computer, Android or
any other, I'd suggest sparing yourself the trouble of modifying Orbot and
going with privoxy. https://www.privoxy.org/
I hope it helps,
David
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17.
o Minor bugfixes (compilation):
- Fix our configuration logic to detect whether we had OpenSSL 3:
previously, our logic was reversed. This has no other effect than
to change whether we suppress deprecated API warnings. Fixes bug
40429; bugfix on
On Thu, Jan 13, 2022 at 11:58:22PM -0700, David Fifield wrote:
> On Fri, Jan 14, 2022 at 05:38:14AM +0200, Markus Ottela via tor-talk wrote:
> > The creation of the Onion Service uses tempfile to create a temporary
> > directory each time a new Onion Service is spin up, but
ber of streams, number of
circuits, or anything like that, as far as I know.
> *In hindsight this I should've only done the GET requests inside the loop.
>
> Here's the script I was running:
> https://gist.github.com/maqp/0e5dcf542ebb97baf98d198115e931ea
>
> Markus
>
&
On Tue, Jan 11, 2022 at 08:06:00PM +0200, Nurmi, Juha wrote:
> In addition, there is a spike in non-direct bridge users from Finland as
> well.
>
> https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-country.html?start=2021-10-13&end=2022-01-11&country=fi
>
> All this is happening only in Finland and
On Thu, Jan 13, 2022 at 06:09:24PM +0200, Markus Ottela via tor-talk wrote:
> I've been experiencing weird behavior with Tor + Stem + Flask Onion Services
> dying randomly once every 1..5 days. I wrote a script that's making
> connections to a test an Onion Service to see when exactly the servers
>
assertion failure. Fixes bug 40494;
bugfix on 0.4.5.1-alpha.
o Documentation (man, relay):
- Missing "OverloadStatistics" in tor.1 manpage. Fixes bug 40504;
bugfix on 0.4.6.1-alpha.
Cheers!
David
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On 26 Oct (18:58:53), mick wrote:
> On Tue, 26 Oct 2021 11:48:54 -0400
> David Goulet allegedly wrote:
>
> > The Tor Network Team will from now on do its release announcement
> > through our new fancy shiny Discourse forum:
> > https://forum.torproject.net
> &
://forum.torproject.net/c/news/tor-release-announcement/28
And for todays' announcement:
https://forum.torproject.net/t/release-0-3-5-17-0-4-5-11-0-4-6-8-and-0-4-7-2-alpha/148
Cheers!
David
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On Mon, Jun 14, 2021 at 02:43:32PM +, torrio888 wrote:
> Does Snowflake bridge knows the IP address of the Snowflake client or it only
> knows the IP address of the Snowflake proxy?
The bridge knows the IP address of the Snowflake client. The Snowflake
client's IP address is forwarded to the
Hi tor-talk,
I'm working as a consultant to a criminal defense lawyer who's
representing a defendant in a case involving Tor and an investigation
by U.S. law enforcement and foreign law enforcement.
In 2019 a foreign law enforcement agency claimed to identify the clearnet
IP addresses of a large
looking for more than 2 relays per address which is the
limit that has been for a long time now. That is true on IPv4 and IPv6 as
well, the checked masked are /32 and /128 respectively.
David
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On Mon, Sep 14, 2020 at 05:37:53PM +, molter...@airmail.cc wrote:
> Why are all Snowflake proxies connecting to a single bridge (flakey) instead
> of connecting to a normal relay of client`s choice, multiple bridges or even
> connecting directly to the middle relay so that it serves as a first
The point nusenu is making is not that these relays should have contact
info; it's that they all have similar properties (among which is a lack
of contact info) that indicate that they are being run by the same
person.
On Fri, Aug 21, 2020 at 02:11:27PM +, bo0od wrote:
> Its stupid anyway to p
may take several minutes to
connect (or reconnect, when a proxy disappears).
On Wed, Feb 26, 2020 at 11:02:10PM -0700, David Fifield wrote:
> The anti-censorship team is looking for people to try Tor Browser
> packages built from an experimental branch of Snowflake that is supposed
> to make
On Thu, Mar 19, 2020 at 06:08:27PM -0600, David Fifield wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 26, 2020 at 11:02:10PM -0700, David Fifield wrote:
> > The anti-censorship team is looking for people to try Tor Browser
> > packages built from an experimental branch of Snowflake that is supposed
> &
Fwiw, sys_admin doesn't show up in the source code of Firefox.
