The Concept of Emotion in Indian Philosophy
OUR PHILOSOPHY WANTS TO CROSS THE SAMSARA RIVER FROM ONE SIDE OF
EMOTIONS TO BANKS OF THE OTHERSIDE GNANA THROUGH THE UNDERSTANDING.VIZ
RIGHT UNDERSTANDING WHICH MEANS EMOTION OF HEART AND THAT OF ELEVATING
THROUGH THE MIND IS ROGHT WAY TO LIVE. AND THE WHOLE OF b g SPEAKS ONLY
ABOUT THE DISTINCTION OF LIVING IN BETWEEN EMOTIONS REASONS AND
UNDERSTANDING .IT IS NOT QUESTION OF RIGHT OR/AND WRONG. ONE HAS TO PASS
THROUGH IN STAGES. THAT IS WHY HIDUISM IS UNIVERSAL UNLIKE WEST DEDUCTIONS
WHICH KEEP CHANGING. AND WALKING AND CRAWLING TO TRUTH.
In Indian literature, emotions are discussed in several different contexts:
first, within aesthetics (*rasa*). The word *rasa* can mean juice, sap,
essence, condiment or even flavour and refers to the different sentiments
invoked by a work of art, for example a piece of music. Secondly, emotions
are discussed within the context of the *bhakti* (devotional) movement.
Here particular emphasis is placed on cultivating the emotion of love for a
supreme being, e.g., Śiva. Thirdly, they are discussed in various tantric
traditions. These traditions form a counterbalance to the ascetic ideal of
classical philosophical texts (fourth context in which emotions are
discussed) in that they encourage “living out” emotions (and desires)
without forming any attachment to them. This entry focuses on the emotions
in this fourth context, namely classical Indian philosophical thinking,
which includes Brahmanical as well as Buddhist texts, among others. While
there is no equivalent for the term “emotion” in Sanskrit, the concept
nevertheless plays an important role in Indian philosophy. Terms used in
Sanskrit texts include *vedanā* (feeling) and *bhāva* (feeling) as well as
names of individual emotions, such as *rāga* (love, attraction),
*dveṣa* (hatred,
aversion), *harṣa* (joy), *bhaya* (fear) and *śoka* (sorrow). One of the
reasons why emotions are philosophically interesting in India and the West
is their relationship with the mental phenomenon of *vijñāna* or *jñāna* which
is translated as “cognition”. The relationship between emotion and
cognition is important for any account of reason and rationality. While the
importance of the emotions for rational deliberation and decision-making
has been acknowledged in recent discussions in the philosophy of mind, the
history of Western philosophy contains many views, for example those of
Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, which emphasize the dangerous and
destructive role of the emotions. At the heart of these views lies a
division of our mental lives into cognitions and feelings. Cognitions are
representational thoughts. They are often regarded as rational because they
are capable of representing the external world and therefore they provide
us with access to the external world, based on the best available evidence. So,
according to this view of rationality, when I think that there is a book on
the table, based on my available evidence, and there really is one, then my
thought is rational. However, if I am hallucinating that there is a book on
the table, my thought that there is a book might also be rational because
the available evidence points towards this thought. In order to make sure
that our thoughts represent reality correctly, we require an account of
what counts as good evidence, which is one of the main foci of epistemology
in Indian and Western philosophy. Nevertheless, cognitions derive their
status as thoughts capable of rationality from the fact that they have
objects which represent the external world. By contrast, feelings are some
of the non-representational attitudes one can have towards the objects of
the representations of our thoughts. For example, when a person thinks
about her daughters, she has a cognition which represents her daughters.
The objects of her thought are her daughters and her thought pick them out
among various objects and subjects in the world. There are several ways in
which these objects can be picked out: one can simply have the thought that
one has two daughters or one’s thought can be “coloured” with love and
affection. This “colouring” of thought is often regarded as an affect.
Together with the thought, it accounts for an emotion. So, the emotion of
love, for example, is the thought of the object of love plus an affect. The
affect is non-representational and regarded as a “mere” feeling.
