Hi all!
Wrapped up a mini-project of mine a few hours ago, which was a
re-working of Micah Lee's tor-relay-bootstrap script. The main
improvements I've added are making it work on Debian Jessie, merging in
_NSAKEY's tor-bridge-bootstrap fork, along with adding options to set up
your server to be
* Mike Perry [2015-09-14 20:27:34 -0700]:
If you have Bitcoin, you can buy some SMS numbers for getting out of
this lockout without giving up your real phone number:
http://receivesmsonline.com/buynumbers
That service also has free numbers available on their front page:
http://receivesmsonline
* Tempest [2015-09-14 00:08:44 +]:
to sum up, twitter now appears to be desiring phone numbers from tor
users in order to use their service. without feedback, i expect this
will get worse. over the past 30 days, twitter has regularly locked me
out and required password resets. this is the f
Happy to say I sent some BTC over to Werner (as well as OTR, Tor, i2p, and a
few other pieces of privacy software) the day before Jacob and Laura's talk at
31c3. Was a great feeling to see that the money I donated went to a tool that
works :)
With free software we own our means of production,
I've also gotten nowhere with Erowid setting up a HS, they seemed supportive
but have not contacted me in over a week.
Colin
On January 10, 2015 5:12:11 PM EST, Katya Titov wrote:
>Katya Titov:
>> Colin Mahns:
>>> I'm wondering if a few from the community shoul
This might be a question to ask micah or the other birds in their IRC channel.
I'm not sure if they run a hidden service for their main page.
The list I believe you are talking about [0] is the only doc I know of where
they list the hidden services they own.
[0]: https://www.riseup.net/en/tor
If I'm not mistaken, DuckDuckGo used to run an exit enclave but ended up moving
over to a hidden service. Not sure if their reasons for moving over to a HS
were documented in the same way as their exit enclave blog.
Colin
On January 2, 2015 3:25:32 AM EST, Katya Titov wrote:
>Virgil Griffith:
Awesome! Love the document title by the way :)
If I think of anything more to add, I'll be sure to edit it in.
Colin
On January 1, 2015 7:46:22 PM EST, Katya Titov wrote:
>Colin Mahns:
>> I've written up an example email here:
>>
>http://zerobinqmdqd
l free to improve on it, I based it off of emails I've sent in the
past. I'm not sure if we should list security concerns in the general
sense, or if we should point to a real life example of where a hidden
service was utilized for security reasons.
Colin
Katya Titov:
> Colin Mahns:
&
That was my fault, must've deleted a character by mistake.
https://github.com/chris-barry/darkweb-everywhere is the right link
I missed the "performed in conjunction
with the organisation", looks like we were saying the same thing.
I'm wondering if a few from the community should take part in a
> This could be combined with a change to HTTPS Everywhere to prefer HS
> sites over clear web sites, just as it prefers HTTPS over HTTP. (I
> think this has been mentioned before?)
You mean like what we've been doing over on
https://github.com/chris-barr/darkweb-everywhere? :)
The above tool (gr
I wouldn't recommend using a rPi for a Tor bridge/relay. It's far too
underpowered in my mind to be useful for anyone. If anything, it might harm the
network by introducing slow hops. A spare computer or a VPS would be better
here.
As far as your bandwidth settings those seem fine, you should
By default your bridge is submitted to the bridge-db. Distribution is
via bridges.torproject.org and emailing brid...@torproject.org, as well
as whoever you tell to use your bridge. (Someone please correct me if
I'm missing something here)
Colin
Cypher:
> I already run a exit but I want to do mor
I believe Facebook and Blockchain both used Digicert to issue a .onion cert. If
I'm not mistaken Runa has worked with both teams?
Colin
On December 14, 2014 8:44:57 PM EST, Thomas White
wrote:
>-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
>Hash: SHA512
>
>Christian Gagneraud:
>>> We will be seeking to o
Awesome, thanks for doing this!
Colin
Thomas White:
> I'm happy to announce that both my Globe and Atlas mirrors are now
> available as a hidden service for all those who prefer end-to-end
> encryption over Tor!
>
> Atlas: http://atlas777hhh7mcs7.onion
>
> Globe: http://globe223ezvh6bps.onion
>
Probably. I'm sure it implies any communications that pass through the United
States.
Colin
On December 14, 2014 4:27:13 PM EST, I wrote:
>Does that apply all over the world?
>
>
>> From: tim.mitche...@outlook.com
>> Sent: Sun, 14 Dec 2014 09:39:27 -0800
>> To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
>>
You might be interested in this:
https://blog.torproject.org/blog/mission-impossible-hardening-android-security-and-privacy
Orwall can be used as a replacement for the droidwall scripts.
Colin
andr...@fastmail.fm:
> Anything that google touches or promotes is very suspicious. Now that
> Android
24882_n.jpg
[1]:
https://scontent-b-iad.xx.fbcdn23dssr3jqnq.onion/hphotos-prn2/t1/1896752_807594532587586_979724882_n.jpg
Colin Mahns
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJUVSw5AAoJEPKk/ZeJv4OMa5AP/16XtoE5I8Sl5OylDd0pyzWn
QHz+7D1idEKOSjIq8ufdHCiFyxsJO5sDHWdxVI1sDuo98YNlYYtNkmkHnKdqT2rl
QW1DJzK8
Thank you for doing this! I'm glad to see a site as huge as facebook has
decided to start implementing a HS for their users.
Colin
On October 31, 2014 8:35:50 AM EDT, Alec Muffett wrote:
>Hi - My name¹s Alec, I work for Facebook and am the team lead for
>Facebook
>over Tor.
>
>Long story short
Re: Tor Browser Speed -- your Tor connection is only as fast as the slowest
hop. The bottleneck most likely isn't your home ISP, but one of the relays in
your Tor circuit.
Jan was saying you should consider donating bandwidth and becoming a Tor relay.
Anonymity works well in numbers :)
On Oct
I like how a couple of the alternatives to "Tor" in this article are
Tails and Whonix. What do they use for anonymity again? Oh yeah, Tor...
They also list Disconnect and Tox as an alternative, and then quickly
say they aren't alternatives. I'd say this writer was hoping for clickbait.
Colin
Vir
I was actually going to suggest that idea Griffin, you beat me to it :)
I like the idea of another State of the Onion address like last year's
talk (a LOT more has been written about Tor in the past few months
alone), or Damian's suggestion of another Tor ecosystem talk. There
are a lot more proje
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