Saludad Tor-Talk!
A while back Coderman posted:
“[tor-talk] How does one remove the NSA Virus off the BIOS Chip as described by
Snowden in the ANT Program
here's some fun for you:
https://peertech.org/files/taobios-v2.tar.bz2
$ sha256sum taobios-v2.ta
On 3/19/16, Oskar Wendel wrote:
> ...
> Let's assume that the service is extremely popular, with over 6 terabytes
> of traffic each day, and a gigabit port almost constantly saturated. Then,
> we can observe a small handset of guards and still be able to spot at
> least some users.
the problem wi
On 3/19/16, Oskar Wendel wrote:
>...
> Let's set up a service in a way that it will modulate the traffic, so the
> download would look like:
> [ some distinct signaling here...]
yes; it's a traffic confirmation attack, and by interrupting the flow
you confirm that the endpoints in question are in
On 2/26/16, Roman Mamedov wrote:
> ...
> Maybe I'm missing something, how anything you do inside your server (run
> Tor
> on CPU, GPU, FPGA or magic fairies) will reduce your *bandwidth* costs?
more machines to saturate a gig link.
in theory, future Tor will handle 10GigE at speed on single host
On 2/22/16, Green Dream wrote:
>...
> Interesting. Any idea what they're able to enumerate with the modified
> version of Tor?
they're able to enumerate the onions which land on their node(s) per
O(1) mapping in HSDir participants. e.g. "get lucky"
> Can the Tor network be hardened from this c
On 2/12/16, Rusty Bird wrote:
> ...
> In my layman's prejudices, the VPN approach's upsides are: no
> superuser privileges needed, and standardization across ROMs. And the
> downside (really unsure here): that some packets, from system
> processes or early in the boot process, could escape the fil
On 2/5/16, Sean Lynch wrote:
> ... Radio is being used right now to provide anonymity, but it's being used[1]
> to hide endpoints similar to the duct-taped payphone trick depicted in
> Hackers, in order to avoid attacks like the one used to capture Ross
> Ulbricht without giving him a chance to wi
On 2/3/16, Jeremy Rennicks wrote:
> Would it be worthwhile or feasible to route Tor traffic through SDR.. For
> example if I were a node on Tor and data came to my system would routing it
> through my SDR to another system then back over the ISP backbone add
> anonymity or be of any use?
where i
On 2/1/16, Michael wrote:
> ...
> My last question (for now) has to do with Fail2Ban and hidden services.
>
> My question is would you all prefer that separate jail.local configuration
> blocks be written for each Tor service port individually, ei failing one
> port
> doesn't ban from a possible s
On 1/23/16, David Stainton wrote:
> tldr...
Michael,
you're not going to find much "professional software developer" uptake
in your effort.
the professionals feel "configuration management" is the domain of
actual programming languages, like Python, or domain specific
constructs like cfEngine.
On 1/19/16, Michael wrote:
> Salutations Tor,
>
> I've something special to share with you all; regardless of if you're a node
> operator, hidden service provider, client or completely new to Tor
> installation and configurations... in short... a script pack aimed to
> install and configure the pr
... btw. thanks for this! :)
best regards,
--
tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
To unsubscribe or change other settings go to
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
On 1/18/16, Christian Stöveken wrote:
> ...
> I was talking to one of the tor developers at the Wauholland place the
> last day @32C3 about his opinion on transparent tor wlan boxes like
> anonabox or invinzbox and others.
a recurrent theme. past discussion threads:
1. "[tor-dev] design for a To
On 1/11/16, Oskar Wendel wrote:
> ...
> I have one more question. What are the drawbacks of not preserving Tor
> state directory between reboots? ...
> One drawback that I see is that after every reboot, a new entry guard will
> be selected and it can make correlation attacks easier.
this becomes
On 12/29/15, Seth David Schoen wrote:
> ...
> I would suggest looking at Tom Ritter's overview presentation about Tor.
> It is very detailed...
