surface. Ideal to me would be an independent extension that minimally
implements this. Or is my concern about GreaseMonkey unfounded?
dhanlin
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TheMindwareGroup:
> Look up UK child stealing and gagging orders you can be thrown in jail
> for telling people about the governments corruption, child stealing
> and gagging orders, 91,000 children in care, 900 children taken a
> month and the benevalent Cameron wants it to be 1000, and they're
>
Bobby Brewster:
> I was experimenting using Tor and Thunderbird by entering 127.0.0.1: 9150 in
> the TB Preferences.
>
> I used my Gmail account and hence Gmail's SMTP server.
>
> I checked the headers of the message I sent to Gmail and the IP was a Tor
> exit node.
>
> However, I am wondering
;T for not allowing me location privacy when signing up for an
>> account on their website. Sorry to say that I am sticking with them because
>> I don't want to give my personal information to yet another bank, but you
>> all should know that they suck.
>>
>> dhanlin
never seen a fingerprinting attack used, AFAIK.
(I am not questioning the TBB default of allowing JavaScript; that
probably should be the default even if it increases risk, for usability
reasons.)
dhanlin
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Greg Norcie:
> Had the perp not invoked his right to remain silent, I'm pretty sure he
> wouldn't have been convicted.
You mean the opposite, right: if he *had* invoked his right to remain
silent?
As a hypothetical, how should law enforcement have handled it if the
perpetrator had not confessed?
r. Is TorBirdy using it? As
best I can tell it does not when used with a default TBB configuration.
Maybe it should be a TorBirdy default?
dhanlin
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Mix+TB Test:
> dhanlin:
>> Sebastian G. :
>>> 04.01.2014 09:05, dhanlin:
>>> It also depends on where and who your adversary is.
>>
>> The adversary I had in mind was a malicious exit node administrator. If
>> all e-mail accounts are accessed usin
Sebastian G. :
> 04.01.2014 09:05, dhanlin:
> It also depends on where and who your adversary is.
The adversary I had in mind was a malicious exit node administrator. If
all e-mail accounts are accessed using the same circuit, it seems the
exit node would see the near simultaneous conne
ed to enter a code received via phone or SMS.
Even if you do that, you are immediately returned to the login page with
username and password fields blank. AFAICT, you cannot turn off the
mobile authentication step.
dhanlin
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accounts at once, it seems an eavesdropper could match the
identifying accounts to the anonymous ones. I suspect this is a more
general question since the same problem exists with, for example, web
identities.
Thanks,
dhanlin
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