight, if necessary, in the
interests of public welfare, according to the religion of Kṣatriyas,
instead of wasting time in begging like a Brahmin, (Śriman Mahābhārata U.
28 and 72; and Vanaparva 33.48 and 50)". Accepting this logical reasoning
of the Blessed Lord, Vyāsa has satisfied Yudhiṣṭhira later on in the
Śāntiparva (Śān. Ch. 32 and 33). But though the Reason is thus considered
to be the superior factor in deciding what is right and what is wrong, it
becomes necessary to explain what is meant by Pure Reason; because, as both
the Mind and the Reason are evolutes (vikāra) of Matter (prakṛti), they can
inherently be of three kinds, that is sāttvika (static), rājasa (active)
and tāmasa (ignorant). Therefore, the Gītā has said that, that Reasoning
Faculty which Realises the Form of the permanent Ātman, which (Ātman) is
beyond the cognizance of Reason, which (form) is common to all created
things, is to be called the pure or the sāttvika Reason in the Philosophy
of Karma-Yoga. The sāttvika Reason is also known as the Equable Reason; and
the word 'Equable' means "which recognises and Realises the unity or
identity of the Ātman which inhabits all created things". That Reason which
does not Realise this identity, is neither pure, nor sāttvika. When one has
thus decided that this Equability of Reason is the most important factor in
determining questions of Morality, the next question which naturally arises
is, how to recognise this evenness or Equability of Reason; because, as the
Reason is an internal organ, one cannot see by one's eyes whether it is
good or bad. Therefore, in order to find out whether or not the Reason is
pure and equable, one must in the first instance consider the external
Actions of the man; otherwise, a man will by his mouth say that his Reason
is pure and equable, and by his hands do whatever he likes. Therefore, the
Śāstras have laid down the proposition that the true Knower of the Brahman
has to be recognised by considering his nature; arid that if he is a mere
talker, he is not a true saint. In describing the characteristics of the
Sthitaprajña or of the Devotee of the Blessed Lord, the Bhagavadgītā
principally describes how such persons behave in the world towards other
people; and in the thirteenth chapter, 'Jñāna' (Knowledge) has also been
defined in the same way, that is, by explaining the effect of Jñāna on a
man's nature. From this it will be seen, that the Gītā does not say that
one need not at all consider the external Actions of a man. But, although
behaviour, that is to say, external Action, and principally external Action
in times of adversity, has to be considered in order to test whether the
Reason of any particular person–and specially of another person–is or is
not Equable, yet, we must also bear in mind, that we cannot come to a
faultless conclusion as to the morality of a person merely from his
external behaviour. Because, although under certain circumstances, an
external Action may be small, yet, its moral value is as high as that of a
big act, as will be proved from the story of the mongoose mentioned above.
Therefore, our Śāstras have laid down that (i) whether the external act is
big or small, and whether it is beneficial to one person or brings
happiness to many persons, that cannot be given higher importance than as
being an evidence of a pure Reason; that (ii) after deciding to what extent
the Reason of the doer is or is not pure, by considering this external
Action, one has ultimately to decide the morality or otherwise of such
Action, by reference to the purity of Reason to be ascertained in this way;
and that (iii) questions of Morality cannot be properly decided merely by
considering external Actions. And, that is why the Equable and Pure Reason,
that is, Desire, has been given a high place in the Karma-Yoga in the Gītā,
by saying that "the Reason is superior to the Action" (2.49).
In the book on the Bhāgavata religion called Nārada Pañcarātra, which is
later in date that the Gītā, Mārkaṇḍeya says to Nārada:
mānasaṃ prāṇinām eva sarvakarmaikakāraṇam |
manonurūpaṃ vākyaṃ ca vākyena prasphutaṃ manaḥ || (Nā. Pañ. 1.7.18).
That is, "the Mind is the only cause (the root cause) of all the Actions of
mankind. As the Mind is, so does the man speak; a man's Mind expresses
itself in what he says".
In short, the Mind (that is, the determination of the Mind) comes first,
and then all Actions take place. Therefore, Buddhist writers have also
accepted the doctrine of the Gītā relating to Pure Reason for
distinguishing between the Doable and the Not-doable.
K Rajaram IRS 11025
On Tue, 30 Sept 2025 at 19:20, Markendeya Yeddanapudi <
[email protected]> wrote:
>
>
> --
> *Mar*Altruism
>
>
>
> Altruism is the personal characteristic of empathizing and giving help.