The reason why many philosophers regard the emotions as an obstacle to
rational thought is the influence of the non-representational feeling. The
fact that feelings do not seem to have objects means, according to some
views, that they can interfere with rational thought. According to these
views, rational thought, which is representational and therefore
object-directed, is subject to disturbing interferences from the feelings.
The feelings themselves, however, are non-rational because they arise due
to some physical imbalance in the body, for example through an imbalance of
the various “humours”. This imbalance can negatively influence rational
thought. An example is the person who acts against her better judgment
because she is in the grip of some feeling. This is of course also the
basis for the term “passion” as something that we “suffer”, which was
discussed by many philosophers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
e.g., Descartes, Spinoza and Hume. Since rational thought is an ideal for
many philosophers and the feelings can interfere with this ideal, the
natural consequence seems to be to advocate for the extinction or at least
the control of the feelings and, as a consequence, of the emotions. This is
what many philosophers throughout the history of philosophy have done, most
notably of course the Stoics. While they often recognize that the emotions
contain a cognitive, and therefore potentially rational, element, they try
to uncover this element by advocating its separation from the affect. Of
course, if the affect were to be purged from the emotion, the resulting
cognition would cease to be an emotion.
------------------------------
1. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika account of the emotions
The discussion of this account will focus on the *Nyāya-sūtras*,
Vātsyāyana’s *Nyāya-bhāṣya*, Uddyotakara’s *Nyāya-vārttika* and Jayanta
Bhaṭṭa’s *Nyāya-mañjarī*. In addition, the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* together with
Śaṅkara Miśra’s *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra-upaskāra* will be mentioned. The
Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika account of the emotions involves a strict division into
cognition (*jñāna*) and mental phenomena that include a feeling aspect,
such as love or attraction (*rāga*) and aversion (*dveṣa*). One of the main
reasons for this is the acceptance of the existence of a permanent
immaterial self (*ātman*) by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers. According to
their arguments, the *ātman* is a substance (*dravya*) which possesses
several qualities (*guṇas*), such as cognition, desire, effort, aversion,
pleasure and pain. This enumeration shows that there is no common Sanskrit
term for the concept “emotion” in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika texts. One general
term used is *saṃvedana* which translates as “feeling”, for example
*sukha-saṃvedana* (feeling of pleasure).
The important aspect of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika account is that the individual
emotions, such as attachment and aversion are regarded as defects (*doṣas *NV
1.1.22 mentions one exception, namely the desire for eternal pleasure and
absence from pain which is final liberation. While, strictly speaking, a
desire is not an emotion, it usually has the same negative effect because
it results in attachment to the object of desire. The desire for eternal
pleasure, however, is not detrimental to liberation; in fact it is a
precondition for liberation. Another reason why cognition is an important
quality is that it is not necessarily a defect whereas the other qualities
are always defects. The defects fall into 3 groups: i) attraction (*rāga*),
ii) aversion (*dveṣa*) and iii) illusion (*moha*) [NS 4.1.3]. Among the
first group we find love, selfishness and greed. The second group includes
anger, jealousy, envy, malice and resentment. The Third group encompasses
error, suspicion, pride and negligence. These groupings show that,
according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika account, there are no positive emotions.
Even love, which is regarded as a positive emotion in many cultures, is
ultimately a defect because all emotions lead to attachment and error.
2. The Vedānta account of the emotions
In his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtras*, Śaṃkara makes the well-known
argument that the self (*ātman*) exists because its existence is the only
way to account for the idea of a subject of experience. This argument
relies on the idea that the self has certain mental qualities, which are
termed *manas* (mind), *buddhi* (intellect), *vijñāna* (cognition) or
*citta* (consciousness), depending on what mental function is ascribed to
them. Different mental functions are doubt, resolution, egoism or
recollection [BSBh 2.4.6]. These mental functions, regardless of how they
are referred to, have several qualities or modifications, including desire,
imagination, doubt, faith, want of faith, memory, forgetfulness, shame,
reflection and fear [BSBh 2.3.32] as well as love, aversion, pleasure and
pain [BSBh 2.3.29]. This means that, according to Śaṃkara, the mind’s
cognitive and emotional abilities are the qualities of our mental
functioning which is different from the self.
