[tor-talk] Perceived safety of Tor Browser and onion services

This is the third part of our preliminary analysis of how Tor users interact with onion services [0]. In this part, we look at the subjective feeling of safety that people experience when using Tor Browser and onion services, respectively. Question 6.6 in our survey asked: > Please tell us about

Re: [tor-talk] Tor Router

On Sat, Jul 22, 2017 at 10:41:00AM +, Andri Effendi wrote: > I remember some time last year there was talk about a router for > journalists to bring with them when they went abroad. > > It was really simple. I don't remember what it was called, netaid netkit??? That was probably NetAidKit:

Re: [tor-talk] Systematically finding bad relays (was: Anecdotical experience of SSH MITM)

On Wed, Jul 19, 2017 at 04:39:41PM -0500, eric gisse wrote: > Looking at the exitmap source, as I was curious what modules > existedthe problem I see is that it does not have modules that are > capable of the more difficult to pull off things like SSH honeypot > detection. The Tor Project main

[tor-talk] Systematically finding bad relays (was: Anecdotical experience of SSH MITM)

On Wed, Jul 19, 2017 at 01:43:32PM -0500, eric gisse wrote: > Is there any notion of doing a sort of automated testing for things > like this that can be easily proven? Yes, the blog post I linked to contains some more information. We are using tools such as exitmap [1] to systematically scan the

Re: [tor-talk] Anecdotical experience of SSH MITM

On Wed, Jul 19, 2017 at 04:59:13PM +0200, carlo von lynX wrote: > Hey out there.. I had two more attempts > from 'coriandolino' to MITM my ssh traffic! I could confirm the issue. The relay will no longer be part of the network consensus once enough directory authorities updated their config -- ho

Re: [tor-talk] What is preventing Bridge Enumeration?

On Wed, Feb 15, 2017 at 02:32:32PM +0100, BVpTuvb AVMV wrote: > What is preventing an attacker to start up a few mid-nodes and > enumerating all IPs and substracting those from the list of publicly > known entry-nodes to get a list of (all) unlisted bridges? That is indeed a problem. Section III.

Re: [tor-talk] OBFS4 Blocking

On Thu, Nov 17, 2016 at 05:16:49AM -0600, Justin wrote: > OBFS4 is blocked behind both filters. Cyberoam is doing some sort of > timing attack, but I’m not sure what. When a bridge is used by lots of > people, then it doesn’t work. Even enabling Iat mode=1 or 2 doesn’t > fix the issue. When I tried

Re: [tor-talk] Tor DNS Deanonymization

On Sun, Oct 16, 2016 at 01:15:32AM -0400, Nick Mathewson wrote: > On Fri, Oct 14, 2016 at 11:09 AM, Philipp Winter wrote: > [...] > > There are two ways to mitigate the issue. First, we need better > > defences against website fingerprinting, so an attacker learns less by

Re: [tor-talk] Tor DNS Deanonymization

On Fri, Oct 14, 2016 at 07:29:17AM -0500, Justin wrote: > Not too long ago, a paper was published that talks about how Tor users > can be deanonymized through their DNS lookups. Is this something I > should be concerned about? I am one of the authors. While the attack is very precise in our simul

Re: [tor-talk] Which Dns?

On Mon, Jul 18, 2016 at 08:39:02AM +0200, Flipchan wrote: > Hi all ! Im configuring a new debian server > Can anyone recommend a good dns server? I assume this is for a Tor relay? > i Dont want to use my isp default one, i found one that sounded good > when i read about it uncensoreddns.Org. i

Re: [tor-talk] Latest Research Trends in Tor Security

On Tue, Jun 21, 2016 at 08:39:22AM +, Imran Ahmad wrote: > Dear All  I am going to start my PhD and I have chosen "Tor Security" as my > research area. > I am going to prepare my PhD research proposal. > It is requested to suggest some latest topics in Tor security and some useful > links and

Re: [tor-talk] The Aqua design (was: A possible solution to traffic correlation attacks)

On Sun, Jun 05, 2016 at 02:34:22PM -0400, grarpamp wrote: > You need fulltime regulated fill traffic, within which, your traffic resides. The Aqua design goes in that direction. It is a traffic analysis-resistant anonymity system for BitTorrent:

Re: [tor-talk] Tor Sensorship

On Wed, May 25, 2016 at 04:59:00PM -0500, Justin wrote: > I was wondering does anyone have a list of countries that are > currently blocking Tor? Check out Table II: Cheers, Philipp -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To un

Re: [tor-talk] CloudFlare blog post

On Wed, Mar 30, 2016 at 01:21:05PM +, Martijn Grooten wrote: > CloudFlare CEO Matthew Prince just posted this blog post > > https://blog.cloudflare.com/the-trouble-with-tor/ > > which I think is worth a read for people on this list. My blog comment is still awaiting moderation, so I'll p

Re: [tor-talk] Escape NSA just to enter commercial surveillance?

