Tim Schmidt wrote:
On 10/6/06, Kai Blin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
On Friday 06 October 2006 10:19, Tim Schmidt wrote:
> Again, works for me. I believe the only part missing for this case is
> the simulation. Of course, there's the added possibility that apps
> will go mucking about with data
Tim Schmidt wrote:
> Again, works for me. I believe the only part missing for this case is
> the simulation. Of course, there's the added possibility that apps
> will go mucking about with data other apps care about, in which case a
> per-executable simulated device would be best.
Wouldn't suc
On 10/6/06, Kai Blin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
On Friday 06 October 2006 10:19, Tim Schmidt wrote:
> Again, works for me. I believe the only part missing for this case is
> the simulation. Of course, there's the added possibility that apps
> will go mucking about with data other apps care abo
On Friday 06 October 2006 10:19, Tim Schmidt wrote:
> Again, works for me. I believe the only part missing for this case is
> the simulation. Of course, there's the added possibility that apps
> will go mucking about with data other apps care about, in which case a
> per-executable simulated dev
On 10/6/06, Vincent Povirk <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
On 10/5/06, Tim Schmidt <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> An application you are running (Application Name) is attempting to
> access a disk in a potentially unsafe way. Would you like it to
> access a safe virtual disk instead?
>
> Yes No
A dia
On 10/5/06, Tim Schmidt <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
An application you are running (Application Name) is attempting to
access a disk in a potentially unsafe way. Would you like it to
access a safe virtual disk instead?
Yes No
A dialog like this would only serve to confuse people. If a setting
On 10/5/06, Vassilis Virvilis <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
How about a loopback device in linux?
This is potentially already possible to do with wine. I use loopbacked
CD images, so loopbacked MBR's should be easy enough, with no change
to wine. Just set the device node link for the device to
To clarify my thoughts, and throw this out there... Here's how I'm
imagining this working:
Assuming there's no problem intercepting the raw disk i/o attempts,
the first time an app attempts a raw disk access, Wine can throw a
popup (I know, I hate them too) with something like the following
text
On 10/5/06, Christoph Frick <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
the #2 folks are proficient enough with their systems to know what they
are doing. the #1 folks hope to get away from the world of #2 things
they are forced on the windows world when they change to unix.
Not nescessarily. I'm thinking spec
On 10/5/06, Mike McCormack <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
UML has a COW (copy-on-write) layer [1]. If we had something like this,
conceivable we could allow Wine to read raw disks (or the COW file),
then write back to the COW file.
QEMU has nice support for several different COW and sparse format
Mike McCormack wrote:
Tim Schmidt wrote:
It sounds like a general framework for routing these kind of raw disk
i/o would be useful... probably configurable by app would be most
useful.
UML has a COW (copy-on-write) layer [1]. If we had something like this,
conceivable we could allow Wine
On Thu, Oct 05, 2006 at 04:25:38AM -0400, Tim Schmidt wrote:
> What we're talking about here is a class of applications that expect
> raw (or nearly-raw) disk access:
>
> - copy-protection that writes mysterious things to or near the MBR
> - various utility software (virus scanners, disk defragme
Tim Schmidt wrote:
It sounds like a general framework for routing these kind of raw disk
i/o would be useful... probably configurable by app would be most
useful.
UML has a COW (copy-on-write) layer [1]. If we had something like this,
conceivable we could allow Wine to read raw disks (or t
It sounds like a general framework for routing these kind of raw disk
i/o would be useful... probably configurable by app would be most
useful.
thoughts?
I agree, a sandbox system where the 'litter box' (a sand box to put
all your crap) would hold potentialy dangerous direct disk accesses to
On 10/5/06, Christoph Frick <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
and its very unlikely, that a sane person would WINE allow writing
to the MBR (or close to it). right?
OK...
This discussion is veering off somewhat, but I believe it's heading in
a fairly constructive direction.
What we're talking about
On Wed, Oct 04, 2006 at 07:10:41PM +0200, Kopfgeldjaeger wrote:
> 2. raw disk access normally requires root rights. It's very unlikely
> that Alexandre would permit anything which requires to run wine as root
> (even if those are only additional features)
and its very unlikely, that a sane perso
On 10/4/06, H. Verbeet <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
On 04/10/06, Jesse Allen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Guys, Wine programs can write to the MBR already with correct permissions...
