packets from
> "routers" I've setup to assume the same MAC & BSSID but without doing some
> auto-magics with rotating these identifiers on both router and attached
> clients I don't see an easier way of preventing local/drive-by MiTM attacks.
> For the remote attac
/bcfg2/wiki/EncapPlatforms
> ~ and that's a bit prohibitive when I do a lot of development on unsupported
> hardware. But that is not to say that you or someone else couldn't write a
> parser for translating what has already been written in `bash` to be instead
> be written in `bcfg
hmm it's written in bash. that would not have been my first choice to
express this type of software.
why bash?
i like ansible's agent-less design (no SPOF server with ambient
authority) however it's restrictive yaml really lacks expressiveness
and writing ansible modules in addition to yaml seems
I built tbb for arm archlinux:
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/12631
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/12631#comment:6
I ended up not being too clever about it; I performed the build on the
raspberry pi 2 and it took fucking 7 hours. It would be faster to do a
cross-c
Hi tor-talk,
Hi Chris,
I've finally fixed all the false positive bugs in honeybadger (as far
as I know!).
I've updated the docs here with a few additional usage considerations
that Tor exit operators might find helpful:
https://honeybadger.readthedocs.org/
If a TCP attack is detected then honeyb
could enable you to capture a
zero-day payload from a TCP attack; you should then responsibly
disclose to the software vendor or contact a malware analyst to help
out!
Sincerely,
David Stainton
--
tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
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perhaps use "stealth" authenticated tor hidden service for your ssh to
mitigate the ssh 0-day(s); obviously this is not just a tin foil hat
practice anymore.
On Mon, Feb 16, 2015 at 10:56 PM, Dave Warren wrote:
> On 2015-02-16 03:30, blo...@openmailbox.org wrote:
>>
>> On 2015-02-16 02:31, Dave W
