On 04/11/2011 08:22 PM, Anders Andersson wrote:
> I consider myself a rather technical user with a lot of knowledge
> about the pitfalls of using Tor and security products in general, and
> I'm scared shit whenever I want to use torbutton in firefox because
> I'm afraid I will forget to toggle it,
On 03/09/2011 12:47 PM, berta...@ptitcanardnoir.org wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 09, 2011 at 04:25:40PM +0100, Anders Andersson wrote:
>> On Wed, Mar 9, 2011 at 2:56 PM, wrote:
>>> Seems that there are already kind of a convention in the way it is
>>> written :
>>>
>>> - Lines starting with '## ' are des
On 03/02/2011 11:27 AM, e e wrote:
> hello
> i want to know if i can run bridges for one country.
> best regards
>
Well a bridge can only be used by someone who know about it. You could
only distribute it to people in that country, but, that doesn't stop it
from leaking to, or being discovered by,
On 02/28/2011 03:30 PM, Robert Ransom wrote:
> On Mon, 28 Feb 2011 15:02:40 -0500
> thecarp wrote:
>
>> After the whole discussion about "gatereloaded" and "badexits" I was
>> thinking a bit about the discussion and wondering if there is a way to
>&
After the whole discussion about "gatereloaded" and "badexits" I was
thinking a bit about the discussion and wondering if there is a way to
add a bit more protection to people who are, well, newbs. As one article
pointed out:
"many who use Tor mistakenly believe it is an end-to-end encryption
tool
On 02/24/2011 07:27 AM, Olaf Selke wrote:
> Am 24.02.2011 08:45, schrieb grarpamp:
>
>> There is NO way to detect passive monitoring unless you have access
>> to the monitor.
> for each exit node I can set up a unique decoy email account one a
> machine controlled my myself, access it over unencryp
On 02/22/2011 01:52 AM, Scott Bennett wrote:
> On Mon, 14 Feb 2011 14:17:45 -0500 "Aplin, Justin M"
> wrote:
>> Although I've been keeping out of this argument for the most part, and
>> even though I'm leaning towards seeing things Mike's way, I just wanted
>> to comment that I've actually