I think that should read "with wrong permissions" :-)
Yes, very wrong from a security standpoint :P
Le mercredi 04 octobre 2006 à 21:14 +0100, Martin Owens a écrit :
> It's a very very bad idea, I don't understand why linux doesn't
> protect normal users corrupting the disk at byte level that just seems
> really bad for security.
Every distro does AFAIK. However if people mess with their user's
On 04/10/06, Jesse Allen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Guys, Wine programs can write to the MBR already with correct permissions...
I think that should read "with wrong permissions" :-)
On Wed, Oct 04, 2006 at 09:41:16AM -0500, Tom Spear wrote:
>
> I agree that we shouldn't write to the MBR, but I definitely think that we
> should get some legal guidance before we proceed with writing anything to a
> file (in this case), because
If it isn't a silly question, which part of the m
It's a very very bad idea, I don't understand why linux doesn't
protect normal users corrupting the disk at byte level that just seems
really bad for security.
On 10/4/06, Aaron Slunt <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Jesse Allen wrote:
> Guys, Wine programs can write to the MBR already with correct
>
Jesse Allen wrote:
Guys, Wine programs can write to the MBR already with correct
permissions...
http://bugs.winehq.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4672
I hope nobody needs to explain why that's a very bad idea...
On 10/4/06, Karsten Anderson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
why not just implement the write to MBR? figure out how the copy
protector does it and just implement it. as long as you know what
you're doing and where the O/S stores its stuff you should be alright.
put a few warnings on the instaeller a
Maybe someone from FSF could provide legal guidance on this issue.
http://www.fsf.org/about/contact.html
Hi,
Karsten Anderson wrote:
> why not just implement the write to MBR? figure out how the copy
> protector does it and just implement it. as long as you know what
> you're doing and where the O/S stores its stuff you should be alright.
> put a few warnings on the instaeller and whatnot that this
On Wednesday 04 October 2006 09:25, Karsten Anderson wrote:
> why not just implement the write to MBR?
The user running Wine more than likely won't have such write access to the
disk. Only root would be able to do that, and running Wine as root is far
from encouraged. Plus, fooling around with t
Quoting EA Durbin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
What makes copy protection problematic to circumvent is not the math or the
technical stuff, it is the laws protecting it :-(
how does cedega do it?
They license the code for the copy protection detection from the likes
of macrovision.
--
Darragh
"
What makes copy protection problematic to circumvent is not the math or the
technical stuff, it is the laws protecting it :-(
how does cedega do it?
why not just implement the write to MBR? figure out how the copy
protector does it and just implement it. as long as you know what
you're doing and where the O/S stores its stuff you should be alright.
put a few warnings on the instaeller and whatnot that this might be
risky, and then let the use
> what keeps some nosy haxx0r from looking in the MBR (or some blocks
> later) if he wants to find out about the copy protection? if they store
> data like this unprotected (e.g. crypting them) then this is just
> security-by-obscurity (which is no security at all).
Copy protection IS security by o
On Wed, Oct 04, 2006 at 04:09:51PM +0100, Martin Owens wrote:
> Anyone techinicaly adept could find the MBR, it's the 1st sector on
> the disk, this isn't about boot records but the MBR which is in a
> known place. I recon you could use linux tools on your windows hard
> drive to retrieve it easy.
On 10/4/06, Jonathan Ernst <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Le mardi 03 octobre 2006 à 15:51 -0500, Tom Spear a écrit :[...]>>> I'm by no means an expert on copyright law or copy protection, but I> think that using any method other than writing directly to the MBR
> with those copy protection measures wo
On Wed, Oct 04, 2006 at 09:41:16AM -0500, Tom Spear wrote:
> I should add that I just thought about this and realized that we
> _could_ always just encrypt the contents of the file as it is written
> and read, so that we can actually get somewhere, and not be exposing
> sensitive data at the same
Technically yes, but the difference is that VMware actually writes
_everything_ into that one file vs wine proposing to write just what is
written to the boot sector into a file..
The reason it is different, is because it is much more difficult (if not
impossible) to tell what is boot sector and
Le mardi 03 octobre 2006 à 15:51 -0500, Tom Spear a écrit :
[...]