CAP_SYS_ADMIN is defined but never used.
Cheers,
Yoric
On 16/04/2020 00:52, Matthew Finkel wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 15, 2020 at 10:49 PM Nicolas Vigier
> wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, 15 Apr 2020, Mr. Bob Dobalina wrote:
>>
>>> Dear Friends,
>>
This is a merge candidate for the experimental Snowflake packages that
make Snowflake more reliable by allowing a session to span multiple
temporary proxies. They are based on the current 9.5a11.
https://people.torproject.org/~dcf/pt-bundle/tor-browser-snowflake-turbotunnel-9.5a11-20200410/
To en
On Wed, Feb 26, 2020 at 11:02:10PM -0700, David Fifield wrote:
> The anti-censorship team is looking for people to try Tor Browser
> packages built from an experimental branch of Snowflake that is supposed
> to make Snowflake more reliable. There are two versions; you can try
> either
On Tue, Mar 03, 2020 at 10:38:06AM +0100, john doe wrote:
> What range of UDP port do I need to open for snowflake to work properly
> alternatively how can I restrict the UDP port used by snowflake?
You will need to open at least UDP port 19302 for communication with the
STUN server, but even afte
On Sat, Feb 29, 2020 at 09:24:19AM +0100, john doe wrote:
> On 2/28/2020 3:32 AM, David Fifield wrote:
> > On Thu, Feb 27, 2020 at 08:06:35PM +0100, john doe wrote:
> >> I get stuck at 50% while trying to connect.
> >> Is there specific ports that are required to be
On Wed, Feb 26, 2020 at 11:02:10PM -0700, David Fifield wrote:
> These special packages are made not to auto-update until 2020-04-23.
> After that, they will update and become a normal Tor Browser alpha.
The prefs I tried setting to disable automatic updates didn't work. If
you were u
On Thu, Feb 27, 2020 at 08:06:35PM +0100, john doe wrote:
> I get stuck at 50% while trying to connect.
> Is there specific ports that are required to be opened?
50% is the point where Tor needs to download the consensus, which can
take a few minutes the first time you run the browser. (Because it
The anti-censorship team is looking for people to try Tor Browser
packages built from an experimental branch of Snowflake that is supposed
to make Snowflake more reliable. There are two versions; you can try
either one or both of them. If you have feedback, tell us whether you
are using the "kcp" o
On 07 Jan (15:38:46), s7r wrote:
> David Goulet wrote:
> > Tor relays supporting the HS DoS defense (intro points) at this point in
> > time
> > are not in majority. Basically >= 0.4.2.1-alpha relays do support it which
> > currently represents ~36% in bandwidt
to the anonymity and stability properties of the
network.
Onion service reachability under DDoS is a hard problem and being researched:
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/31223
Hope this help!
David
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be *under* the "HiddenServiceDir" since they are
specific per HS.
If it still fails, maybe providing the output of the error?
Thanks!
David
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Hi Jan,
I haven't noticed this border, but torBrowser does add random borders
to windows to make it harder to fingerprint you. So what you're
describing actually sounds like a privacy feature :)
Cheers,
David
On 05/11/2019 12:34, Jan wrote:
> Hello folks,
>
> I&
nusenu writes:
> InjureWellprepred
> ChicgoHopeful
> VillgerVenice
> FemleDiffer
> PossibilityCreture
> CrownDutchmn
> BeyondNtionl
> BridegroomDisster
> HrmonyCrown
> NurseryGreement
> RibbonUnderline
> CookbookRoundbout
> SectionPolitics
> PerfectThlete
Very odd naming convention. It's kind of
On 13 Oct (19:27:00), nusenu wrote:
> you might want to avoid using these Tor relays
Bad relay team has asked the dirauths to reject these relays from the network.
Cheers!
Da
hi...@safe-mail.net writes:
> They're basically talking about eliminating criminal activities facilitated
> online by the darknet, by making Tor and the dark web illegal and
> inaccessible
> in Europe.
But this discussion is one politician's view in a keynote address at a
police congress -- wh
plugged in TorBrowser, but there may be holes
that have escaped the attention of devs.
I personally browse with JS activated, because I have very low safety
requirements (I use TorBrowser as a VPN, largely to increase deniability
by people who really need this), but YMMV.
Cheers,
David
On 10/12/2018
Seth David Schoen writes:
> if its operator knew a vulnerability in some clients' video codecs,
(or in some other part of Tor Browser, since the proxy can also serve
arbitrary HTTP headers, HTML, CSS, Javascript, JSON, and media files of
various types)
> it could also serve a
bo0od writes:
> This is another front end to YouTube:
Hi bo0od,
Thanks for the links.
