Re: [tor-talk] Question Regarding Routing of Network-Traffic using Tor-Browser

2015-11-02 Thread Roger Dingledine
On Sun, Nov 01, 2015 at 03:26:23PM +0200, s7r wrote: > Just to make sure you realize this puts you at higher risk in running > into a malicious guard. Right, correct. I would suggest you read and understand https://blog.torproject.org/blog/improving-tors-anonymity-changing-guard-parameters before

Re: [tor-talk] Question Regarding Routing of Network-Traffic using Tor-Browser

2015-11-01 Thread s7r
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 Hello, Just to make sure you realize this puts you at higher risk in running into a malicious guard. If you stick to the same entry guard for longer time as Tor does by default, you have less chances to run into an evil guard because you don't choos

Re: [tor-talk] Question Regarding Routing of Network-Traffic using Tor-Browser

2015-11-01 Thread Felix
O.K., I found a workaround, I edited the File start-tor_browser and inserted a command at the beginning, that deletes the State-File in /Data/Tor. Thank you, Harmony... Am 01.11.2015 11:12, schrieb Tom van der Woerdt: > Felix, > > Guards' network speeds are assessed based on the view of the netw

Re: [tor-talk] Question Regarding Routing of Network-Traffic using Tor-Browser

2015-11-01 Thread Tom van der Woerdt
You can't fake a Tor relay, they are cryptographically protected. At best they could tell that you're connected somewhere, or stop you from doing that, but they can't see any of the contents, or MITM it. Tom > On 01 Nov 2015, at 11:23, Felix wrote: > > O.K., so if the Guards that are used a

Re: [tor-talk] Question Regarding Routing of Network-Traffic using Tor-Browser

2015-11-01 Thread Felix
O.K., so if the Guards that are used are based on the view of the network, this means NC knows which Entry-Guards are accessed from users within NC, so the next approach would be to fake these Entry-Guards (IPs) from within the country (Lets setup a Tor-Node inside NC, that uses the same IP as the

Re: [tor-talk] Question Regarding Routing of Network-Traffic using Tor-Browser

2015-11-01 Thread Tom van der Woerdt
Felix, Guards' network speeds are assessed based on the view of the network, not the client. What this means for your North Korea example is that the government couldn't affect path selection by slowing down the network, as Tor will still pick the same guards. Tom > On 01 Nov 2015, at 11:10

Re: [tor-talk] Question Regarding Routing of Network-Traffic using Tor-Browser

2015-11-01 Thread Felix
Hello, I read the linked Page and understand most of the ideas behind the concept of using only a few number of Entry-Guadrs. However, as I understand Entry Guards are chosen by Parameters like Response-Time or Network-Bandwidth. If i.e North Corea. would like to control the Tor-Network in

Re: [tor-talk] Question Regarding Routing of Network-Traffic using Tor-Browser

2015-10-31 Thread Harmony
Felix: > Hello, > > I am from Germany and I use the Tor-Browser very often. I think Tor is a > great product. > > I have a question regarding the connection from my Tor-Browser to the > Tor-Network. > > I noticed, that Tor tends to always connect to the same Tor-Relays on > the internet. I can o

[tor-talk] Question Regarding Routing of Network-Traffic using Tor-Browser

2015-10-31 Thread Felix
Hello, I am from Germany and I use the Tor-Browser very often. I think Tor is a great product. I have a question regarding the connection from my Tor-Browser to the Tor-Network. I noticed, that Tor tends to always connect to the same Tor-Relays on the internet. I can observe this when I mo