At the heart of Śaṃkara’s teaching lies the notion that the true knowledge
of the *ātman* is knowledge that is devoid of any of the above-mentioned
qualities. In this respect one can find a similarity between the Nyāya
school and Śaṃkara because for both of them cognitive and emotional
qualities are due to false knowledge or ignorance of the true self. This
means that the removal of ignorance results in a removal of emotions as
well as cognitions. However, it is clear that the emotions present the main
obstacle for the realization of the true self because desire and aversion
lead to attachment and clinging which cause us to neglect the search for
liberation that is crucial to Vedānta teaching. So, while Śaṃkara
distinguishes between what Western philosophers would call cognitions and
emotions, he does not present a purely cognitive state of mind without
emotions as the ideal state of mind because such a state would be
impossible. By definition, any purely cognitive state of mind presupposes
the existence of a mind or intellect. For Śaṃkara, however, the problem is
that a mind will always have certain qualities that would be called emotive
in Western philosophy, such as desire, aversion, hatred, pleasure or pain.
So, as long there are cognitions, there will also be emotions. Therefore,
both must be eliminated in order for the self to attain liberation. On this
point, Śaṃkara agrees with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers. While Śaṃkara
distinguishes between emotions and cognitions, his distinction is not as
pronounced as that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers. He regards both as
qualities of the mind or intellect.
3. The Sāṃkhya-Yoga account of the emotions
Unlike the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Vedānta accounts of the emotions, the
Sāṃkhya-Yoga account does not draw a fundamental distinction between
feelings and cognitions. The reason for this is that the Sāṃkhya account
rests on the division between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. The former is pure
consciousness and does not contain any cognitions or feelings whereas
*prakṛti* is primordial matter and has the three qualities (*guṇas*)
*sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, which are aligned with different feelings:
*sattva* with pleasure (*sukha*), *rajas* with pain (*duḥkha*) and *tamas* with
confusion or illusion (*moha*). The terms *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* are
difficult to translate but are sometimes rendered as “reflection”,
“activity” and “inertia”. The important point about this dualist structure
for the emotions is that, according to the Sāṃkhya account, both cognition
and feeling belong to the realm of *prakṛti* which means that they are
material. This stands in contrast to many dualist accounts in the history
of Western philosophy, for example that of Descartes, according to which
cognitions are immaterial whereas emotions or passions are material, thus
making it easier to oppose the two. Larson and Bhattacharya (1987)
summarize the difference between Western and Sāṃkhya dualism in the
following way:
[A]ccording to Sāṃkhya philosophy, the experiences of intellect, egoity,
and mind, and the “raw feels” such as frustration or satisfaction—or, in
other words, what conventional dualists would consider to be “inherently
private”—are simply subtle reflections of primordial materiality, a
primordial materiality undergoing continuous transformation by means of its
constituent unfolding as spontaneous activity, reflective discerning, and
determinate formulation. Thus, the modern reductive materialists’ claim
that “sensations are identical with certain brain processes” would have a
peculiar counterpart in the Sāṃkhya claim that “awarenesses” [Sanskrit
terms omitted] are identical with certain *guṇa* modalities. (Larson and
Bhattacharya 1987, p. 76)
Cognitions, emotions and kleśas
In what follows, these questions are addressed briefly in reverse order.
The second question raises the general problem of the translatability of
the concept of feeling or emotion into Sanskrit. As mentioned in the
introduction, there is no general term in Sanskrit for emotion and
Śāntarakṣita uses the expression “love and hatred etc.” (*rāga-dveṣa* +
*ādi*). In the translation, Jha has taken the “etc.” as referring to other
feelings, assuming that Śāntarakṣita was operating with a psychological
category such as “feeling”. However, there is no single word in the text
which would translate as feeling every time it appears in the translation.
