Re: [tor-talk] Krypton Anonymous: A Chromium Tor Browser

2014-11-04 Thread Cyrus Katrak
On Mon, Nov 3, 2014 at 3:05 PM, Mike Perry wrote: > Cyrus Katrak: > > https://github.com/kr36/seaturtle > > > > At a high level: > > - Process per tab security model, with each tab owning it's own in-memory > > state (cache, cookies, local storage, hsts db etc...). > > We've been going for URL ba

Re: [tor-talk] Krypton Anonymous: A Chromium Tor Browser

2014-11-04 Thread Cyrus Katrak
No, currently I am not using any Isolation flags. I assume this means all tabs are sharing the same stream. I could trivially use something like IsolateDestAddr, but I assume what you are suggesting is to have one Tor SOCKS port per tab? On Mon, Nov 3, 2014 at 11:12 AM, coderman wrote: > On 11/3

Re: [tor-talk] Krypton Anonymous: A Chromium Tor Browser

2014-11-04 Thread Cyrus Katrak
Thanks, I've been looking for something like this. On Mon, Nov 3, 2014 at 5:07 PM, Tom Ritter wrote: > On 3 November 2014 17:05, Mike Perry wrote: > > I also have an OpenWRT configuration I can give you to monitor for proxy > > leaks on an upstream router, but you need to be able to configure T

Re: [tor-talk] Krypton Anonymous: A Chromium Tor Browser

2014-11-03 Thread Mike Perry
Mike Perry: > Cyrus Katrak: > > https://github.com/kr36/seaturtle > > > > At a high level: > > - Process per tab security model, with each tab owning it's own in-memory > > state (cache, cookies, local storage, hsts db etc...). > > We've been going for URL bar domain isolation in Tor Browser to a

Re: [tor-talk] Krypton Anonymous: A Chromium Tor Browser

2014-11-03 Thread Tom Ritter
On 3 November 2014 17:05, Mike Perry wrote: > I also have an OpenWRT configuration I can give you to monitor for proxy > leaks on an upstream router, but you need to be able to configure Tor > Bridges to make use of it. Same idea, but I use a full linux machine as a router rather than an OpenWRT

Re: [tor-talk] Krypton Anonymous: A Chromium Tor Browser

2014-11-03 Thread Mike Perry
Cyrus Katrak: > https://github.com/kr36/seaturtle > > At a high level: > - Process per tab security model, with each tab owning it's own in-memory > state (cache, cookies, local storage, hsts db etc...). We've been going for URL bar domain isolation in Tor Browser to avoid divergence with how use

Re: [tor-talk] Krypton Anonymous: A Chromium Tor Browser

2014-11-03 Thread coderman
On 11/3/14, Cyrus Katrak wrote: > https://github.com/kr36/seaturtle cool :) > At a high level: > - Process per tab security model, with each tab owning it's own in-memory > state (cache, cookies, local storage, hsts db etc...). do you use any stream isolation per tab behavior? (perhaps via the

[tor-talk] Krypton Anonymous: A Chromium Tor Browser

2014-11-03 Thread Cyrus Katrak
https://github.com/kr36/seaturtle At a high level: - Process per tab security model, with each tab owning it's own in-memory state (cache, cookies, local storage, hsts db etc...). - Efficiently integrated HTTPS Everywhere rules. - Addresses some fingerprint-ability issues: Disabled geolocation, we