On Thu, Jan 14, 2016 at 05:58:50PM +0100, Markus Hitter wrote: > To be honest, this surprises me quite a bit. Tor is for anonymisation, > so one can escape tax paid surveillance by NSA, GCHQ & Co., which is > useful. And then such a Tor user connects to Facebook, where one has to > log in, making t

Re: [tor-talk] Tor Historical Consensus Analytic

On Wed, Dec 16, 2015 at 10:51:21AM +0100, Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) - lists wrote: > Basically i would like to extract all emails account from the Contact: > field of the consensus that end-up with .it. The contact field is part of a relay's server descriptor, not of the consensus. > I'm wonderin

Re: [tor-talk] TOR and Obfsproxy packet size

On Sun, Nov 29, 2015 at 06:35:12PM +0330, Amin s wrote: >1. TOR cell size is 512 bytes but most TOR packets have size of 586 >bytes [1]. > > My question is that why there is such difference in size (74 bytes > difference)? The difference is caused by the protocol headers that are wrapped

Re: [tor-talk] tor not running

On Tue, Jul 28, 2015 at 10:09:16AM -0700, Seth David Schoen wrote: > Bill Cunningham writes: > > #3 and on I did not know. Never usesd "Keys". But I have the gp44win > > know. I will let you know the results. After having "imported the > > keychain" If that's the correct wording. How does this down

Re: [tor-talk] A month with BADONIONS

On Fri, Jun 26, 2015 at 01:45:13PM +0200, nusenu wrote: > @phw: did the dir authorities blacklist > 09A880567B0839B4085C2EC14002DE34AAFE8548 or did it disappear on its > own? (downtime 4 days) The relay wasn't blacklisted and disappeared on its own. Chloe is right in saying that the BadExit proce

Re: [tor-talk] DocTor's 'Possible Sybil Attack' (2015-06-03) report

On Fri, Jun 05, 2015 at 12:14:56PM +, nusenu wrote: > How have they been excluded? (specific IPs, entire IP blocks, > fingerprints, ...) The relay list I put online? By fingerprint. > > All these relays were HSDirs and actively scanned hidden services > > they were responsible for. > > What

Re: [tor-talk] DocTor's 'Possible Sybil Attack' (2015-06-03) report

On Fri, Jun 05, 2015 at 11:10:45AM +0200, Philipp Winter wrote: > I attached a list of fingerprints that were rejected by the directory > authorities around May 20. Apparently the mailing list won't let me. Here's a URL: <https://www.nymity.ch/sybilhunting/misc/rejected_

Re: [tor-talk] DocTor's 'Possible Sybil Attack' (2015-06-03) report

On Thu, Jun 04, 2015 at 10:39:03AM +, nusenu wrote: > > These relays have previously been excluded from the Tor network. > > They have now tried rejoining with new fingerprints. All of the > > following relays are confirmed as being managed by the same > > operator. > > Again, I really dislike

Re: [tor-talk] Recorded Future webinar on sniffing exit nodes

On Wed, Jun 03, 2015 at 09:32:47AM -0400, Roc Admin wrote: > I wanted to make some of us aware that Recorded Future is a threat intel > service that is doing a webinar in how to run exit nodes that sniff > traffic. In the webinar they will show how to "Visualize malicious cyber > activity from Tor

Re: [tor-talk] reverse enumeration attacks on bridges (re: 100-foot overview on Tor)

On Wed, May 20, 2015 at 10:42:27AM +0800, Virgil Griffith wrote: > Tom: If a hostile relay receives a connection from a ip-address A that > is not listed in the Tor consensus, as far as I understand the hostile > relay stills has two possibilities about ip-address A: > > (1) A is the client > (2)

Re: [tor-talk] google meek server returns 403 error to Iranian IPs !

