Jerome Leclanche wrote:
> Austin English wrote:
>> Anyone opposed to removing that keyword?
>
> +1 on removing it.
> It would be nice to have a bugzilla filter to replace it, too.
>
> Are we keeping "tasklist" and "tasklet" keywords as well? theres
> barely a dozen very old bugs for both of them.
Dan Kegel wrote:
> Can we do the same this time, and retarget 1.2 bugs for 1.4
> if they're not going to be fixed for 1.2?
At least simple explanation for why bugs were un-nominated from 1.2 would
have been great. Half of bugs had no explanation whatsoever.
Vitaliy.
On Sun, Nov 8, 2009 at 03:55, Dan Kegel wrote:
> On Sat, Nov 7, 2009 at 3:40 PM, James McKenzie
> wrote:
>> You really underestimate the stupidity of people.
>
> I expect that people will do utterly stupid things,
> there's no two ways around that, it's human nature.
> That being the case, I thin
On Sun, Nov 8, 2009 at 8:46 AM, Jeremy White wrote:
> Alexandre expressed a preference that the bugs not be auto rolled to 1.4;
> he'd rather we deliberately chose bugs to go into 1.4. So when we
> un-nominated, we were intentionally returning bugs to the larger pool.
OK.
> We were trying an
Hey Dan,
Dan Kegel wrote:
In the gcc world, when a bug is targeted for release X
and doesn't make it in time, it is retargeted for release X+1.
So when 1.0 rolled around, I retargeted the leftover 1.0-targeted
bugs at 1.2.
Can we do the same this time, and retarget 1.2 bugs for 1.4
if they're
2009/11/8 Dan Kegel :
> On Sun, Nov 8, 2009 at 3:25 AM, Ben Klein wrote:
>> I believe the type of sandboxing being discussed includes things like
>> preventing Win32 apps from breaking out into native calls using the
>> infamous interrupt trick. Correct me if I'm wrong though :)
> No, I was thin
In the gcc world, when a bug is targeted for release X
and doesn't make it in time, it is retargeted for release X+1.
So when 1.0 rolled around, I retargeted the leftover 1.0-targeted
bugs at 1.2.
Can we do the same this time, and retarget 1.2 bugs for 1.4
if they're not going to be fixed for 1.2
On Sun, Nov 8, 2009 at 3:25 AM, Ben Klein wrote:
> I believe the type of sandboxing being discussed includes things like
> preventing Win32 apps from breaking out into native calls using the
> infamous interrupt trick. Correct me if I'm wrong though :)
No, I was thinking of native sandboxing, so
On Sun, 8 Nov 2009, Francois Gouget wrote:
[...]
> Here's my configuration:
> * Intel Corporation Mobile 945GME Express Integrated Graphics Controller rev
> 3
> * VideoRAM: 256MB (according to /var/log/Xorg.0.log)
> * xserver-xorg-video-intel 2:2.9.0-1
>Latest from Debian Testing.
>Debi
Francois Gouget wrote:
> I hit this issue while trying to run winetest for WineConf. I looked
> into it and the crash is caused by this line in dlls/user32/tests/win.c:
>
>SetWindowPos(hwnd, 0, 32768, 4, 32768, 4, SWP_NOMOVE);
>
> More precisely it's the setting of the window width a
Am 08.11.2009 um 13:28 schrieb Austin English:
On Sun, Nov 8, 2009 at 6:14 AM, Louis Lenders
wrote:
These are spawned at huge rate in World in Conflict demo
(http://bugs.winehq.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4)
It'd be quicker/cleaner to just change them to warn's instead, IMHO.
I think BeginEvent
On Sun, Nov 8, 2009 at 6:14 AM, Louis Lenders
wrote:
> These are spawned at huge rate in World in Conflict demo
> (http://bugs.winehq.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4)
It'd be quicker/cleaner to just change them to warn's instead, IMHO.
--
-Austin
2009/11/8 David Gerard :
> You'd get good sandboxing running Wine apps as another user. Main
> problem then is integration with the user's desktop. Doable, but a
> nuisance.
Not really. A separate Wine user wouldn't prevent people from running
Wine as root incorrectly, and if you integrate it with
I hit this issue while trying to run winetest for WineConf. I looked
into it and the crash is caused by this line in dlls/user32/tests/win.c:
SetWindowPos(hwnd, 0, 32768, 4, 32768, 4, SWP_NOMOVE);
More precisely it's the setting of the window width and height to
32768 x 4 that c
2009/11/8 Dan Kegel :
> I expect that people will do utterly stupid things,
> there's no two ways around that, it's human nature.
> That being the case, I think there are still opportunities
> for providing a safe computing experience without
> compromising the user's convenience.
> Case in point:
2009/11/8 Marcus Meissner :
> @@ -84,6 +84,17 @@ static RPC_STATUS RpcAssoc_Alloc(LPCSTR Protseq, LPCSTR
> NetworkAddr,
> return RPC_S_OK;
> }
>
> +static BOOL compare_networkoptions(LPCWSTR opts1, LPCWSTR opts2)
> +{
> + if ((opts1 == NULL) && (opts2 == NULL))
> + return TRUE;
> +
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