>
> https://ritter.vg/p/tor-v1.6.pdf
Tom also provided a handy redirect to latest,
https://ritter.vg/p/tor-vlatest.pdf
:)
--
tor-talk mailing list
On 12/10/15, Rob Jansen wrote:
> ...
> That is definitely an error! I rebooted the nodes but it appears that their
> consensus weights in the latest consensus have not been corrected. So I just
> took them down now.
thank you to everyone for acting transparently and conservatively in
this situat
On 11/21/15, Flipchan wrote:
> I would like to help in anyway i can , i'm currently developing an anti
> virus and auditing multi platform program , So if u can find out/copy all
> the viruses the nsa have given You and send it i would love to help on
> detecting and protecting ppl from it :)
you
On 12/3/15, Sebastian Hahn wrote:
> ...
> You're on the FreeNode irc network, not OFTC's.
don't use freenode. ever.
best regards,
--
tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
To unsubscribe or change other settings go to
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-ta
On Tue, Dec 1, 2015 at 4:23 AM, Tempest wrote:
> i noticed a number of accounts were suspended due to using tor recently.
> any news on the status of accounts locked out in the last round of
> twitter's tor censorship? i'm coming up on 96 hours since twitter has
> acknowledged in email that there
On Wed, Dec 2, 2015 at 7:31 AM, CASPER aka the PARTY G
wrote:
> What happened??
this is a mystery to us all!
> tor used to be about torture,
this has been aggregated into a handful of tickets for multi-threading support.
> killings live killings
the collective defect identification efforts
On 11/20/15, Virilha wrote:
>
> I believe you need immediate help, to capture evidence and/or reverse
> engineer malware.
it will be persistent but latent.
e.g. after a time period of "unable to successfully implant in OS"
it will quit trying. or maybe not! unknown unknowns, etc.
or maybe n
On 11/11/15, Soul Plane wrote:
> ...
> Is this a problem that can't be stopped, these relays that may join the
> network in an effort to de-anonymize users?
conflating issues; let's pick apart,
can you stop evil relays from ever participating?
No. however the design of Tor takes this into accou
On 10/31/15, Lara wrote:
> ... only two
> or three servers have .onion addresses. Both services (or pods) I have
> tested use plain http for the .onion address. Anyway, it is quite
> pointless, because once you are in you get a bunch of connections in the
> regular Internet, including the main ser
On 10/28/15, Juan wrote:
> ...
> edit : I mean, of course, without giving a phone number or any
> other real information.
i can't speak to "Real Names" policy, or verification requirements. it
seems you can be singled out for verification by any number of
feedback or automatic select
On 10/27/15, Juan wrote:
> ...
> Can you create a facebook account thru the hidden service?
yes. i am using an account only ever accessed via onion.
[ https://www.facebookcorewwwi.onion/ ]
--
tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
To unsubscribe or change other settings go
On 10/12/15, David Tomic wrote:
> To help students answer their assignment questions?
this is what's called an ancillary benefit.
"teachable moments"
--
tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
To unsubscribe or change other settings go to
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mail
On 10/12/15, coderman wrote:
> ...
> multi-homed flag must die in a fire. don't even consider it!
note that multiple listen addrs for a relay (multi-homing) would be
fine in consensus. this "multi-homed exit behavior" flag is a farce,
however.
best regards,
--
tor-talk ma
On 10/12/15, sh-expires-12-2...@quantentunnel.de
wrote:
> ...
> Tor users aren't entitled to special treatment,
at times it is desirable to avoid the usual "knee-jerk" responses, however.
there is a trick, which is to monitor the consensus. any new relay
identity, or new IP associated with an ex
On 10/12/15, kennedy weinrich wrote:
> What was the main purpose in creating Tor or the Tor Project?
Private communications for all earth humans!
as noble an aim today as it was then. and forever a basic human right.
best regards,
--
tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
To un
On 10/12/15, sh-expires-12-2...@quantentunnel.de
wrote:
>
> Mozilla browser (and plugins) more or less hardwired to Tor.
there are also significant numbers of browser hardening and
configuration tuning for privacy, beyond just plugins and the Tor
hard-wire-on.
this is the fun part!
