Re: [tor-talk] Why corrupt government officials are strongly opposed to this Tor project (a Gestapo government run amok!)

On 03/03/2015 10:01 PM, Ben Tasker wrote: >> When referring to "corrupt government officials", this includes a >> handful who are abusing the NSA's Internet, phone, and email monitoring >> PRISM program for their own personal profit and gain. This includes News >> Corp and 21st Century Fox. > > If

Re: [tor-talk] Why corrupt government officials are strongly opposed to this Tor project (a Gestapo government run amok!)

On 03/03/2015 02:19 PM, Travis Biehn wrote: > Certain individuals attribute structures that a society naturally evolves > as being somehow directed by an omnipotent actor. This actor is often cast > in the role of tormentor / antagonist. > > For you your tormentor is the 'Gestapo government' and w

Re: [tor-talk] Why corrupt government officials are strongly opposed to this Tor project (a Gestapo government run amok!)

> Just because certain government agencies, such as the U.S. State > Department that supply funding for Tor to help protect dissidents, does > not mean everyone affiliated with the U.S. government approve of this > Tor project. That is almost certainly true, there will be those who frown on Tor fo

Re: [tor-talk] Why corrupt government officials are strongly opposed to this Tor project (a Gestapo government run amok!)

03.03.2015, 04:40, "Travis Bean" : > I am giving everyone on this mailing list a heads-up regarding what I > have uncovered about the Gestapo government here in the United States > and why corrupt government officials are so strongly opposed to this Tor > project. If you seriously think that US g

Re: [tor-talk] Why corrupt government officials are strongly opposed to this Tor project (a Gestapo government run amok!)

On 03/03/2015 03:32 PM, Lara wrote: > z9wahqvh: >> if the corrupt Gestapo government is so opposed to Tor, why do it and its >> subsidiary agencies provide (and have provided for all of its history) >> between 50 and 80% of the project's entire funding, a pattern which >> continues to this day? >

Re: [tor-talk] Why corrupt government officials are strongly opposed to this Tor project (a Gestapo government run amok!)

TAO.. Tailored Advertising Operations!! Got it. :) -Travis On Mar 3, 2015 7:11 PM, "Travis Bean" wrote: > On 03/03/2015 02:51 PM, z9wahqvh wrote: > > if the corrupt Gestapo government is so opposed to Tor, why do it and its > > subsidiary agencies provide (and have provided for all of its histo

Re: [tor-talk] Why corrupt government officials are strongly opposed to this Tor project (a Gestapo government run amok!)

On 03/03/2015 02:51 PM, z9wahqvh wrote: > if the corrupt Gestapo government is so opposed to Tor, why do it and its > subsidiary agencies provide (and have provided for all of its history) > between 50 and 80% of the project's entire funding, a pattern which > continues to this day? > Just becaus

Re: [tor-talk] Why corrupt government officials are strongly opposed to this Tor project (a Gestapo government run amok!)

On 03/03/2015 02:19 PM, Travis Biehn wrote: > Couldn't resist! > > Certain individuals attribute structures that a society naturally evolves > as being somehow directed by an omnipotent actor. This actor is often cast > in the role of tormentor / antagonist. > > For you your tormentor is the 'Ges

Re: [tor-talk] Why corrupt government officials are strongly opposed to this Tor project (a Gestapo government run amok!)

z9wahqvh: > if the corrupt Gestapo government is so opposed to Tor, why do it and its > subsidiary agencies provide (and have provided for all of its history) > between 50 and 80% of the project's entire funding, a pattern which > continues to this day? Dude, this is a conspiracy. It does not need

Re: [tor-talk] Why corrupt government officials are strongly opposed to this Tor project (a Gestapo government run amok!)

if the corrupt Gestapo government is so opposed to Tor, why do it and its subsidiary agencies provide (and have provided for all of its history) between 50 and 80% of the project's entire funding, a pattern which continues to this day? - z On Mon, Mar 2, 2015 at 10:56 PM, grarpamp wrote: >

Re: [tor-talk] Why corrupt government officials are strongly opposed to this Tor project (a Gestapo government run amok!)