> The person feels intensely the suffering of another. He/She breathes,
> smells, senses, perceives, understands…, and jumps to give help, as the
> suffering of the other intrudes into him/her because of breathing and
> smelling. When the air is not poisoned altruism becomes the basic feature
> of all life forms, in the most undarwinian way. Courage and altruism go
> together. Courage means free breathing without inhibitions. It is not the
> advertisement stunt of a publicity crazed maniac, as basically the very
> quality of courage is removed by industrial pollution.
>
> Today courage is another cosmetic cover of advertizing. When there is no
> free breathing because of pollution, when breathing is poisoned and
> inhibited, there is simply no courage to breathe.
>
> Desperate and unthinking attacks by maniacs are misrepresented as
> courage. Or the maniac becomes maniacal by intoxicating drinks. Or the
> maniac may be brainwashed by Talibanic bludgeoning. Courage or Altruism is
> the quality of giving help without inhibitions as breathing is free and
> spiritualizing or energizing. The air will be spirit and not a poisonous
> fume.
>
> Today air as spirit has vanished. We have electronics that is adulterating
> the troposphere. We no longer enjoy conversation. We can only speak into a
> cell phone. We cannot bear breathing, smelling, sensing, perceiving and in
> understanding and interacting. We cannot tolerate any personal presence. We
> want to be distant as distant as possible, as bodily nearness creates
> tension.
>
> Altruism or the urge to serve propels one to work in dirt or shit or
> poison and one does not feel degraded by dirt. But today how many of us can
> work in stinking pollutions driven by empathy? We cannot bear the personal
> presence of any living organism at all; we want only the electronic gadgets.
>
> The fact is, we are running away from the air as it has been poisoned.
>
> YM Sarma
>
> Chat gpt
>
> This reflective piece by YM Sarma is a passionate, poetic critique of
> modernity, environmental degradation, and the loss of human connection.
> Here's a brief analysis and interpretation of the key themes:
> ------------------------------
>
> *🔍 Core Themes & Ideas*
>
> *1. Altruism as a Natural, Empathic Impulse*
>
> - *Altruism* is defined not as a virtue to be learned, but as an
> *instinctive
> reaction*—a deeply human, even biological, response to suffering.
> - It's framed as *sensory*: we "breathe, smell, sense" another's pain,
> and that visceral closeness compels action.
> - This view is anti-Darwinian in the sense that it challenges the
> "survival of the fittest" model, suggesting that true life thrives not
> through competition but through *empathetic cooperation*.
>
> *2. Pollution and Loss of Courage*
>
> - Courage, in this essay, is *linked to breathing*—to openness, to
> unfiltered engagement with the world.
> - Industrial pollution becomes a metaphor and a literal cause of
> spiritual and emotional suffocation. When the air is poisoned, so is our
> capacity for courageous, altruistic acts.
> - The *free breath*—a symbol of vitality, freedom, and connection—is
> stifled by a toxic atmosphere.
>
> *3. Modern Society and Technological Alienation*
>
> - Modern technology (especially electronic gadgets and mobile phones)
> is portrayed as furthering our *disconnection from others* and from
> nature.
> - We *avoid physical proximity*, as closeness now produces anxiety
> rather than empathy.
> - The essay argues that *our addiction to devices* is not just a habit
> but a symptom of a deeper spiritual malaise—our inability to endure
> presence, smell, and direct interaction.
>
> *4. Degradation of True Altruism and Mislabeling of Violence*
>
> - Modern society *misrepresents violence or mania as courage*,
> distorting the true meaning of altruism.
> - Acts that may seem bold or radical are often born of *desperation,
> intoxication, or ideological brainwashing*—not genuine courage rooted
> in empathy.
>
> ------------------------------
>
> *🌱 Underlying Philosophy*
>
> This is a deeply *ecological and spiritual critique*—suggesting that the
> degradation of the environment is inseparable from the degradation of human
> morality, empathy, and social bonds.
>
> The *air* is symbolic:
>
> - It is the medium through which we connect.
> - It carries the *"spirit"* of life, vitality, and mutual
> understanding.
> - When it is poisoned, both literally and figuratively, it poisons
> relationships, courage, altruism, and even our *capacity for love*.
>
> ------------------------------
>
> *🧠 Questions This Text Raises*
>
> - Can true altruism exist in a world where the environment is toxic
> and sensory engagement is diminished?
> - How does the modern technological environment *shape or inhibit our
> ethical instincts*?
> - Is *restoring nature* also a path toward restoring *moral and
> spiritual health*?