(seeing how
On 10/12/15, sh-expires-12-2...@quantentunnel.de
wrote:
> ...
> Thats what you fail to grasp, imho.
i appreciate education in all forms :)
> I am not sure, what "rogue remote execution" is, please elaborate.
> Sounds like an assassin sniper to me. ;)
i should have been more clear.
specifical
On 10/11/15, Idel Martinez Ramos wrote:
> Hello!
> I'm an 11th grade student and I'm doing a science fair about Anonymity
it would be fun to compare different Tor configurations:
- Tor Browser
- TAILS
- Whonix / Whonix-Qubes
- Qubes-TorVM
- TransProxy [
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/t
On 10/8/15, sh-expires-12-2...@quantentunnel.de
wrote:
>
> One of the major problems is the design of Pidign, which tries
> to build a convenient IM client before it takes security into
> consideration
"security vs. usability", as ever...
> Still, it is possible to a achieve a high degree
On 9/29/15, Tempest wrote:
> ...
> another option to consider is whonix. https://whonix.org. it's a good
> mitigation platform against potentially leaky aps.
the primary problem with Pidgin is libpurple [
https://pidgin.im/news/security/ ] and a more appropriate mitigation
would be Qubes isolatio
On 8/11/15, coderman wrote:
> ...
> i thought i had a list of Trac tickets to the gist of this matter,
> alas i cannot find them. perhaps someone else has a convenient
> collection?
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/projects/Tor/MultithreadedCrypto
which covers th
On 8/11/15, coderman wrote:
> ...
i think it also is worth pointing out:
using Tor in odd ways outside the supported Tor Browser configuration
is not recommended. (like transparent Tor routers, or different
browsers with Tor proxy setup)
as with the PDF.js viewer, which has flaws, you do
On 8/10/15, Thomas White wrote:
> ...
> If anyone has any links to good guides on using Tor with common
> applications,
resources i find myself suggesting to others:
Surveillance Self Defense Guides and Briefings
- https://ssd.eff.org/en
Library Freedom Project presentations:
- https://libra
On 8/11/15, Roman Mamedov wrote:
> ...
> *Repeatedly headbangs on the desk*
>
> Uhm so what was I talking about. Ah yes, I believe that's not the case. It
> would add a great deal of benefit actually.
it would be useful, particularly on systems with native acceleration
of supported crypto primiti
On 7/15/15, Apple Apple wrote:
> ...
> I think coderman was saying something about a conversion tool as well but I
> didn't really understand it...
you could call that rube goldberg a "conversion tool", but really it
was an object lesson. ;)
speaking of PDFs,
"
minijail better than real jail, see:
https://github.com/omegaup/minijail
"a tiny, custom launcher that handles namespacing, control groups,
chroot'ing..."
forked from https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/platform/minijail/
documentation
http://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-des
On 7/22/15, Apple Apple wrote:
> ... is there some deeper reasoning ...?
USB fit in your pocket; more like DVD-RW perhaps, too.
best regards,
--
tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
To unsubscribe or change other settings go to
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/list
On 7/12/15, Yuri wrote:
> ...
> It is nothing inherently unsafe in pdf format itself, and any other
> document formats aren't any safer. You probably confuse pdf and
> PostScript, which is more like a programming language. PDF isn't nearly
> as much a programming language as ps is. It does have in
On 7/9/15, flipc...@riseup.net wrote:
> couldnt we just code some protection against this
WhonixQubes with DeepLang semantic barriers between isolated temporal
processing pipelines.
you obtain the PDF inside a transient isolated VM via scrutinized path
through upstream Tor and Firewall VMs.
nex
On 7/8/15, grarpamp wrote:
> I don't think openvpn supports socks5 on its input yet.
>
> Anyone know of a shim to put in front of openvpn that will accept
> socks5 on its input and send to an IP nexthop / interface as its output
> (thus making it configurable to point into openvpn)?
this would be
On 7/7/15, chloe wrote:
> ...
