>>> This is the use case for Tails. . . . [T]here are no writes to storage,
>>> unless users configure [otherwise] . . . .
> Sure, but this isn't a _Tor_ issue. It's just about Tor browser, which
> is just (heavily) modified Firefox. And although I'm no software expert,
> I'm guessing that it's im
On 10/12/2018 01:47 PM, Nick Levinson wrote:
>> This is the use case for Tails. . . . [T]here are no writes to storage,
>> unless users configure [otherwise] . . . .
>
> One need not use Tails to use Tor (I used to sometimes use Tor and never used
> Tails), so, while Tails may be a good idea, th
add the updated tests , the wiki even accept anonymous edits.
you can discuss that openly in the forum of Whonix as well.
(though, i dont see much changes that would make Tor safer only through
the amnesic usage)
intrigeri:
> bo0od:
>> There is a full comparison of Tails and Whonix (persistent v
bo0od:
> There is a full comparison of Tails and Whonix (persistent virtual OS)
> can be found here:
> https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Comparison_with_Others#Introduction
FTR the Tails part of that page is quite outdated.
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Not really Tor is the best practice using it with amnesic system like
Tails due to the guards entry issue ..
There is a full comparison of Tails and Whonix (persistent virtual OS)
can be found here:
Clearnet Link:-
https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Comparison_with_Others#Introduction
Onion Link:-
ht
> This is the use case for Tails. . . . [T]here are no writes to storage,
> unless users configure [otherwise] . . . .
One need not use Tails to use Tor (I used to sometimes use Tor and never used
Tails), so, while Tails may be a good idea, the question remains for Tor and
its security architec