Couldn't resist! Certain individuals attribute structures that a society naturally evolves as being somehow directed by an omnipotent actor. This actor is often cast in the role of tormentor / antagonist. For you your tormentor is the 'Gestapo government' and what you perceive as its colluding br

Re: [tor-talk] Revoking a hidden service key

I'm not saying it wouldn't still be useful, it just doesn't provide any protection in the scenario a running hidden service is hacked, which is what we were talking about. On 2015-03-03 2:09 PM, grarpamp wrote: Duhr, I know this, it's just another excuse to not do anything. Pathetic given the

Re: [tor-talk] Revoking a hidden service key

Duhr, I know this, it's just another excuse to not do anything. Pathetic given the relative simplicity of adding passphrase option vs benefit of not being able to troll fs, backups, etc for keys. Bitcoin added wallet passphrases for the same reason. Defense in depth. -- tor-talk mailing list - tor

Re: [tor-talk] Revoking a hidden service key

Putting a passphrase on the master secret key (in the current system) would protect from theft if the hidden service is offline. But if the service is online, the master secret key needs to be stored decrypted in memory so the hidden service can sign and publish its updated descriptors. If the

Re: [tor-talk] Revoking a hidden service key

The keys are RSA, we need to be able to put an optional passphrase on them (for startup as in httpd) as a simple first (and zero cost/design to network) measure to eliminate their value to thieves. This has not been done. There have been threads and tickets on this whole key management topic. -- t

[tor-talk] RFC: Tor Messenger Second Alpha

Hi, Tor Messenger is an instant messaging client currently under development. It is designed to make connections using the Tor network and will therefore be a valuable piece in the privacy-enhancing software toolkit (web: Tor Browser, email: Thunderbird + TorBirdy, chat: Tor Messenger.) Based on

Re: [tor-talk] Revoking a hidden service key

A correction, The purpose of the blinded secret keys is not to give an extra layer of protection against secret key compromise, but to prevent hidden service harvesting and cataloging by hidden service directories. This is achieved by deriving the blinded signing keys from the master secret ke

Re: [tor-talk] Revoking a hidden service key

Adrien, yes, something like that. thanks for the pointer. Domenico On Tue, Mar 3, 2015 at 4:58 PM, Adrien Johnson wrote: > Domenico, > > In the proposed next generation Rendezvous specification > , > there are some

Re: [tor-talk] Revoking a hidden service key

Domenico, In the proposed next generation Rendezvous specification , there are some major improvements to the security model for hidden services. The hidden service master secret key no longer has to be live on the

Re: [tor-talk] Revoking a hidden service key

The unvoidable single point of failure is the loss of control on a given onion node. Isn't possible to require multiple nodes to sustain a single hidden service? So that loosing control of a single node doesn't compromise the whole service. Domenico On Tue, Mar 3, 2015 at 2:40 PM, Adrien Johnson

Re: [tor-talk] Problems? Verifying signatures in Tor 4.0.4

On Tue, Mar 3, 2015, at 12:49 AM, goofyzrn...@vfemail.net wrote: > The more complicated verification gets, the more difficult it becomes > for `the bad guys' to hack your files. So there's a real benefit to > embracing the advanced verification process. Learning that process > may take so

Re: [tor-talk] Revoking a hidden service key

A client receiving a revocation descriptor would want to remember not to trust that hidden service for as long as possible, so there's still going to be long-term storage somewhere in the chain. Putting it in the directories would mean that as many client as possible could be notified of the hi

Re: [tor-talk] Delete certificates

You can not delete them. But you can disable them. This is quiet like you don't know someone = deleted certificate Or Your know the Authority but you do not trust them = disabled Authority. There are two different approaches for chrome, opera, internet exploiter use Windows Certificate storage. Th

Re: [tor-talk] Revoking a hidden service key

Alternatively the original hidden service operator could publish hidden service descriptors with a normal validity period which contain a revocation field. A HSDir which receives a descriptor containing the revocation could replace the (potentially malicious) HS descriptor stored in its cache. A c

Re: [tor-talk] Why corrupt government officials are strongly opposed to this Tor project (a Gestapo government run amok!)

On 03/03/2015 12:17 AM, Lara wrote: > Travis Bean: >> I am giving everyone on this mailing list a heads-up regarding what I >> have uncovered about the Gestapo government here in the United States >> and why corrupt government officials are so strongly opposed to this Tor >> project. > > You have

Re: [tor-talk] Why corrupt government officials are strongly opposed to this Tor project (a Gestapo government run amok!)

Travis Bean: > I am giving everyone on this mailing list a heads-up regarding what I > have uncovered about the Gestapo government here in the United States > and why corrupt government officials are so strongly opposed to this Tor > project. You have no idea what Gestapo was troll. > I can prove