>
>
> I'm by no means an expert on copyright law or copy protection, but I
> think that using any method other than writing directly to the MBR
> with those copy protection measures would be illegal because writing
> to a f
On 10/3/06, Martin Owens <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
On 10/3/06, Michael [Plouj] Ploujnikov <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:> > I'm by no means an expert on copyright law or copy protection, but I think> > that using any method other than writing directly to the MBR with those copy
> > protection measures
On 10/3/06, Michael [Plouj] Ploujnikov <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I'm by no means an expert on copyright law or copy protection, but I think> that using any method other than writing directly to the MBR with those copy> protection measures would be illegal because writing to a file (registry,
> w
On 10/3/06, Michael [Plouj] Ploujnikov <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I'm by no means an expert on copyright law or copy protection, but I think
> that using any method other than writing directly to the MBR with those copy
> protection measures would be illegal because writing to a file (registry,
I'm by no means an expert on copyright law or copy protection, but I think
that using any method other than writing directly to the MBR with those copy
protection measures would be illegal because writing to a file (registry,
wine-only proprietary db or any other type of file) as opposed to writin
Hello
> Sure there are tools out there that crackers use
> that read the mbr and store it in a file, so that they can circumvent the
> copy protection, but that has nothing to do with wine.
IANAL but curcumventing for personal use using generic tools (wich wine is)
and with no bad intentions can
On 10/3/06, Robert Lunnon <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
On Tuesday 03 October 2006 02:18, James Courtier-Dutton wrote:> Martin Owens wrote:> >> Re Copy Protection.> >>> >> be quite hard to make this work I think?> >> > It would be quite dangerous to m
On 10/3/06, Robert Lunnon <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Part 3 Applies, however it could be read as being permissible for the purpose
of implementing a compatible interface. IE for the purpose of making the copy
protection work under Wine. I think it would be much safer to make the
protection work f
On Tuesday 03 October 2006 02:18, James Courtier-Dutton wrote:
> Martin Owens wrote:
> >> Re Copy Protection.
> >>
> >> be quite hard to make this work I think?
> >
> > It would be quite dangerous to make this work.
> >
> > What about crea
On Tuesday 03 October 2006 02:56, Tim Schmidt wrote:
> On 10/2/06, Marcus Meissner <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > We can't, this kind of circumvention is likely to be illegal in the US.
>
> The relevant portion of the DMCA reads as follows:
> (http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c105:6:./temp/~c1
On 10/2/06, Marcus Meissner <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
We can't, this kind of circumvention is likely to be illegal in the US.
The relevant portion of the DMCA reads as follows:
(http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c105:6:./temp/~c105bzNC4v:e11559:)
`(2) No person shall manufacture, im
On Mon, Oct 02, 2006 at 05:18:57PM +0100, James Courtier-Dutton wrote:
> Martin Owens wrote:
> >>Re Copy Protection.
> >>
> >>be quite hard to make this work I think?
> >
> >It would be quite dangerous to make this work.
> >
> >What about crea
On 10/2/06, James Courtier-Dutton <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
The easiest way round this is to simply recognise the executable with
the copy protection, and simply install a hook to catch the appropriate
file system or registry calls and divert them to a special handling
routine to satisfy the app
Martin Owens wrote:
Re Copy Protection.
be quite hard to make this work I think?
It would be quite dangerous to make this work.
What about creating a file say with a fake data map, wine thinks it's
the direct access to the hard drive where all this information is
held. all we do is ad
Re Copy Protection.
be quite hard to make this work I think?
It would be quite dangerous to make this work.
What about creating a file say with a fake data map, wine thinks it's
the direct access to the hard drive where all this information is
held. all we do is add the place where the
Am Montag, 2. Oktober 2006 04:49 schrieb Vitaliy Margolen:
> EA Durbin wrote:
> >> So the short story is that copy protection support is the
> >> gating issue here, and it's a serious PITA.
> >
> > What specifically keeps most copy protection from working with wine?
> > Why does it work in some ap
EA Durbin wrote:
>> So the short story is that copy protection support is the
>> gating issue here, and it's a serious PITA.
>>
>
> What specifically keeps most copy protection from working with wine?
> Why does it work in some applications, such as Star Wars Jedi Academy
> and not others?
>
The
Jonathan Wilson wrote:
From what I understand, there are 3 ways to do copy protection in WINE
(at least for copy protection that needs a kernel driver to work):
1.Implement a WINE implementation of that kernel driver (in the same way
various stock windows kernel drivers have been implemented).
