Atm CPU is the bottleneck as Tor routers can't keep up with path lookups
crypto. Padding messages to consume more unused bandwidth to make
netflow correlation attacks more difficult makes sense.
Seth David Schoen wrote:
> Has anybody looked at the new HORNET system?
>
> http://arxiv.org/abs/1507.
On Sat, Jul 25, 2015 at 12:30 PM, str4d wrote:
> If you store the FS locally and have a route identifier, then
> essentially you have an I2P tunnel (ignoring differences in the
> specifics of the way symmetric onion encryption is handled). Routers
> sending the extra 344 bytes _is_ what makes thi
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Jeffrey Burdges wrote:
> I've no read much of the NORNET article, although not yet carefully
> enough, very interesting.
>
> On Sat, Jul 25, 2015 at 12:21 AM, str4d wrote:
>
>> In this design, I would say the major problems are wasting
>> network
On Sat, Jul 25, 2015 at 10:41 AM, Leon Johnson
wrote:
> Haven't finished reading the paper yet, but does anyone if code is
> available yet?
>
I couldn't even find the NORNET tech report they cite, just shows up as
"anonymoizedurl" in the paper.
Jeff
--
tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.to
Haven't finished reading the paper yet, but does anyone if code is
available yet?
On Wed, Jul 22, 2015 at 6:36 PM, Seth David Schoen wrote:
> Has anybody looked at the new HORNET system?
>
> http://arxiv.org/abs/1507.05724v1
>
> It's a new onion routing design that seems to call for participatio
I've no read much of the NORNET article, although not yet carefully enough,
very interesting.
On Sat, Jul 25, 2015 at 12:21 AM, str4d wrote:
> In this design, I would say the major problems are wasting network
> resources, and forcing router rotation. There is no way to "cancel" a
> session othe
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Seth David Schoen wrote:
> str4d writes:
>
>> * No replay detection - packet replay is ignored within the
>> lifetime of a session. They suggest that adversaries would be
>> deterred by the risk of being detected by
>> volunteers/organizations/ASs,
str4d writes:
> * No replay detection - packet replay is ignored within the lifetime
> of a session. They suggest that adversaries would be deterred by the
> risk of being detected by volunteers/organizations/ASs, but the
> detection process is going to add additional processing time and
> therefo
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str4d wrote:
> * Stateless data transmission (as they say on the box) - the
> routing info is replicated in every data packet, removing the need
> for local lookups. This increases the data packet header size (7
> hops requires 344 bytes for HORNET,
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Jeffrey Burdges wrote:
> I have not but I'm happy to read the article.
>
> Is there a discussion group for onion router and mixnet design?
> tor-talk might be a big generic for this.
According to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinf
I have not but I'm happy to read the article.
Is there a discussion group for onion router and mixnet design? tor-talk
might be a big generic for this.
On Wed, Jul 22, 2015 at 11:36 PM, Seth David Schoen wrote:
> Has anybody looked at the new HORNET system?
>
> http://arxiv.org/abs/1507.05724v
Has anybody looked at the new HORNET system?
http://arxiv.org/abs/1507.05724v1
It's a new onion routing design that seems to call for participation
by clients, servers, and network-layer routers; in exchange it claims
extremely good performance and scalability results.
I think it also calls for
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