Could be fun red/blue team exercise. Just watch out for those
cryptominors that get in through Solr injection (among many other
unsecured methods) and are a real pain to remove.

Regards,
   Alex.
P.s. Don't ask me how I know :-(
P.p.s. Read-only docker container may still be a good layer of defence
on top of everything. Respawn it every hour, if needed.

On Thu, 8 Oct 2020 at 15:05, David Hastings <dhasti...@wshein.com> wrote:
>
> Welp. Never mind I refer back to point #1 this is a bad idea
>
> > On Oct 8, 2020, at 3:01 PM, Alexandre Rafalovitch <arafa...@gmail.com> 
> > wrote:
> >
> > The update handlers are now implicitly defined (3 or 4 of them). So,
> > it actually needs to be explicitly shadowed and overridden with other
> > Noop handler. And block Config API to avoid attackers creating new
> > handlers.
> >
> > Regards,
> >   Alex.
> >
> >> On Thu, 8 Oct 2020 at 14:54, David Hastings <dhasti...@wshein.com> wrote:
> >>
> >> Well that’s why I suggested deleting the update handler :)
> >>
> >>>> On Oct 8, 2020, at 2:52 PM, Walter Underwood <wun...@wunderwood.org> 
> >>>> wrote:
> >>>
> >>> Let me know where it is and I’ll delete all the documents in your 
> >>> collection.
> >>> It is easy, just one HTTP request.
> >>>
> >>> https://gist.github.com/nz/673027/313f70681daa985ea13ba33a385753aef951a0f3
> >>>
> >>> wunder
> >>> Walter Underwood
> >>> wun...@wunderwood.org
> >>> http://observer.wunderwood.org/  (my blog)
> >>>
> >>>> On Oct 8, 2020, at 11:49 AM, Alexandre Rafalovitch <arafa...@gmail.com> 
> >>>> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>> I think there were past discussions about people doing but they really
> >>>> really knew what they were doing from a security perspective, not just
> >>>> Solr one.
> >>>>
> >>>> You are increasing your risk factor a lot, so you need to think
> >>>> through this. What are you protecting and what are you exposing. Are
> >>>> you trying to protect the updates? You may be able to do it with - for
> >>>> example - read-only docker container, or with embedded Solr or/and
> >>>> with reverse proxy.
> >>>>
> >>>> Are you trying to protect some of the data from being read? Even harder.
> >>>>
> >>>> There are implicit handlers, admin handlers, 'qt' to select query
> >>>> parser, etc. Lots of things to think about.
> >>>>
> >>>> It just may not be worth it.
> >>>>
> >>>> Regards,
> >>>> Alex.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> On Thu, 8 Oct 2020 at 14:27, Marco Aurélio <aurelio.marco...@gmail.com> 
> >>>>> wrote:
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Hi!
> >>>>>
> >>>>> We're looking into the option of setting up search with Solr without an
> >>>>> intermediary application. This would mean our backend would index data 
> >>>>> into
> >>>>> Solr and we would have a public Solr endpoint on the internet that would
> >>>>> receive search requests directly.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Since I couldn't find an existing solution similar to ours, I would 
> >>>>> like to
> >>>>> know whether it's possible to secure Solr in a way that allows anyone 
> >>>>> only
> >>>>> read-access only to collections and how to achieve that. Specifically
> >>>>> because of this part of the documentation
> >>>>> <https://lucene.apache.org/solr/guide/8_5/securing-solr.html>:
> >>>>>
> >>>>> *No Solr API, including the Admin UI, is designed to be exposed to
> >>>>> non-trusted parties. Tune your firewall so that only trusted computers 
> >>>>> and
> >>>>> people are allowed access. Because of this, the project will not regard
> >>>>> e.g., Admin UI XSS issues as security vulnerabilities. However, we still
> >>>>> ask you to report such issues in JIRA.*
> >>>>> Is there a way we can restrict read-only access to Solr collections so 
> >>>>> as
> >>>>> to allow users to make search requests directly to it or should we 
> >>>>> always
> >>>>> keep our Solr instances completely private?
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Thanks in advance!
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Best regards,
> >>>>> Marco Godinho
> >>>

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