And don't forget to donate some Bitcoins to Scihub if you can ;)
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Hi,
This would make projects such as Ricochet, unMessage, ..., and any other one
that uses
an onion service as an "identity".
And with the already upcoming long addresses, this would make them unusable for
any
practical purpose to put simply.
--Jeff
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Hi,
> When TBB checks & updates itself, does it use an Onion site?
Neither according to: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17216
Note that Yawning's sandbox for Linux does the checks & updates over onion.
--Jeff
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Hi!
Yes this is a bug with the Tor Browser (ticket #22471).
There's a work-around for this issue: right-click on the PDF file
and choose the "Save page as" option.
Hope this helps!
--Jeff
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> Looks like all connections from Tor exits by innocent Tor users
to Google"s search service are being treated by Google as
being lepers and are constantly force fed captchas so Google
can eat them as fois gras.
Work-around that I found to be somewhat acceptable:
1. Set high security setting,
2. Go
Hi,
Some links you may be interested in:
https://forums.whonix.org/t/todo-research-and-document-how-to-use-tor-browser-for-security-not-anonymity-how-to-use-tbb-using-clearnet/3822https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Tor_Browser_without_Torhttps://www.whonix.org/wiki/Tor_Browser_without_Tor
Best,
--Jeff
-
> Maybe an option under Tor button to reset it?
There's a ticket for that https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/16364
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> Even with software isolation though I am beginning to think that hardware
> isolation
when implemented properly is more secure than software isolation, with all the
Xen
bugs recently.
The Qubes OS team are going to ditch paravirtualization for hardware-based
virtualization
since all the fatal
Hi Roman.
Nice find! To mention other events, something strange is happening in Taiwan,
https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-country.html?graph=userstats-relay-country&country=tw&events=on
And it looks like Egypt is starting to censor vanilla Tor again (election
times?),
https://metri
> everytime startup tor same log same obtfs4- why?
Yes, that's perfectly normal, read this great blog post:
https://blog.torproject.org/blog/improving-tors-anonymity-changing-guard-parameters
And the FAQ entry:
https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#EntryGuards
(Hope I didn't misunderstan
Hi!
I've been making those tests on your website multiple times with the TBB but
most of the
time I get a unique fingerprint even when re-doing the test at different times
with the same
browser.
There also some wrong measurements such as the Facebook button that gets
labeled as
being blocked b
> This can mean that something is forcing rapid reconnection, right?
Yes, as with the Turkey block (see Annex A):
https://turkeyblocks.org/2016/12/18/tor-blocked-in-turkey-vpn-ban/
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As predicted the spike is now visible in the global graph.
Also compare these two:
https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-country.html?start=2016-11-12&end=2017-01-23&country=ae&events=off
https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-country.html?start=2017-01-12&end=2017-04-11&country
> I'm wondering why that spike of new users from IL does not show in theoverall
> user graphs.
> Did another country "lose" that many users at the same time?
Another country, no. Other countries yes :) It's 91k more users, minus total
losses from
other countries which should add up to it. For ex
Hi,
Direct users graph:
https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-country.html?graph=userstats-relay-country&country=il
Bridge users (nothing suspicious for now):
https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-combined.html?start=2017-01-11&end=2017-04-11&country=il
--Jeff
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> That said, one of the side effects of making a successful i2p pluggable
transport would be that censors would have more incentive to censor
i2p connections.
I think that's a very important point, especially since the i2p team doesn't
have enough
funding, and censorship resistance is not their h
> I2P is probably also not the easiest thing to implement due to it's complexity
and it's currently only implemented in Java, which is not exactly a good basis
for a pluggable transport.
There's a C++ implementation of i2p called i2pd:
https://github.com/purplei2p/i2pd
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> You want to hide the fact that you are using an anonymization network by using
an anonymization network. This idea seems pretty stupid to me.
That setup was not about hiding the fact that one uses Tor, I can think of
three or four
advantages:
o Getting around Tor censorship when your governmen
> Perhaps, but wouldn't that cause considerable lag?
Indeed! I can't imagine something better than 100Kb/s with that sort of setup.
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Hi,
Could it be possible to implement a pluggable transport using i2p? The way this
could work
is that a server would function as a bridge node, and will also have the i2p
router installed,
and the client will connect to this bridge via I2P Tunnels,
<=><=><=><=>
What do you think?
Thx
--Jeff
Hi,
I just thought about a possible (partial) solution to solve the "UX disaster"
of next-gen onion services, namely the very long addresses. Tor Browser already
ships with HTTPS
Everywhere, and one can easily write rules that redirect from http or https to
onion services, as an example,
https
Hi
One of the possible solutions that was mentioned earlier concerning Cloudflare
captchas was generation .onion automatically for sites on Cloudflare to make
things easier all round. However Cloudflare's CEO didn't want such solution
because "weak hash used by .onion means theoretical risk you
@lists.torproject.org
On 11 Feb (06:14:34), Lolint wrote:
> Hi
Hello!
>
> I have some questions about the coming switch to next-gen onion services:
>
> o What will happen to current onion services? Will they all be simply
> discontinued or will there be a process by
Hi
I have some questions about the coming switch to next-gen onion services:
o What will happen to current onion services? Will they all be simply
discontinued or will there be a process by which they will be automatically
built again to form next-gen onions?
o What will happen to all the rela
Hi
Can anyone explain like i'm five proposition 271 for the new guard selection
implemented in Tor 0.3.x-a?
https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/271-another-guard-selection.txt
What makes it different from previous ones?
Thx
--Jeff
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Hi
I see that guard selection is a very important criteria for ensuring anonymity
with Tor. But I've never seen it being discussed in the context of bridge users
who usually have to input those bridges manually.
I have a couple of questions:
o The recommended behavior is to take the 3 or 2 bri
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