Dustin Navea wrote:
Guys, bug 2895 got me thinkin.. If we only support a handful of games
that use copy protection, shouldnt we file a bug in Bugzilla and append
that to 1434 (Get games working perfectly)? That way we can attach any
copy protection related bugs to this metabug?
Yes I think it'
Hi,
On Tue, 11 Nov 2003 03:05:55 +0100, KJK::Hyperion wrote:
> At 02.11 11/11/2003, Steven Edwards wrote:
> >>Further run fails for Captive as 'secdrv.sys' is somehow broken driver as
> >>it does not provide any way to mount a filesystem. :-?
>
> secdrv isn't a filesystem, nor a volume driver.
At 02.11 11/11/2003, Steven Edwards wrote:
Further run fails for Captive as 'secdrv.sys' is somehow broken driver as
it does not provide any way to mount a filesystem. :-?
secdrv isn't a filesystem, nor a volume driver. Filesystems and volume
drivers, in Windows NT, are special, and secdrv is nei
At 18.17 09/11/2003, Steven Edwards wrote:
The problem is how emulate windows kernel internal behavior (ie assembly
tips as NtCurrentTeb)
We have been looking in to loading this driver under ReactOS and all of
the functions are implemented but it still returns STATUS_UNSUCESSFULL. I
think that t
Hello Jan!
--- Jan Kratochvil <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Hi,
>
> On Mon, 10 Nov 2003 20:19:45 +0100, Raphaël Junqueira wrote:
> ...
> > > BTW, I have got as far with loading secdrv.sys as crashing on
> unimplemented
> > > IoCreateDevice. I believe the Io* functions will be the biggest
> problems
Hi,
On Mon, 10 Nov 2003 20:19:45 +0100, Raphaël Junqueira wrote:
...
> > BTW, I have got as far with loading secdrv.sys as crashing on unimplemented
> > IoCreateDevice. I believe the Io* functions will be the biggest problems.
It is no problem loading it and initializing it by Captive NTFS for GN
On Fri, 7 Nov 2003 05:59, Alexandre Julliard wrote:
> The DMCA does not require copyright violation, what is illegal is
> "circumventing" the protection measure, it doesn't really matter if
> the replacement code has the same functionality or not.
Decryption is a different matter - that's banned
On Thu, 6 Nov 2003 20:00, Shachar Shemesh wrote:
> I don't get it. As far as I understand, so long as the code in the Wine
> archives does not allow running copied discs, we are not violating the
> DMCA. If someone else takes Wine code and modifies it, that's where the
> DMCA violation happens.
I
Lionel Ulmer; Marcus Meissner
> > Cc: Alexandre Julliard; Wine Devel
> > Subject: Re: copy protection - was: Re: Is it time for playing games on
> > WINE?
> >
> > Well it's not really easy as the NT_HEADER only declare:
> > Characteristics: 0306
&g
> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Behalf Of Raphaël Junqueira
> Sent: 10 November 2003 08:05
> To: Lionel Ulmer; Marcus Meissner
> Cc: Alexandre Julliard; Wine Devel
> Subject: Re: copy protection - was: Re: Is it time for pl
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Hi all,
Le Lundi 10 Novembre 2003 08:11, Marcus Meissner a écrit :
> On Fri, Nov 07, 2003 at 07:46:58PM +0100, Lionel Ulmer wrote:
> > On Fri, Nov 07, 2003 at 10:32:02AM +, Mike Hearn wrote:
> > > Lionel, could QEMU be used here? I guess the drive
On Fri, Nov 07, 2003 at 07:46:58PM +0100, Lionel Ulmer wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 07, 2003 at 10:32:02AM +, Mike Hearn wrote:
> > Lionel, could QEMU be used here? I guess the driver expects to have
> > kernel level access to the machine, so we could either:
>
> Well, as I have no idea how .SYS loadi
Hello,
--- Raphaël_Junqueira <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> it is simple, only a PE module who work on kernel mode using os APIs:
>
> - -=(FeniX as [EMAIL PROTECTED])-(on tty2)-(at 13:39:31)=-
> -={$:'~'}=->winedump dump -j import
> /mnt/win_c2/windows/system32/drivers/
> secdrv.sys
> Contents of
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Le Friday 07 November 2003 19:46, Lionel Ulmer a écrit :
> On Fri, Nov 07, 2003 at 10:32:02AM +, Mike Hearn wrote:
> > Lionel, could QEMU be used here? I guess the driver expects to have
> > kernel level access to the machine, so we could either:
>
Hiya Lionel,
--- Lionel Ulmer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 07, 2003 at 10:32:02AM +, Mike Hearn wrote:
> > Lionel, could QEMU be used here? I guess the driver expects to have
> > kernel level access to the machine, so we could either:
>
> Well, as I have no idea how .SYS loading w
On Fri, Nov 07, 2003 at 10:32:02AM +, Mike Hearn wrote:
> Lionel, could QEMU be used here? I guess the driver expects to have
> kernel level access to the machine, so we could either:
Well, as I have no idea how .SYS loading working and how it interfaces with
the kernel, I cannot comment here.