> how would this method work if an infected client tries to visit a hidden
> service?
there are at least three common ways:
1. using an evil proxy, as directed above. they install a rogue CA so
they can sign for any SSL/TLS required. this works for hidden
services
On 6/18/15, coderman wrote:
> ...
> this is where multi-path transports, which resist attacks against
> traditional in-order or stream oriented transports - inherently
> encumbered by serial datagram sequence
i should have mentioned that stochastic shaping is required along with
the
On 6/18/15, l.m wrote:
> ...
> All that padding means nothing if an adversary can introduce latency
> or gaps *at arbitrary* locations in a path. An adversary that can see
> your guard, and who can also see the guards traffic can introduce the
> gaps/latency in traffic at any point in your path. Y
congratulations! glad to see Qubes & Whonix work continue...
-- Forwarded message --
From: Joanna Rutkowska
Date: Thu, 4 Jun 2015 13:12:52 +0200
...
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
Hello,
Here is some great news:
http://blog.invisiblethings.org/2015/06/04/otf-fun
On 5/27/15, Allen wrote:
> I have a client application that Tor to communicate with several servers.
> For privacy reasons, it is important that after each request, the client
> starts with a "fresh slate" so the server is not able to tell that the next
> request is coming from the same client.
o
On 5/26/15, Donncha O'Cearbhaill wrote:
> ...
> I am interested in hearing from all existing hidden service operators.
speaking for two,
> In particular I'd like to understand the use-cases,
- file distribution
- "web services", etherpad, ethersheet, webdav
- XMPP
- IRC
- overlay network (tun
On 5/8/15, l.m wrote:
>> There may be other security implications of a shared Tor client.
>
> Such as
>
> 1. All users that share a tor client also share a threat model. The
> tor configuration is shared. This may not be an ideal property.
> 2. If one user of the shared tor client breaks the proce
On 5/5/15, l.m wrote:
> I didn't say wondering about an anomaly is disrespectful. Assuming you
> have the right bring their relay's to everyone's attention is
> disrespectful.
"Dodgson, Dodgson, we've got Dodgson here!"
... in other words, relays are inherently public.
more importantly, this i
On 5/3/15, Juan wrote:
> ...
hey Juan,
i'm turning over a new leaf and responding to your feedback with
promptness and detail. [0]
>> what part of "Will never compromise Tor" do you not understand?
>
> LMAO! What part of 'secret laws' and US military nazis you
> don't understand?
On 5/3/15, benjamin barber wrote:
> Except that TOR says they're going to help LEO with stop cyber criminals
> according to briefings with UK parliament.
what part of "Will never compromise Tor" do you not understand?
educating law enforcement does not equate to capitulating to calls for
backdoor
On 5/2/15, benjamin barber wrote:
> This has been discussed in the past here, specifically with darpa / memex
> thread,
funding. check. (a hard problem for anybody!)
> and the pando saga,
mostly funding, disagreements over earth humans being decent to each other?
> and some documents submi
On 5/2/15, benjamin barber wrote:
> How does Ed Snowden not getting caught, have to do with Tor being immune
> from flaws, by that logic I have a tiger repelling rock to sell you (money
> back guarantee).
the claim was not that Tor is immune to flaws. the point is that it
works. it is not systema
On 5/2/15, Mirimir wrote:
> ... I can't resist sharing this: "And it’s a matter
> of record that Ed [Snowden] trusted his life to Tor, because he saw from
> the other side that it worked."
>
> I wonder what the haters say to that. Actually, I know: "He's a double
> agent, and it's all a con." Amir
On 4/27/15, Griffin Boyce wrote:
> ...
>I've run hidden services successfully on TP-Link WDR-4300 -- they have
> 8mb of flash (storage), 128mb ram, and 2 usb ports. With an added flash
> drive it's basically a small server. For the size-conscious, you can
> also run a hidden service on a TP-
On 4/17/15, WhonixQubes wrote:
> ...