This seems to be in a category of "third-party onion proxy for clearnet
service" which is distinct from the situation where a site operator
provides its own official onion service (like Facebook's facebookcore
.torproject.org/torsocks.git
Tarball: https://people.torproject.org/~dgoulet/torsocks/torsocks-2.3.0.tar.xz
(sig: https://people.torproject.org/~dgoulet/torsocks/torsocks-2.3.0.tar.xz.asc)
Cheers!
David
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/ticket/27750 with this
problem.
Quickly like that, I can't tell you why this is happening or any workaround
you could do so keep an eye on the ticket. If this is an 0.3.4.x regression,
we'll find it quickly.
Thanks!
David
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D
> Message: 1
> Date: Fri, 3 Aug 2018 07:47:18 -0400
> From: Nick Mathewson
> To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
> Subject: Re: [tor-talk] The Onion Report at #hopeconf (video)
> Message-ID:
>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
>
> On Tue, Jul 31,
On Sun, 29 Jul 2018 22:51:00 +
nusenu wrote:
> > https://twitter.com/torproject/status/1022840807374635009
>
> > If you
> > missed The Onion Report at #hopeconf last week with Steph, Alison,
> > George, David, and Matt, you can watch it online and find out a
Yup, I did not believe it either, until I tried disabling all plugins and
then reload the page and open the web inspector in FF. All the content is
gone after the page is mostly rendered, but the ADs and trackers are
still there to take advantage of any info they can pull from your browser.
Disable
On Wed, 11 Jul 2018 18:50:48 -0700
Dave Warren wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 11, 2018, at 09:32, Lara wrote:
> > On Wed, 11 Jul 2018, at 16:01, Nathaniel Suchy wrote:
> > > I hate Cloudflare and what they’re doing to Tor users.
> >
> > Luckily Cloudflare, Google, Facebook do not hate you or the other
On Mon, 9 Jul 2018 02:17:17 -0400
grarpamp wrote:
> Your only recourse is to educate whatever helpdesks
> and humans at these sites like Phoronix you can find.
>
> One email, and ticket opened, and tweet complaint, per each
> captcha click, from each affected tor user... that should do the
> tric
Many websites, for example: https://www.phoronix.com/
have a page called:
"One more step
Please complete the security check to access XXX"
It requires that I enable JS for several things and then reads that I
have a 2 min exception, after which I have to complete another challenge.
This makes bro
On Sun, 8 Jul 2018 02:54:19 -0400
Roger Dingledine wrote:
>
> On Sat, Jul 07, 2018 at 11:19:49PM -0400, David Niklas wrote:
> > Hello,
> > I'm running firefox 61.0.1. I am trying to access the media outlet
> > defcon's onion site. https://media.
Hello,
I'm running firefox 61.0.1. I am trying to access the media outlet
defcon's onion site. https://media.defcon.org/ points me to:
http://m6rqq6kocsyugo2laitup5nn32bwm3lh677chuodjfmggczoafzwfcad.onion/
I have network.dns.blockDotOnion false
network.http.referer.hideOnionSource true and
network
Kevin Burress writes:
> honestly, ideally it would be a lot easier to do things with tor if it
> actually internally followed the unix philosophy and the layers of service
> could be used as a part of the linux system and modular use of the parts. I
> was just looking at BGP routing over tor. I'm
Dear Tor list members,
my name is David Harborth and I am a PhD student at Goethe University Frankfurt
am Main. I am currently working for a project called AN.ON-Next
(https://www.anon-next.de)<https://www.anon-next.de)/> where we investigate
different anonymization services. For that p
ee some tor logs.
And I would also be very interested in learning if your tor process was under
a lot of load once your v3 got public?
Do you usually have a lot of users going to these v3 once public? That is, are
you expecting many users or it is mostly for yourself? We could have a
reachability
grarpamp writes:
> [Quoting The Intercept]
> financial privacy “is something that matters incredibly” to the
> Bitcoin community, and expects that “people who are privacy conscious
> will switch to privacy-oriented coins” after learning of the NSA’s
> work here.
Or, maybe people who are privacy c
ks hijacks that exploded:
$ strace -f -o /tmp/strace-torsocks.log torsocks nodejs [...]