Mike Hearn <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> Alexandre - do these options sound sane?
I would suggest investigating the problems before we start designing
the solutions...
--
Alexandre Julliard
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
On Thu, 2003-11-06 at 23:54, Alexandre Julliard wrote:
> The usual technique: run the app, see what breaks, implement the
> missing feature/fix the bug, retry. The first thing of course is to
> investigate how to support loading the needed driver.
Lionel, could QEMU be used here? I guess the drive
On Thursday 06 November 2003 03:31 pm, Geoff Thorpe wrote:
> War crime tribunals, environmental protection treaties, privacy
> legislation, ... the ability to let chilling effects meet little or no
> significant organised obstacle has become the trademark of a certain
> breed of "freedom-loving" pe
>"the Copyright Office ruled that the DMCA does not block software
>developers from using reverse engineering to circumvent digital
>protection of copyright material if they do so to achieve
>interoperability with an independently created computer program."
So some people in the US do believe in
>In the mean time, (and as long as people in the US are involved in Wine,)
>we're stuck with them.
Not is we publish (Host) wine outside the US.
>I don't get it. As far as I understand, so long as the code in the Wine
>archives does not allow running copied discs, we are not violating the
>DMCA. If someone else takes Wine code and modifies it, that's where the
>DMCA violation happens.
Right, I think a lot of people would be happy to host
"Ann and Jason Edmeades" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> [Ever had the feeling you regret asking a question...]
>
> Possibly another question for Alexander then - Realistically do you believe
> that we can ever support copy protection, and if so how?
I definitely think we can support it yes. It's j
[Ever had the feeling you regret asking a question...]
Possibly another question for Alexander then - Realistically do you believe
that we can ever support copy protection, and if so how?
If we can work out how to load the driver in question (which remember is
safedisk specific, there's others) t
Hi there,
On November 6, 2003 02:18 pm, Shachar Shemesh wrote:
> Alexandre Julliard wrote:
> >So the question is whether the code in question is "circumventing" the
> >protection or not.
>
> If the code in Wine still doesn't allow unprotected CDs from running,
> there can be no problem.
>
> >I thi
Shachar Shemesh <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> If the code in Wine still doesn't allow unprotected CDs from running,
> there can be no problem.
No, it's not that simple. By providing a replacement driver, you are
circumventing a technical measure controlling access to the work. The
fact is that wi
Alexandre Julliard wrote:
Shachar Shemesh <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
I don't get it. As far as I understand, so long as the code in the
Wine archives does not allow running copied discs, we are not
violating the DMCA. If someone else takes Wine code and modifies it,
that's where the DMCA viol
Shachar Shemesh <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> I don't get it. As far as I understand, so long as the code in the
> Wine archives does not allow running copied discs, we are not
> violating the DMCA. If someone else takes Wine code and modifies it,
> that's where the DMCA violation happens.
The DM
Geoff Thorpe wrote:
[snip]
subject to trivial circumvention. I can't see how this can be done
without requiring a DMCA violation in Wine, the O/S kernel, or requiring
the copying of a closed-source driver that *itself* is irreplacable
(choosing to load it from Wine and say "don't edit this Win
Geoff Thorpe wrote:
On November 5, 2003 01:00 am, Jonathan Wilson wrote:
Basicly as long as our code:
A.cant run "copied" safedisk disks ("perfect copies" and "no-cd cracks"
aside) and B.cant be modified to run "copied" safedisk disks (e.g. by
disabling some parts of the WINE code that performe
> >
> > Why about trying to get this driver working on top of current ntdll ?