In fact, it is clear that Śāntarakṣita does not mean “feelings” in the
sense of non-representational attitudes towards objects because love and
hatred have objects according to him, albeit mental objects. Since
Śāntarakṣita remains within the context of Buddhist psychology and clearly
refers to Dharmakīrti, it is plausible that he means “other *kleśas*”
instead of “other feelings” because love and hatred are *kleśas* and have
objects.
In this context, it is also important to discuss the translation of the
term *vijñāna* as “cognition”. Both terms refer to a mental phenomenon that
provides knowledge. This means that they refer to a state of affairs that
pertains in the world. Both terms presuppose an external or mental object
they are directed towards. One important difference between these two
terms, which shows the difficulty with translating *vijñāna* as cognition,
is that, according to Śāntarakṣita, a *vijñāna* always has an object but it
does not have to have conceptual content. In this sense, even a sensation
or feeling, such as the sensation of pleasure, is a *vijñāna* because it
has an object but lacks conceptual content, according to Śāntarakṣita. The
sensation has an object because it provides knowledge about mental states
and therefore has to have an object of knowledge. However, this object is
not conceptual. So, according to Śāntarakṣita, a *vijñāna* includes
affective mental states, such as feelings, sensations and emotions and
therefore *kleśas*. The Western term “cognition”, by contrast, excludes
affective mental states.
In Western discussions of this topic, feelings are very often
associated with some physical change, such as a quicker heartbeat or a
change in the chemical make up of the brain. For this reason, emotions are
very often regarded as providing some link between the mental and the
physical. Śāntarakṣita mentions this link between feeling and physical
changes in TS 1960. He claims that phlegm (*balāsa*) and other bodily
changes are not responsible for love, hatred or perturbations through
sexual arousal because there is no observed concomitance between them.
While this claim might be true with regard to phlegm, it is obviously false
with regard to other physical changes, especially changes in the brain.
However, it would be wrong to completely dismiss Śāntarakṣita’s argument
simply because he turned out to be wrong about this empirical claim. After
all, the argument raises important questions about the status of mental
phenomena, such as love and hatred.
BHAGAVAT GHITA KENO KATHO UPANISHASDS
As I had written so many times verses may be seen connecting every
words described above.
Conclusion
A number of themes emerge from this overview: 1) The Western categories of
“cognition” and “emotion” do not have equivalents in classical Indian
philosophy. This is interesting because it suggests that these concepts are
not psychological categories but perhaps social categories. 2) One common
theme in classical Indian philosophy is that the phenomena that would be
labelled as “emotions” in Western philosophy are to be eradicated because
they prevent liberation. 3) None of the Indian philosophical schools aim at
“emotion-free” cognitions as an end in itself. In fact, those states that
would be labelled “cognitions” in Western philosophy are also to be
eradicated because they also prevent liberation. 4) Indian schools differ
over the inclusion of feeling states under the concept of *vijñāna*
(cognition).
Some schools distinguish between feeling states and *vijñāna* whereas
others, most notably Buddhists, do not. This last point suggests that there
is an interesting comparison to be made between Buddhist accounts and
cognitive accounts of the emotions. However, any comparison must be
sensitive to the difficulties in translating the concepts involved.
K Rajaram IRS 22625
On Sun, 22 Jun 2025 at 08:24, Markendeya Yeddanapudi <
[email protected]> wrote:
>
>
> --
> *Mar*Great question! You’ve touched on some really important points about
> the nature of *scientific evidence* and the relationship between
> machines, statistics, perception, and emotions. Let’s break it down:
> What is scientific evidence?
>
> At its core, *scientific evidence* refers to the data and observations
> that support or refute a hypothesis, theory, or claim. It typically comes
> from:
>
> 1.
>
> *Experiments*: Controlled environments where variables are manipulated
> to observe outcomes.
> 2.
>
> *Observations*: Data collected through observation, often in natural
> settings or through measurements.
> 3.
>
> *Statistics*: The mathematical analysis of data, which helps determine
> whether an observed effect is significant or due to chance.
> 4.
>
> *Peer Review*: The process by which other experts in the field
> scrutinize and validate findings before they are accepted as part of the
> scientific body of knowledge.