On Tue, May 19, 2015 at 06:05:11PM +, reza-ask...@riseup.net wrote: > and i think it seams funny that you use google app engine to unblock tor in > countries like Iran > and then google blocks Iranian access to that service. There is also meek-azure and meek-amazon, but they might have the sam

Re: [tor-talk] What is being detected to alert upon?

On Thu, Apr 30, 2015 at 02:57:01PM -0400, t...@t-3.net wrote: > One rules file is dedicated to it (emerging-tor.rules), that file has all > the Tor IP addresses hardcoded into it. That's probably not very effective because the Tor network has quite a bit of churn, which would lead to plenty of fal

Re: [tor-talk] What is being detected to alert upon?

On Thu, Apr 30, 2015 at 02:20:34PM -0400, Frederick Zierold wrote: > Thanks for replying. I understand it is a spy vs spy type of situation but > what do they see currently? I don't believe they are seeing it by the IP > addresses (or so they claim). > > Is it something in the handshake the is t

Re: [tor-talk] SIGAINT email service targeted by 70 bad exit nodes

On Sun, Apr 26, 2015 at 11:19:08AM +, nusenu wrote: > > On Thu, Apr 23, 2015 at 07:30:57PM +, nusenu wrote: > >>> Almost all of them were younger than one month and they seem > >>> to have joined the network in small batches. I uploaded > >>> Onionoo's JSON-formatted relay descriptors, so

Re: [tor-talk] SIGAINT email service targeted by 70 bad exit nodes

On Thu, Apr 23, 2015 at 07:30:57PM +, nusenu wrote: > > Almost all of them were younger than one month and they seem to > > have joined the network in small batches. I uploaded Onionoo's > > JSON-formatted relay descriptors, so everybody can have a look: > >

Re: [tor-talk] SIGAINT email service targeted by 70 bad exit nodes

On Thu, Apr 23, 2015 at 12:08:05AM -0400, Roger Dingledine wrote: > On Thu, Apr 23, 2015 at 03:03:57AM -, supp...@sigaint.org wrote: > > Today we reported 58 bad exit nodes to Philipp. He instantly found 12 more > > that > > we had missed, and there may be even more of them. (Thank you, Philipp

Re: [tor-talk] DNS hijacking

On Sun, Apr 05, 2015 at 05:10:19PM +, Chuck Peters wrote: > Philipp Winter said: > > On Fri, Apr 03, 2015 at 10:15:42PM -, throwaway...@sigaint.org wrote: > > > It will only happen when using Tor. I did a "normal" DNS dig and a > > > tor-resolve simul

Re: [tor-talk] DNS hijacking

On Fri, Apr 03, 2015 at 10:15:42PM -, throwaway...@sigaint.org wrote: > It will only happen when using Tor. I did a "normal" DNS dig and a > tor-resolve simultaneously - the first pointing to the real IP, the latter > pointing to said server. What is the "real" IP address? All exit relays tha

Re: [tor-talk] New to this list

On Fri, Jan 23, 2015 at 01:17:30PM -0500, Kevin wrote: > Hello. I am a programmer and computer security specialist, to name > a few things. I am on this list because I have learned of onion > botnets and I felt that this would be a good place to research ways > to combat them. I hope to gather s

Re: [tor-talk] Which PTs shall we prioritize for inclusion in Tails?

On Tue, Jan 20, 2015 at 10:26:12PM +0100, intrigeri wrote: > Assuming an ideal world in which they involve an equal amount of work, > among scramblesuit, meek, flashproxy and obfs4, which ones should we > prioritize our efforts on? You shouldn't prioritise ScrambleSuit because it's superseded by o

Re: [tor-talk] Using obfsproxy with OpenVPN

On Mon, Jan 12, 2015 at 10:51:36PM +0100, Alfredo Palhares wrote: > But using the safe switch does the following: > > ``` > obfsproxy: error: unrecognized arguments: --data-dir=/path/to/data/ > ``` What is the exact command you are trying to run? Here's a working example of a server run in exter

Re: [tor-talk] Looking to write alternative to DNS2SOCKS...