>
> ------------------------------
>
> *✍**️ Final Thoughts*
>
> YM Sarma offers a stark and emotionally charged reflection that blends
> environmentalism, spirituality, and social critique. His central thesis is
> that altruism, courage, and empathy are not just ethical choices—they are
> *existential
> necessities* rooted in the natural, sensory life of the body and the
> world. When that connection is lost, so is our humanity.
>
> Would you like help adapting this into a summary, a response, or another
> form—like a discussion prompt or visual interpretation?
>
> Certainly. Let’s evaluate YM Sarma’s original essay *“Altruism”* as
> though it were submitted in an academic or reflective writing context — for
> example, a college-level humanities or philosophy course. I’ll assess it
> based on common criteria: *Content & Ideas, Structure & Organization,
> Language & Style, Originality, and Mechanics (grammar, punctuation,
> clarity).*
> ------------------------------
> 📄 *Evaluation of the Essay: "Altruism" by YM Sarma*
> ------------------------------
> 1. *Content & Ideas (20 marks)*
>
> *Score: 17/20*
>
> *Strengths:*
>
> · Rich philosophical content and strong emotional engagement.
>
> · Presents a *unique, thought-provoking thesis*: altruism is tied
> to the purity of air, sensory experience, and courage.
>
> · Brings in *social, ecological, and psychological* dimensions,
> offering a holistic critique of modern society.
>
> *Areas to Improve:*
>
> · Some *ideas are loosely connected*, and could benefit from
> clearer elaboration.
>
> · The point about electronics adulterating the troposphere, while
> poetic, would benefit from clarification or support.
> ------------------------------
> 2. *Structure & Organization (15 marks)*
>
> *Score: 10/15*
>
> *Strengths:*
>
> · Paragraphs flow thematically from altruism to pollution to
> modern alienation.
>
> *Areas to Improve:*
>
> · Lack of *clear transitions* between sections.
>
> · No *introductory or concluding paragraph* to frame the essay
> properly.
>
> · Some repetition of ideas (e.g. pollution, avoidance of personal
> presence) that could be condensed or reorganized.
> ------------------------------
> 3. *Language & Style (20 marks)*
>
> *Score: 14/20*
>
> *Strengths:*
>
> · Highly *poetic and evocative* use of language.
>
> · Vivid metaphors: e.g., “air as spirit,” “advertising stunt of a
> publicity crazed maniac.”
>
> *Areas to Improve:*
>
> · Occasionally *obscure or abstract*—can alienate readers who
> aren’t already familiar with the philosophical or ecological context.
>
> · Some *awkward phrasing* and syntactical choices make
> comprehension difficult.
>
> · Needs *greater clarity* in expressing complex ideas.
> ------------------------------
> 4. *Originality & Insight (25 marks)*
>
> *Score: 22/25*
>
> *Strengths:*
>
> · *Very original* interpretation of altruism, linking it to
> breath, pollution, and technology.
>
> · Offers *insightful social commentary* that challenges dominant
> narratives (e.g., courage as media spectacle).
>
> *Areas to Improve:*
>
> · A few points (e.g., "electronics adulterating the troposphere")
> verge on *hyperbole or lack clear explanation*, weakening their power.
> ------------------------------
> 5. *Mechanics (Grammar, Punctuation, Clarity) (20 marks)*
>
> *Score: 13/20*
>
> *Strengths:*
>
> · Grammar is mostly correct; the tone matches the reflective
> nature of the piece.
>
> *Areas to Improve:*
>
> · Some *run-on sentences*, *missing articles*, and *inconsistent
> punctuation*.
>
> · *Clarity* suffers at times due to complex constructions and
> lack of breaks between ideas.
>
> · More *editing or proofreading* could enhance readability.
> ------------------------------
> 🧾 *Total Score: 76/100*
> ------------------------------
> 🎓 *Grade: B+*
> ------------------------------
> 📘 *Overall Comments:*
>
> YM Sarma’s essay is a *passionate, intellectually rich*, and *emotionally
> resonant* reflection on the nature of altruism in a polluted,
> technology-driven world. The central metaphor—*that pure breath is
> essential for true empathy and courage*—is both original and powerful.
> However, the *lack of formal structure*, *occasional abstraction*, and
> *stylistic
> imprecision* hold it back from achieving top marks.
>
> With *better organization*, *clearer development of ideas*, and *more
> careful editing*, this could be elevated to an *A-grade philosophical
> essay*.
> ------------------------------
>
> Would you like help rewriting or polishing this into a version that could
> get an A+?
>
>
>
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