It was <2022-07-04 pon 11:00>, when Lennart Poettering wrote: > On Mo, 27.06.22 23:36, Lukasz Stelmach ([email protected]) wrote: > >> Hi, >> >> I need an apparently exotic configuration and I don't know how to >> approach the problem. Here are the requirements: >> >> - [email protected] (systemd --user) >> + runs with Priv SMACK label (SmackProcessLabel in [email protected]) >> + has cap_mac_admin (and a few other capabilities) to assign SMACK >> labels to its children (AmbientCapabilities in [email protected]) >> >> - children (session services) run with Reg SMACK label (I added >> support for DefaultSmackProcessLabel to user.conf, to avoid >> modifications of all unit files) > > sounds upstreamable.
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/23921 Done. Thanks, for help. >> - children DO NOT inherit capabilites from systemd --user (they do now) >> >> This last is a problem because I'd like to avoid modifications of all >> service files. I tried to drop inheritable caps before execve() (in >> exec_child()) but as described in capabilities(7) this results in >> dropping caps from the ambient set too, which means systemd --user >> doens't get what it needs. >> >> Is there anything I am missing? Is there any way to start a service with >> UID!=0, some capabilities set but not implicitly inheritable by >> processes spawned by the service? > > Quite frankly that should probably be the default behaviour. > > I'd probably merge a patch that unconditionally resets all caps > passed to children of the --user manager even if the manager itself > got some ambient caps passed. It might be a slight compat breakage, > but I think it would be safer that way, as the service execution > environment becomes more uniform then. > > Security credentials should be passed down to user services opt-in, > not opt-out after all. > > Can you prep a patch for that and submit via github? RFC https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/23988 -- Łukasz Stelmach Samsung R&D Institute Poland Samsung Electronics
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