Hope this help! Just a quick note, making the full nodejs work with torsocks
could end up being quite complicated. You should also consider a way to use
nodejs SOCKS proxy option (if any) instead and make your app
Dash Four writes:
> Which part of "provided you know what you are doing" don't you understand?
You still can't mitigate the browser distinctiveness issue through
expertise or caution, so you can't get the same level of cross-site or
cross-session unlinkability that Tor Browser users can get. But
Dash Four writes:
> Roger Dingledine wrote:
> >Using any browser with Tor besides Tor Browser is usually a bad idea:
> >https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#TBBOtherBrowser
> I disagree with that statement. It is certainly _not_ a bad idea, provided
> you know what you are doing.
As the documenta
Dear Tor list members,
my name is David Harborth and I am a PhD student at Goethe University Frankfurt
am Main. I am currently working for a project called AN.ON-Next
(https://www.anon-next.de)<https://www.anon-next.de)/> where we investigate
different anonymization services. For that p
bob1983 writes:
> 3. Even if this protocol is integrated in Tor Browser, after clicking "New
> Identity", all local data will be erased. Considering this feature is
> frequently
> used by Tor users, we still need to solve some CAPTCHAs.
If the protocol is sound here in its unlinkability property
Coinciding with the Tor blog post today about next-generation onion
services, I sent a proposal to the CA/Browser Forum to amend the rules
to allow issuance of publicly-trusted certificates for use with TLS
services on next-generation onion addresses (with DV validation methods,
in addition to the
Matej Kovacic writes:
> Hi,
>
> there is some interesting project called Noiszy: https://noiszy.com/
>
> It generates fake traffic. It is more "artists" project that real
> countermeasure, but I am thinking to implement something like this on my
> network with several machines inside.
>
> Howev
George writes:
> But ultimately, Tor's topography mitigates against one of the three
> nodes in your circuit being compromised. If the first hop is
> compromised, then they only know who you are, but not where your
> destination is. If the last hop is compromised, they only know where
> you're goi
Arturo Filastò writes:
> That said, something to keep in mind, is that OONI Probe is not a privacy
> tool, but rather a tool for investigations and as such poses some risks (as
> we explain inside of our informed consent procedure).
>
> We are not aware of any OONI Probe users having gotten int
Hi Maria,
I also posted this question as a comment on the blog post, but I was
wondering if OONI encounters adversarial activity from censors who
try to either locate and shut down OONI nodes, or return different
information to OONI nodes than to other Internet users. If so, the
OONI Run feature
Roger Dingledine writes:
> Asking Cloudflare how many people are deciding to solve their captchas
> today is measuring a different thing -- if I try to load a news article,
> see a cloudflare captcha, and say "aw, fuck cloudflare, oh well" and
> move on, am I a bot?
I'm just figuring that you can
Scfith Riseup writes:
> Nope.
>
> Indication that Tor in use uptick unfortunately could point to more
> bots collecting Tor, not necessarily people using Tor. Wish there was
> a way to differentiate bots from meat.
Amusingly, CloudFlare would probably be in a position to do so because
they presen
Paul Syverson writes:
> As the cryptographic design changes for next generation onion services
> are now being rolled out, that
> in-my-opinion-never-actually-well-grounded concern will go away. I
> cover at a high level, a design for onion altnames in "The Once and
> Future Onion" [1] that I thin
Roger Dingledine writes:
> I think finding ways to tie onion addresses to normal ("insecure web")
> domains, when a service has both, is really important too. I'd like to
> live in a world where Let's Encrypt gives you an onion altname in your
> https cert by default, and spins up a Tor client by
Dave Warren writes:
> I don't completely understand this, since outside the Tor world it's
> possible to acquire DV certificates using verification performed on
> unencrypted (HTTP) channels.
>
> Wouldn't the same be possible for a .onion, simply requiring that the
> verification service act as a
Hi folks,
For a long time, publicly-trusted certificate authorities were not
clearly permitted to issue certificates for .onion names. However, RFC
7686 and a series of three CA/Browser Forum ballots sponsored by Digicert
have allowed issuance of EV certificates (where the legal identity of
the c
I just learned of the Cisco Umbrella domain popularity list, which is
based on counting DNS queries.
https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/blog/2016/12/14/cisco-umbrella-1-million/
https://s3-us-west-1.amazonaws.com/umbrella-static/index.html
https://s3-us-west-1.amazonaws.com/umbrella-static/top-1m-201
Suhaib Mbarak writes:
> Dear Seth Schoen:
>
> Thank you very much for your extremely appreciated answer:
>
> It seems that you were the most person who got what I'm looking for.