> > All drivers accesses should pass by kernel calls no ?
>
> In the perfect world, yes.. but this is not how most copy protections
> do it.
>
> Using the copy protection's driver directly will IMHO not be possible
> w
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Raphaël Junqueira wrote:
> -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
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>
> Le Tuesday 04 November 2003 23:07, Alexandre Julliard a écrit :
>> Tom <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>>
>>
>> > Alexandre, is there any chance of this code *ever* being excepted into
>> >
On November 5, 2003 01:00 am, Jonathan Wilson wrote:
> Basicly as long as our code:
> A.cant run "copied" safedisk disks ("perfect copies" and "no-cd cracks"
> aside) and B.cant be modified to run "copied" safedisk disks (e.g. by
> disabling some parts of the WINE code that performed checks)
> then
On Wednesday 05 November 2003 6:00 am, you wrote:
> > None whatsoever, the driver "reimplementation" is clearly a DMCA
> > violation. The proper way to do that is to somehow load the driver and
> > let it perform all the checks it wants to perform; a dummy driver that
> > returns magic values t
El mié, 05 de nov de 2003, a las 00:50, Raphaël Junqueira escribio:
>
> > > Alexandre, is there any chance of this code *ever* being excepted into
> > > the wine tree?
> >
> > None whatsoever, the driver "reimplementation" is clearly a DMCA
> > violation. The proper way to do that is to somehow lo
> None whatsoever, the driver "reimplementation" is clearly a DMCA
> violation. The proper way to do that is to somehow load the driver and
> let it perform all the checks it wants to perform; a dummy driver that
> returns magic values to bypass the checks is not acceptable.
From what I know about
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Le Tuesday 04 November 2003 23:07, Alexandre Julliard a écrit :
> Tom <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>
>
> > Alexandre, is there any chance of this code *ever* being excepted into
> > the wine tree?
>
>
> None whatsoever, the driver "reimplementation" i
Tom <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> Alexandre, is there any chance of this code *ever* being excepted into
> the wine tree?
None whatsoever, the driver "reimplementation" is clearly a DMCA
violation. The proper way to do that is to somehow load the driver and
let it perform all the checks it wants
On Wed, 5 Nov 2003 02:29, Mike Hearn wrote:
> I don't think there's any legal issue anyway. There are no laws against
> cracking copy protection unless you're in the states and it's got
> encryption.
You want to be careful here. There's also laws in Australia against bypassing
a "technological p
> When you play
> using an incorrect crack the game will slowly become unplayable.
Like this we can be sure that the reimplemented driver is perfect or a bit
buggy. Also, some people may prefer the idea of a open source safe disc driver
more that the idea of loading the proprietary one.
--- Roderick Colenbrander <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Perhaps the "solution" is to write a wrapper to load secdrv.sys and
> friends.
> Perhaps in a way like that ntfs emulation project works (it uses a
> reactos
> kernel) or perhaps using an emulator like qemu.
Yes it should be possibe to adapt t
It might be possible to reverse engineer the current safedisc 1 and 2
protections and include the code in wine. The problem is that the new version (a
snapshot of it was used at the time in flashpoint) is less nice. Nowadays when
you for example use a crack the game works or doesn't work. The new s
El mar, 04 de nov de 2003, a las 16:13, Ivan Leo Murray-Smith escribio:
> >but this brings fort the legal issues.
> If the re-implemented driver only allows the user to play the game, and not to
> make a perfect copy of the CD, there is no legal issue.
I think that the actual status is even worse,
Zsolt Rizsanyi wrote:
So this is what I think that the status of copy protection is. If I'm wrong
somewhere then please correct me.
Hi,
Yea I think your correct.. here is his post...
http://www.winehq.com/hypermail/wine-patches/2002/04/0194.html
And our last exchange: Zsolt
http://www.winehq
On Tue, 2003-11-04 at 15:13, Ivan Leo Murray-Smith wrote:
> >but this brings fort the legal issues.
> If the re-implemented driver only allows the user to play the game, and not to
> make a perfect copy of the CD, there is no legal issue.
I don't think there's any legal issue anyway. There are no
>but this brings fort the legal issues.
If the re-implemented driver only allows the user to play the game, and not to
make a perfect copy of the CD, there is no legal issue.
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