> And my next major project will hopefully overcome most all of the
> top-tier low-level exploits you mentioned and shift us further towards
> truly bulletproof security + anonymity systems. :)
as an attacker, i love claims of bullet proof and NSA proof and m
On 4/5/15, Zenaan Harkness wrote:
> ...
> If we want a better future in 30 years, how can we achieve that? ...
> What is the next step?
>
> Bind oneself (oh ye powerful tech hacker for freedom) to make no
> compromise of means, for any purported ends.
as an individual doing things independently,
On 3/25/15, grarpamp wrote:
> ... [ shell games ] ...
i want proposals to de-fund entire classes of offensive operations
that contribute nothing to security, only detriment to all privacy.
it's telling that even token gestures, and make no mistake - the CDR
db debacle was a show - were scuttled
On 3/16/15, Kevin wrote:
> ...
> If such attacks are network wide, is there anything the end-user can do
> to keep themselves safe? Does tor need special configuration?
i use cyclops to monitor BGP routes of interest. it would be
interesting to automate monitoring of routes for routers in consen
first responsive one to complete:
https://www.muckrock.com/foi/united-states-of-america-10/pet-15590/
"A search of the INTERPOL Washington indices produced 87 responsive
pages regarding the Tor Project. We have reviewed the pages and are
releasing 3 pages with partial redactions pursuant to Title
On 2/26/15, Hongyi Zhao wrote:
> ...
> Could someone please give me some hints on how to let tor use my own dns
> settings instead of using its built-in dns query mechanism?
using your own DNS settings would be a "side channel" and "IP leak/disclosure".
Tor cares about your DNS if configured as
On 1/18/15, Thom Miller wrote:
> ...
> I'm using your OPTION 3 on a Debian Wheezy system and it's working for
> me. I sometimes get a bad package (didn't download properly) and I have
> to remove it and re-download it...
don't use polipo, it has trouble with very large downloads.
better to use
On 1/3/15, usprey wrote:
> Summary:
> The documentation is still somewhat vague on the best use of the
> "HardwareAccel" option.
you could submit a patch ;)
>> *HardwareAccel* *0*|*1*
>>
>> If non-zero, try to use built-in (static) crypto hardware acceleration
>> when available. (Default: 0)
On 12/7/14, coderman wrote:
> ...
> Qubes OS is based on Centos, while Whonix is based on Debian. Whonix +
> Qubes OS a chimera, and perhaps one day you'll have a usable Gentoo
> Hardened App VM template for various other paranoid purposes, too.
that should read: Qubes OS i
On 12/7/14, carlo von lynX wrote:
> ...
> I wasn't talking of (2) because that is a given which isn't questioned
> anywhere. I was only talking of (1). I don't know why you bring (2) into
> the discussion as if there was any problem with that. Unless you are
> using Microsoft Windows, there is not
On 12/7/14, carlo von lynX wrote:
> ...
> If it took ages to find heartbleed in the source, how likely is it
> that a backdoored binary is found?
if the source is available, how likely is it to be reviewed?
(to play devil's advocate, if heartbleed was found via protocol
fuzzing, then a rogue bin
On 12/7/14, carlo von lynX wrote:
> ...
> This question may spell a change of topic, but wouldn't
> it make much more sense to introduce backdoors into debian,
> gaining thus access to any derivate distribution?
exploits are developed at all levels of the system. from attacking
applications, to s
ml
thanks for pointing out the thread. there are more questions there, as
you ask below.
> Are you coderman the Martin R. Peck of the mentioned affidavit and
> BigSun application?
>
> - http://cryptome.org/2014/12/peck-roark-affidavit.pdf
> - http://sunshineeevvocqr.onion
Patrick wo
On 12/6/14, EGOTISTICALSHALLOT wrote:
>
> And if anyone else has any additional information regarding this
> EGOTISTICALSHALLOT mention-/-codename-/-program then please contribute.
other useful resources for _non-fictional_ codenames / projects,
http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/p/nicknames-and-c
On 12/6/14, EGOTISTICALSHALLOT wrote:
"This fictional example is constructed to convey some similarities to
parts of reporting in the public knowledge base."