On Wed, Dec 24, 2014 at 11:54:53AM +, Richard Brooks wrote: > I am a software developer who has been trying to use DNS2SOCKS but haven't > had much success with it communicating with the latest TOR > Bundle. You might be interested in tor-resolve:

Re: [tor-talk] Anonbib November papers without papers

On Sat, Dec 20, 2014 at 09:12:58PM +0100, Sebastian G. wrote: > while there are more pressing issue, or not I had noticed previously > that all papers on anonbib from November 2014 have no papers. Well > November wasn't over, but now it is December. > > Up to August 2014 papers have papers "attac

Re: [tor-talk] Simulators available for Tor Network

On Thu, Nov 13, 2014 at 06:36:43AM +, Imran Ahmad wrote: > What simulators are available other than Shadow? It's not a simulator but you might still be interested in ExperimenTor: Cheers, Philipp -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@list

Re: [tor-talk] "Hidden Services" vs "Onion services"

On Thu, Nov 13, 2014 at 02:08:49PM -0300, hellekin wrote: > I use "onionspace" regularly, and find "onion service" and "onion site" > equally attractive. Just wanted to remind you that not all onion > services are websites. The term "onion service" could supersede "hidden service" and an "onion s

Re: [tor-talk] What was the academic paper in which

On Sun, Oct 19, 2014 at 11:04:01PM +, Runa A. Sandvik wrote: > On Sun, Oct 19, 2014 at 11:02 PM, Virgil Griffith wrote: > > researchers setup an exit node and then recorded what sites people > > were going to? > > I believe you are referring to > http://homes.cs.washington.edu/~yoshi/papers/T

Re: [tor-talk] Double-checking a couple questions about node churn rate

On Tue, Oct 07, 2014 at 03:57:46PM -0700, Jeremy Gillula wrote: > 1. Does anyone have an idea of what the usual churn rate is for Tor > nodes? (I'm guessing fairly low for most nodes, but if anyone has even > rough numbers, that would help...) I'm late to the party but the following might also be

Re: [tor-talk] Why make bad-relays a closed mailing list?

On Thu, Jul 31, 2014 at 01:58:18PM -0700, Seth David Schoen wrote: > Roger Dingledine writes: > > > But in this particular case I'm stuck, because the arms race is so > > lopsidedly against us. > > > > We can scan for whether exit relays handle certain websites poorly, > > but if the list that we

Re: [tor-talk] Why make bad-relays a closed mailing list?

On Thu, Jul 31, 2014 at 07:21:59PM +, Nusenu wrote: > > I think we need to distinguish between the report and the > > discussion. Ultimately, a report that is acted upon *cannot* remain > > secret. As soon as a relay gets the BadExit flag, the operator can > > figure out that they got caught.

Re: [tor-talk] Why make bad-relays a closed mailing list?

On Wed, Jul 30, 2014 at 11:33:05PM +, Nusenu wrote: > I raised this question already some time ago [1] but I guess the > discussion there ended with the busy PETS week ;) Sorry, I must have missed that email. First of all, thanks for your feedback and for putting so much thought into this! >

Re: [tor-talk] 'How to report bad relays' (blog entry)

On Wed, Jul 30, 2014 at 11:03:03PM +, Nusenu wrote: > > If it's reproducible, we attempt to get in touch with the relay > > operator > > Does this imply that you try to fix the issue with an confirmed "bad > relay" before assigning them the badexit flag? > (opposed to flagging them first - whi

Re: [tor-talk] Atlas

On Thu, Jul 10, 2014 at 08:02:32AM -0700, C B wrote: > Any chance of creating a non-javascript version of the Atlas, > at https://atlas.torproject.org/ ? I can access it by allowing > temporary all access, but it seems that it would be easier if a > non-javascript version could be created, or added

Re: [tor-talk] What are the PPTOR relays?

On Sun, Jul 06, 2014 at 10:57:18PM -0400, Soul Plane wrote: > Last night I noticed my relay path was using two PPTOR relays. I don't > know much about Tor but from what I've read I thought servers that are > related are supposed to identify themselves as such. Just because two > servers have simila

Re: [tor-talk] About Bandwidth rate, burst and observed.

On Tue, Jul 01, 2014 at 01:23:27PM +0900, saurav dahal wrote: > In atlas.torproject.org, I saw Bandwidth rate, burst and observed. Can > anybody please explain these terms with the following example: > > Nickname IPredator > *Bandwidth values* > Bandwidth rate: 1073.74 MB/S > Bandwidth burst: 2

Re: [tor-talk] Bad Exit Nodes.

On Fri, Jun 27, 2014 at 04:26:30AM -0700, Bobby Brewster wrote: > How could a person who is sniffing / stripping exit traffic be detected? We recently did some work on that: Long story short: Active attacks such as sslstripping are easy to detect be

Re: [tor-talk] Pogoplug: is safe enough against NSA?

