Re: Announcing security hardened kernels for testing

2005-01-07 Thread Kuba Ober
> This can't do everything. It protects against return-to-libc style > attacks but there are other stack based attacks that it doesn't work for > (if I remember correctly). I.e. for C++ apps you could instead change the implicit this argument of the caller, for example, to point to a made-up inst

Re: Announcing security hardened kernels for testing

2005-01-07 Thread pageexec
> Actually, we shouldn't be generating assembly code on the fly. If you > have more than say 16 proxies in a process then it is actually cheaper > in terms of memory usage and cache locality to have a set of compiled > entry points that can be shared by all proxies. It is even better if you > c

Re: Announcing security hardened kernels for testing

2005-01-07 Thread Mike Hearn
On Fri, 2005-01-07 at 13:46 +0100, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > i totally agree with you on this one ;-), but the feasibility of this > depends on how dynamic these proxies have to be, i.e., is enough > information known at compile/link time to create them in a read-only > section or not. The thunks

Re: Announcing security hardened kernels for testing

2005-01-06 Thread Mike Hearn
On Thu, 2005-01-06 at 15:47 -0600, Robert Shearman wrote: > Actually, we shouldn't be generating assembly code on the fly. If you > have more than say 16 proxies in a process then it is actually cheaper > in terms of memory usage and cache locality to have a set of compiled > entry points that c

Re: Announcing security hardened kernels for testing

2005-01-06 Thread Robert Shearman
Mike Hearn wrote: On Thu, 2005-01-06 at 02:28 +0100, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: c) Required to implement DCOM universal interface proxies required as in 'cannot be implemented any other way'? I'm not sure. These proxies are run-time generated objects. Essentially a DCOM universal/type

re: Announcing security hardened kernels for testing

2005-01-06 Thread pageexec
> http://source.winehq.org/source/dlls/ntdll/ > > It's fairly harmless, there is some assembly in there but I don't > remember seeing any code which assumed an executable stack. i've looked at it and as i suggested yesterday, it's a false positive. what happens here is that relay32.s doesn't emit

re: Announcing security hardened kernels for testing

2005-01-06 Thread Mike Hearn
On Thu, 2005-01-06 at 02:28 +0100, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > for historical reasons, there're 2 marks. the older one (controlled by > chpax) abuses an otherwise (or yet) unused field in the ELF header, i > personally don't encourage the use of it. the other one (controlled by > paxctl) is based on

re: Announcing security hardened kernels for testing

2005-01-05 Thread pageexec
> Thanks for the great info. I'll CC this to wine-devel as I think it's of > general interest, I hope you don't mind. sure, no problem (let's hope i don't bounce by not being subscribed ;-). > http://lists.debian.org/debian-devel/2003/11/msg00206.html > > in which the PaX author and Ingo Molnar

re: Announcing security hardened kernels for testing

2005-01-05 Thread Mike Hearn
Hi, Thanks for the great info. I'll CC this to wine-devel as I think it's of general interest, I hope you don't mind. For context, PaX is a set of security patches for Linux which lock down the system in a similar manner to exec-shield and SELinux. I say similar manner, because PaX seems to go fu