...
"Fictional Input Document"
...
With a link to an actual example,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/nsa-gchq-attack-t
On 11/28/14, Mansour Moufid wrote:
> ...
> They implemented new traffic confirmation attacks that cannot be
> detected by the end points, based on some radar techniques. They
> don't mention it but the attacks can be implemented in real time.
>
> They can also decrease the false positive rate by
On 11/14/14, coderman wrote:
> """
that was quoting arma (Roger) per
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-October/005544.html
and of course, how could i leave out PORTAL :
https://github.com/grugq/portal
best regards,
--
tor-talk maili
On 11/10/14, Lars Boegild Thomsen wrote:
> ...
> Would run an OpenWrt build with Tor as Relay/Exit just fine. And I would be
> quite OK if the Relay/Exit version required some technical skills for
> installation (as in was not available as a ready flashed plug-and-go
> device).
prior testing on
On 11/13/14, IGNACIO GAGO PADRENY wrote:
> ...
> I am currently studying network security and I am focusing on defense
> against DDoS attacks in Tor. I have read a few papers (replay attack,
> sniper attack, etc.) but most of them are not recent.
i assume you looked over http://freehaven.net/anon
On 11/9/14, grarpamp wrote:
> ...
> HS operators banding together to compare the above logs is one
> of them. You could conceivably throw the logs/pcaps from many
> relays and onions into a splunk.onion instance and try to mine some
> knowledge out of them that way. Tor is a jointly owned wide are
Griffin, Matt, Adam, Roger, David, George, Karen, and Jake worked on a
wonderful write up of all the questions and concerns regarding this
Op:
https://blog.torproject.org/blog/thoughts-and-concerns-about-operation-onymous
thank you!
also,
the performance link to doc/TUNING shows it could use mu
On 11/9/14, coderman wrote:
> ...
> all signs point to modified slowloris with a limited set of suspects.
or was it RELAY_EARLY?
https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-security-advisory-relay-early-traffic-confirmation-attack
you could also use the attack above as "parallel constr
On 11/9/14, coderman wrote:
> ...
> your ConstrainedSockets experiments are exactly what i would expect to
> see if this technique were used, since reducing socket buffers would
> allow you to have more concurrent connections open (and thus thwart a
> DoS at lower limits).
someo
On 11/7/14, Öyvind Saether wrote:
> "The BBC understands that the raid represented both a technological
> breakthrough - with police using new techniques to track down the
> physical location of dark net servers ..."
>
> There you have it: An admission that Yes, they really can locate the
> Tor hi
On 11/7/14, Mirimir wrote:
>> ...
>> "Something to note from that graph: There were lots of very odd layer
>> 7 ddos requests which affected tor performance moreso than anything
>> ... like my TCP buffers weren't even close to max, but I had to mess
>> with the ContrainedSockets options in torrc i
On 11/9/14, coderman wrote:
> ...
> Andrea's distribution shows this type of behavior, as i would expect it:
> https://people.torproject.org/~andrea/loldoxbin-logs/analysis/length_distribution.txt
> e.g. send small bits to keep connection active and not closed by
> ser
thanks for the transparency, nachash! i am putting this conversation
on tor-talk, since my replies are more noise and less dev, and the
details seem to be around Tor use and configuration.
On 11/8/14, Fears No One wrote:
> ... Another regret is that pcaps weren't taken, but we both made
> the mi
On 11/4/14, Lars Boegild Thomsen wrote:
> ...
> I will definitely look into this one. This should be quite easy to
> implement by messing a bit with the firewall tables :)
>
> Only problem I see is that to make it useful I think it would have to time
> out at some point.
in the past i have used
On 11/5/14, grarpamp wrote:
> ...
>1 DragonFly
kudos, whoever you are!