On Thu, Apr 10, 2014 at 09:55:03PM +0200, Moritz Bartl wrote: > On 04/10/2014 03:01 PM, Marcos Eugenio Kehl wrote: > > Hello experts! > > What do you think about Pogoplug? > > https://pogoplug.com/safeplug > > > > Why do I use it instead of Tor Browser in my computer? > > Nothing is "safe enough

Re: [tor-talk] Fail to test scramblesuit.

On Sat, Mar 22, 2014 at 11:26:30AM +0800, Hongyi Zhao wrote: > According to the guides here: > > https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2013-October/030252.html Note that you no longer need to use this custom obfsproxy branch. The official repository [0] now also contains ScrambleSuit.

Re: [tor-talk] TLS/SSL SMTP MitM

On Mon, Mar 10, 2014 at 06:43:31PM +, Gordon Morehouse wrote: > I have been doing some testing of sending email over Tor and today ran > into a definite BadExit (but not flagged, clearly) because there was a > blatant MitM attempt on three separate occasions when I initiated a > TLS/SSL SMTP co

Re: [tor-talk] torproject.org censorship detection using RIPE atlas?

On Tue, Feb 18, 2014 at 02:03:58PM +0100, Max Jakob Maass wrote: > I am currently running two RIPE Atlas probes [0] and had accumulated > some points to use their measurement API, so I set up a measurement to > check the SSL Certificate of torproject.org from as many countries as > possible to dete

Re: [tor-talk] IMAPS login errors

On Sat, Feb 08, 2014 at 11:11:16PM +, ar...@runbox.no wrote: > I'm using IMAPS over Tor for email purposes. Sporadically I get > 'password incorrect' errors which usually go away when I click 'Retry'. > Is this some kind of MitM attack? Real MitM attacks typically don't cause "password incor

Re: [tor-talk] Spoiled Onions

On Wed, Jan 22, 2014 at 11:30:09AM -0500, William Conlow wrote: > I have a basic question about the Spoiled Onions report. The bad onions > mean that someone could block traffic, could re-direct traffic, or > otherwise censor content, but they couldn't de-anonymize users nor could > they prevent us

Re: [tor-talk] Spoiled Onions

On Wed, Jan 22, 2014 at 03:36:10PM +, Elysius wrote: > The more I read about various exit node exploits, the more convinced I > am that Tor's future is in beefing up hidden service functions and > keeping as much traffic as possible within the Tor network. These weren't really exploits, just s

Re: [tor-talk] "Safeplug"

On Mon, Nov 25, 2013 at 01:25:37PM +, Gibson, Aaron wrote: > On 2013-11-23 19:38, Philipp Winter wrote: > >On Sat, Nov 23, 2013 at 02:22:48PM +, Mark McCarron wrote: > >>How about a certification program? A company can donate some > >>funds to have the

Re: [tor-talk] "Safeplug"

On Sat, Nov 23, 2013 at 02:22:48PM +, Mark McCarron wrote: > How about a certification program? A company can donate some > funds to have their product evaluated and if successful gain > "TOR Certified" status. It would stop all this nonsense and > provide everyone the opportunity to request

Re: [tor-talk] A new check

On Fri, Oct 25, 2013 at 03:33:35PM +0200, Lunar wrote: > Philipp Winter: > > On Tue, Oct 01, 2013 at 06:21:19PM -0700, Arlo Breault wrote: > > > We're considering launching a new check, > > > https://check2.torproject.org/ > > > > > > It'

Re: [tor-talk] TOR network topology

On Fri, Oct 25, 2013 at 12:17:57PM +, Mads Tinggaard Pedersen wrote: > I am not concerned about the practical stuff, such as IP addresses, version > numbers, etc. Only what nodes in the network graph is connected to one > another. This paper might interest you: http://freehaven.net/anonbib/cac

Re: [tor-talk] A new check

On Tue, Oct 01, 2013 at 06:21:19PM -0700, Arlo Breault wrote: > We're considering launching a new check, > https://check2.torproject.org/ > > It'd be appreciated if you could take a moment to look for false negatives, > and let us know. I just iterated over all active exit relays and used Python's

Re: [tor-talk] A new check

On Tue, Oct 01, 2013 at 06:21:19PM -0700, Arlo Breault wrote: > We're considering launching a new check, > https://check2.torproject.org/ How about changing "Your browser..." to "This browser..."? I believe that Andrew once reported that some users interpret "your browser" as "my most favourite b

[tor-talk] ScrambleSuit is ready for testing: help needed!