> To be honest I'm doing my best to find away to figure out how to achieve my
> goal to show student how TOR works as
Suhaib Mbarak writes:
> I'm a master student and doing some researches on TOR . I'm using shadow
> simulator; not real tor network; my goal is only to run an experiment and
> from the output of that experiment I can confess my students that Tor
> really : [...]
It seems to me that one useful poss
By the way, there's an interesting new study
https://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2017/papers/84.pdf
that claims that many people believe communications security is "futile"
because of inaccurate mental models of cryptography, and strongly
endorse security through obscurity.
I've been thinking a l
Suhaib Mbarak writes:
> Dear all.
>
> My question is to make sure wether tor source code is open and available
> for public or not?
Yes, it has always been since the beginning of the project. Currently,
the code is available at
https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git
> In case it is open source
On Fri, May 19, 2017 at 03:12:34PM -0400, Lolint wrote:
> Nice find! To mention other events, something strange is happening in Taiwan,
>
> https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-country.html?graph=userstats-relay-country&country=tw&events=on
>
> And it looks like Egypt is starting to cen
your
relay is running the intended version of tor or that it hasn't been tempered
with.
David
>
> The first message that I saw was "Fingerprint is marked rejected -- please
> contact us?" and I read that It could be due outdated software so a ran
> updates and
My spontaneous thought is to check the configure script (I'm not really
into the source but I'm guessing it's a script) to see what the tests are.
It is not improbable that the tests assume a certain configuration and look
for files that aren't necessarily present when you have systemd installed.
There is always a risk of bugs and exploits in the code. Having a security
researcher study these gives us better knowledge of the current flaws and
how to correct them. If you truly trust the browsers current security this
should have no downside, otherwise it is the path to improving it.
//Sidju
nusenu writes:
> that put users at risk because they potentially see traffic entering
> _and_ leaving the tor network (which breaks the assumption that not
> every relay in a circuit is operated by the same operator).
(strictly speaking, the assumption that no more than one relay in a
circuit is
;network
maturity" which will allow us to switch from the current service protocol to
the next-gen for all newly created services.
This post on tor-dev@ kind of explain our intentions (but that might change
overtime of course):
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2016-December/011725
grarpamp writes:
> [quoting movrcx]
> In today’s cyberwar, Tor exit nodes represent the front line of
> battle. At this location it is possible to directly observe attacks,
> to launch attacks, and to even gather intelligence. An alarming figure
> disclosed by The Intercept’s Micah Lee attributed
On 23 Dec (00:03:00), Ivan Markin wrote:
> David Goulet:
> > On 20 Dec (23:38:43), hi...@safe-mail.net wrote:
> >> I just think that this new single-hop system should have been reserved for
> >> a
> >> different Tor source/installation, dedicated only to non-
> but doesn't change the way HSDir and RdVPoint are handled.
Correct except not the RdVPoint but the Introduction Point will be different
for stealth authorization as it is a descriptor per client authorization.
Cheers!
David
>
> Regards,
> --
> Aeris
> Individual crypto-terror
6 months), every onion service will advertise in its descriptor that it *is*
a single onion service and we hope to make the circuit viewer in Tor Browser
show that when visiting a single onion service.
I hope this help answer some of your concerns!
Thanks!
David
>
> -Hikki
> --
> tor-
ike the others".
Second, same occurs with modifying that RendPostPeriod from the default value
of an hour to a custom time time. It makes you a bit more noticeable because
you have a different behavior then anyone else.
(And possibly some effect of disabling LearnCircuitBuildTimeout).
Seth David Schoen writes:
> Notably, Google has even experimentally deployed a PQ ciphersuite
> in Chrome (that uses elliptic-curve cryptography in parallel with
> Alkim et al.'s "new hope" algorithm).
>
> https://security.googleblog.com/2016/07/experi
Flipchan writes:
> I dont think so, quantum 4times at fast so we just need to generate 4times as
> strong keys the entropy will just be bigger, But as Long as we are not useing
> like 56 bit des keys its okey
You're probably thinking of safety of symmetric encryption, where there
is a quadratic
On Thu, Nov 17, 2016 at 11:53:39AM -0600, Yphone wrote:
> Cyberoam calls it Tor. Not sure about iboss but I would guess it calls it Tor
> as well
I just learned that Cyberoam has an online demo.
https://demo.cyberoam.com/ (username: guest, password: guest)
In the Application Filter config, ther
hi...@safe-mail.net writes:
> So, where does this put Tor, encryption and general privacy? Shouldn't we
> start preparing ourselves for the inevitable privacy apocalypse?