(i love this flavor more than most :)
best regards,
--
tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
To unsubscribe or change other settings go to
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
On 11/3/14, Cyrus Katrak wrote:
> https://github.com/kr36/seaturtle
cool :)
> At a high level:
> - Process per tab security model, with each tab owning it's own in-memory
> state (cache, cookies, local storage, hsts db etc...).
do you use any stream isolation per tab behavior? (perhaps via the
On 11/2/14, Lars Boegild Thomsen wrote:
> ...
> In the case of a standard Cloak (as least as it is envisioned right now)
> that is not a problem for Cloak then. Cloak _will_ be the Wireless Access
> Point, it will enforce client isolation at Wi-Fi level and it will hand out
> separate address to
On 11/2/14, Lars Boegild Thomsen wrote:
> ...
> I just tried with the current Cloak build. And different clients use
> different circuits. However, none of the configuration options appear to
> work, so I reckon it is down to:
if each client has a a distinct address (not behind NAT) this works
On 11/2/14, coderman wrote:
> ... the tor ramdisk effort
at https://git.torproject.org/tor-ramdisk.git
--
tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
To unsubscribe or change other settings go to
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
On 11/2/14, Lars Boegild Thomsen wrote:
> ...
> Doesn't this already exist?
there is also the clients behind NAT issue for stream isolation,
e.g. clients[1-N...] -> WiFi Router -> Cloak -> ISP -.
it would be useful to document the list of these concerns somewhere,
perhaps on the Transparent Pr
On 11/1/14, Lars Boegild Thomsen wrote:
> ...
> No, we haven't done that yet apart from me trying to start this discussion
> here on the mailing list
ok. and thanks for running a relay and exit!
> ... [ OpenWRT is difficult to work with ]
this is true; i see you have tried to be accommodating
On 11/1/14, Lars Boegild Thomsen wrote:
> ... We - the team behind Cloak - and me (the
> networking and embedded Linux guy in the team) are genuinely concerned about
> privacy and we really would like this product to ...
first question, did you contact Tor Project Inc. about this for their
input?
On 10/30/14, bm-2cuqbqhfvdhuy34zcpl3pngkplueeer...@bitmessage.ch
wrote:
> ...
> Maybe you get the chance to look into the Hidden Services...
Nick has commented on them before on tor-dev, among other places.
some additional hidden service performance links:
"Hidden Services are in a peculiar sit
On 10/7/14, Nick Mathewson wrote:
> ...
> What's saddest: You didn't explain why you think it's broken.
"Revocable Anonymity" is a farce and distraction; Skipjack Clipper
Clip[0] equivalent in every sense to the non-starter of "key escrow"
and "government / lawful access mandated backdoors".
all
On 10/5/14, BlackSam
wrote:
> ...
> haha use tor stalk tor people.
not sure i can see through the twisted as expected,
but absolutely speaking, i would gladly trade "tor stalking" [do you
mean trolling?] to most other stalking, particularly the stalking
enabled when an aggrieved party can oppor
On 10/5/14, Jeremy Rand wrote:
> ...
> Any chance you could provide more details on what you're using? Last
> I heard the only Namecoin resolvers that handle Tor/I2P services were
> FreeSpeechMe and NMCSocks; FreeSpeechMe doesn't handle round-robin,
> and I'm pretty sure NMCSocks doesn't either.
On 10/3/14, Lluís wrote:
> I understand that for "clients" you mean client processes as:
> apache, httpd, etc.
>
> Right ?
>
> If that so, which is the point on specifying policies as
>
> "reject 2.2.2.2:80" ???
by clients i typically mean Tor Browser, users behind Transparent Tor
Proxy, etc.
b
On 10/3/14, Lluís wrote:
> ...
> SocksPolicy policy,policy,...
>
> Being "policy" the same form as exit policies.
>
> Since I can "reject" anyone but me, this will act as a kind of
> a firewall for hidden services. Am I right ?
this is not correct; think of SocksPort as a way for clients to use
t
1 - 100 of 215 matches
Mail list logo
