Is there a paper available for the algorithm?
On Thu, Aug 21, 2014 at 2:35 PM, Mark Knight wrote:
> Hi,
>
> We have placed MKRAND - A Digital Random Bit Generator, on GitHub, and it
> would be helpful to receive some feedback regarding its potential use in
> the TOR project.
>
> This RBG does no
> Unfortunately, Stevens requirement of familiarity still speaks
> > against functional programming languages, even for something as
> > popular (and watered-down) as Scala. It's very hard to find code
> > contributors who know the language or are willing to learn it.
>
This used to be true, but
Aw snap, that's me. The papers that I have out now are about Dust v1, which
provides randomization across connection properties to avoid
classification. The Defcon presentation (no paper yet) is about Dust v2,
which shapes connection properties to force classification of traffic into
a desired cate
There are a number of ways to make a public key with no corresponding
private key which is verifiable. For instance, you could hash the lastest
block in the blockchain to deterministically generate a verifiable random
string. However, the sending coins to an irretrievable address has already
been d
It's true that you don't really need a nym authority of the normal kind
(like a certificate authority). All the nym authority really needs to do is
accept payment and then redistribute the payments randomly and in a
dispersed fashion, for instance to miners as you prefer. The record in the
bitcoin
I like where you're going with this, Mike Hearn. I've been working on a
similar scheme in which instead of providing a proof of work you provide a
proof of sacrifice of monetary value. My simplest plan is that give a nym
authority a payment in exchange for a new nym. However, this requires
trusting
I did testing of both sniffjoke and obfsproxy with Tor this summer. [1][2]
I had trouble getting sniffjoke to work reliably enough to actually test
its properties against DPI attacks. I found obfsproxy to be reliable, but
at that time it was designed to work against only some of the known DPI
attac
I'm all for security research and finding vulnerabilities, in Tor and
otherwise. Attacks that enumerate bridges are of particular interest.
However, the actual IPs discovered have no publication value. Releasing them
is just irresponsible. In order to receive credit, he just needs to publish
the at
Hello everyone, I wanted to introduce my Google Summer of Code Project,
which is a framework for evaluating the effectiveness of blocking-resistant
transports such as those provided by the "Pluggable Transports" project.
Using the framework is simple. First you generate some captured traffic,
some
Sniffjoke looks interesting. I'm having trouble finding a clear description
of what it actually does to the packets to get them past DPI filters. The
best description I could find mentions insertion of fake packets which will
be discarded by the receiver but which will confuse the filter. [1] This
10 matches
Mail list logo