>
> The role of *machines* or technology in this process is critical in
> modern science. Machines can help gather vast amounts of data, model
> complex phenomena, and even detect things that are too small, too fast, or
> too far to see with human eyes (like particles at the quantum level or
> signals from distant galaxies). But machines are not the *deciders*—humans
> interpret the data.
> Can there be trustworthy evidence without emotions?
>
> This is a nuanced question. In science, *objective* reasoning is the
> goal, and emotions are typically kept out of the data analysis itself. For
> instance, statistical models, machine analysis, and controlled experiments
> are designed to minimize biases and emotional influences. But the
> *interpretation* of evidence, especially when it involves the broader
> implications of the data, can be influenced by human perception, values,
> and emotions.
>
> Humans bring their experiences, cognitive frameworks, and biases to the
> table when interpreting evidence. For example, in a medical study, even if
> the statistical evidence points to the efficacy of a new drug, the
> societal, ethical, or emotional context might influence how that evidence
> is applied or communicated.
>
> *So can understanding exist without emotion?*
> Not entirely. Emotions, in a way, shape how we perceive the world and
> assign meaning to what we observe. Even in science, emotions play a role in
> motivation (curiosity, awe, excitement) and in how we prioritize certain
> areas of research. The need to *understand* often arises from a mix of
> intellectual curiosity and personal or societal emotional drives (like
> wanting to solve a problem, help others, or explain the mysteries of
> existence).
> The problem of invisible connections and the limits of perception:
>
> You raised a good point about not being able to see 99.9965% of
> "totality"—this likely refers to things like dark matter, quantum
> phenomena, or other aspects of the universe that are invisible or
> inaccessible to our direct senses. Scientific evidence in such cases often
> comes from indirect measurements, mathematical modeling, and statistical
> inference. *We trust that certain things exist or behave in specific ways
> based on patterns observed in the data*, even if we can't directly
> experience them.
>
> In such cases, science relies on:
>
> 1.
>
> *Models*: These are approximations of reality that try to explain the
> underlying structures or behaviors that are not directly observable.
> 2.
>
> *Correlation and causation*: Often in science, even if we cannot *see*
> a phenomenon directly, we can observe its effects. For example, we cannot
> see gravity directly, but we can observe its effects on objects.
> 3.
>
> *Mathematical consistency*: The beauty of many scientific theories is
> that they can predict phenomena that have not yet been directly observed,
> based on the consistency of their underlying mathematics (e.g., the
> predictions of general relativity before confirming black holes).
>
> How do emotions tie into this?
>
> *Emotions are part of human perception*, and human perception is how we
> make sense of the world. We cannot fully extricate ourselves from emotional
> states, biases, or cognitive filters when understanding scientific
> phenomena. But we strive to minimize the influence of emotion in formal
> scientific inquiry. That’s why things like double-blind trials, statistical
> significance, and peer review are so important: they reduce personal bias
> and emotional influence.
> Summary:
>
> -
>
> *Scientific evidence* is based on data gathered through observation,
> experimentation, and analysis, with an emphasis on objectivity and
> repeatability.
> -
>
> Machines play a significant role in collecting and analyzing data, but
> humans interpret the results.
> -
>
> Emotions and personal biases affect how we interpret evidence, but
> science tries to minimize their influence in order to arrive at objective
> conclusions.
> -
>
> While we might not be able to see everything (e.g., dark matter or
> quantum phenomena), scientific evidence can still be based on indirect
> observations, mathematical modeling, and statistical reasoning.
> -
>
> Understanding without emotion is impossible in human terms. Emotion
> and perception shape how we approach and internalize knowledge, even in
> fields as "objective" as science.
>
> Would you say that the role of emotion in interpreting scientific evidence
> is something you find more of an issue, or do you think it’s a natural part
> of how we make sense of complex phenomena?
>
> --
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> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/society4servingseniors/CACDCHCJ4V7d%3Dnz%2Bb-dezCNAdSZ8_jfZu_-orpjNMx_az%3D7s7ag%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>
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>
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