Over the past months, we have been working on the ScrambleSuit pluggable transport protocol [1]. The code has now reached some maturity and it's time to test it! I set up a dedicated bridge and compiled a set of installation instructions listed below. You get bonus points if you test the bridge

Re: [tor-talk] Traced by my anti-virus?

On Thu, Aug 01, 2013 at 11:08:04AM +, Marcos Eugenio Kehl wrote: > 2. Must I erase all the metadata inside "event logs" in Windows 8, and use >CCleaner after close Tor Browser? > 3. We could talk a little bit more about computer forensics. >Thanks. You might find this technical repor

Re: [tor-talk] [tor-dev] Idea regarding active probing and follow-up of SSL connections to TOR bridges

On Sat, Jul 27, 2013 at 03:06:22PM +0300, Lag Inimaineb wrote: > If so, what I meant was that since the TOR protocol is encapsulated within > TLS, as is HTTPS traffic, then the differentiation will have to occur after > the TLS handshake, which (assuming Iran/China/etc do not have a forged > certif

Re: [tor-talk] Telex Circumvention tool

On Sun, Dec 30, 2012 at 02:55:02AM +, adrelanos wrote: > Telex https://telex.cc/ > > Circumvention tool. Concept looks promising. > > Has never been discussed here. Why not? Does anyone know more? > > I am interested what the status and progress is. Unfortunately, my > mailing list subscript

Re: [tor-talk] TB download improvement

On Mon, Oct 15, 2012 at 07:25:01AM -0600, somepony wrote: > Is there a reason there is not a board or forum for Tor, or that it > doesn't come up on Google? I'm not talking Usenet or IRC, I'm > talking something my mother-in-law can find, understand and use. There are several reasons for this. Pl

Re: [tor-talk] Tor virus

On Mon, Aug 13, 2012 at 10:31:40PM +0200, ethio tor wrote: > What if there is a tor "virus" (pardon for the choice of word) that can > infect such pc and make a relay, bridge, or what ever on the background > undetected. Sounds like a "human rights worm". Some people thought about that before [1].

Re: [tor-talk] Tor virus

On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 12:29:05AM +0200, HardKor wrote: > Is it possible to connect to Tor from Ethiopia ? Is there any blocking > strategy ? The standard TBB does not work because Ethiopia is currently fingerprinting and dropping both, the TLS client and server hello. More details are available

Re: [tor-talk] Tor as ecommerce platform

On Thu, Aug 09, 2012 at 11:23:52PM +, adrelanos wrote: > I'd be also interested in a top50, 100, 1000, x of regular Tor exit > traffic. The following two papers took a look at that, among other things: http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#mccoy-pet2008 http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#huber2010tor

Re: [tor-talk] Advices for a Newbie

On Mon, Jul 30, 2012 at 01:11:14AM -0400, Simon Brereton wrote: > Like the OP, I would love a Tor-for-dummies paper/e-book/guide. The recent reddit.com Q&A contains some easily digestible information: https://pay.reddit.com/r/IAmA/comments/vdhs8/hi_iama_we_are_core_members_of_the_tor_project/c53q5

Re: [tor-talk] Tor vs Network administrator

On Thu, Jun 28, 2012 at 07:45:53AM +0100, sy00963-...@yahoo.fr wrote: > When using Tor in a local network, what the network administrator can see if > he checks my activity on the network?? The correct answers have already been given but you might also be interested in this link: https://www.eff.o

Re: [tor-talk] Tor blocked

On Mon, Jun 25, 2012 at 06:24:12AM -0700, bao song wrote: > This place uses a standard US blocking service, so I suspect TBB will soon be > blocked throughout the MENA and possibly beyond. You could try the bridges in this blog post: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/update-censorship-ethiopia

Re: [tor-talk] Basic questions from new user but...

On Thu, May 10, 2012 at 03:08:31PM -0400, Matthew Kaufman wrote: > Why can't there be some manner of anonymity such as remote VNCing to a > remote computer (say a web server desktop on Gnome running on an Amazon AWS > cloud)... > > This way your true identity is an Amazon AWS cloud IP and say you

Re: [tor-talk] Talking to users, six months later

> My impression is that those groups really need the software and the > knowledge. Maybe it is a good idea to get in touch with them and make > trainigs in larger groups. What do you think? To me this sounds like a good idea. There are many people out there (activists, journalists, ...) who are in