People have been working on this for years, and they're making good
progress.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Post-quantum_cry
Jason Long writes:
> Hello.
> I found a version of Tor in "http://torbrowser.sourceforge.net/";, But what is
> the different between it and official TorBrowser? Is it a trust version?
This is an unrelated project that seems to be trying to confuse people
by visually imitating the old design of t
Jason Long writes:
> Are you kidding? Iranian relays are good in this scenario? Why?
Because they might be less likely to cooperate with ISPs in other
countries to track Tor traffic.
--
Seth Schoen
Senior Staff Technologist https://www.eff.org/
Electronic Frontier Founda
On Thu, Nov 17, 2016 at 05:16:49AM -0600, Justin wrote:
> OBFS4 is blocked behind both filters. Cyberoam is doing some sort of
> timing attack, but I’m not sure what. When a bridge is used by lots of
> people, then it doesn’t work. Even enabling Iat mode=1 or 2 doesn’t
> fix the issue.
When you sa
Jason Long writes:
> To be honest, I guess that I must stop using Tor It is not secure.I can
> remember that in torproject.org the Tor speaking about some peole that use
> Tor. For example, reporters, Military soldiers and...But I guess all of them
> are ads. Consider a soldier in a country
Jason Long writes:
> Not from ISP!! It is so bad because ISPs are under
> governments control. If an ISP can see I use Tor then it is a good evidence
> in censorship countries.You said " If a government is running the bridge, it
> will know where the users are who are using
Flipchan writes:
> So i was thinking about timing attacks and simular attacks where time is a
> Big factor when deanonymizing users .
> and created a Little script that will generate a ipv4 address and send a get
> request to that address
> https://github.com/flipchan/Nohidy/blob/master/traffi
Jason Long writes:
> You said the governments can see a user bandwidth usage and it is so bad
> because they can understand a user use Tor for regular web surfing or use it
> for upload files and...
> You said governments can see users usages but not contents but how they can
> find specific
Jason Long writes:
> Hello Tor Developers and administrator.The Tor goal is provide Secure web
> surfing as free and Freedom but unfortunately some countries like Iran,
> China, North Korea and... Launch Tor bridges for spying on users and sniff
> their traffics and it is so bad and decrease To
Alec Muffett writes:
> To a first approximation I am in favour of maximising all of those, but
> practically I feel that that's a foolhardy proposition - simply, my Netflix
> viewing, or whatever, does not need to be anonymised.
I appreciate your approach to analyzing what Tor-like tools need to
ackage défaillant :
ID de l’application relative au package défaillant :>>
Le Jeudi 22 septembre 2016 18h05, Cannon a écrit :
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
On 09/21/2016 06:17 PM, David Bodnaraszek wrote:
> I recently downloaded and installed the TOR browser, which
I recently downloaded and installed the TOR browser, which worked well for one
day ;)
Now, every time I try to relaunch it, I get a Windows message telling me that
TOR has stopped working, and Windows (10) is trying to fix it, please close the
browser
Please inform me as to why this is hap
Hi!
Lately (like last 10 days) I see many messages (more than usual) on
the list marked as spam by gmail (using the gmail.com web interface).
The reason given is most often:
- (this message) It has a from address in foo.com but has failed
foo.com's required tests for authentication.
- It's simi
Recently, we had reports of Cyberoam firewalls blocking meek by TLS
signature:
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2016-May/040923.html
I got a similar report, this time for a FortiGuard firewall.
The story is basically the same as last time: the firewall looks for TLS
that has the sig
I assume that it is so that data entered on an assumed http website cannot
be used to identify your data to other sites. Simply, to decouple the
sifferent sessions you're having on different sites.
On 22 Jul 2016 16:21, wrote:
> Has the TBB changed the way that IP addresses are allocated?
>
> It
On 19 July 2016 at 07:13, Friet Pan wrote:
>
> So now i also wonder how many people on this list are not receiving THIS
> message.
For me gmail put your message (but not the replies) into Spam. Forgot
to check the reason it gave, sorry.
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tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
T
On Wed, Jun 01, 2016 at 06:32:27PM -0700, David Fifield wrote:
> meek-google has not been working since May 13, 2016. It is not because
> censors figured out how to block it, but because Google Cloud Platform
> suspended the reflector web application (https://meek-reflect.appspot.com/).
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