This happens for me from time to time. I run XFCE.
Just locate the Process Manager in the system menu, find the firefox/TBB
process and kill it. I normally just go to the command line, start up
top find the process and kill it from there. Launch the TBB again, this
time it should launch and th
Mike Perry:
> Cyrus Katrak:
> > https://github.com/kr36/seaturtle
> >
> > At a high level:
> > - Process per tab security model, with each tab owning it's own in-memory
> > state (cache, cookies, local storage, hsts db etc...).
>
> We've been going for URL bar domain isolation in Tor Browser to a
On Saturday 01 November 2014 12:42:41 coderman wrote:
> - support robust stream isolation, beyond what may be default. perhaps
> IsolateDestAddr and IsolateByClientAddr on TransPort (this does not
> yet exist, but you could code it to the benefit of all Transparent
> proxy consumers
I do believe
On Monday 03 November 2014 07:14:05 CJ wrote:
> Yes they are. But they are options to the SOCKSPort option. I hit the
> same wall lately…
Aarrrggghhh - I obviously can't read :) Sorry and yes those options work on
the TransPort as well, I have just tested it and it work.
--
Lars Boegild Thomse
On Monday 03 November 2014 14:06:27 l.m wrote:
> I've only one thing to say about this idea or any other similar
> Kickstarter project.
There are no other similar Kickstarter projects.
> You've got to be stupid to sacrifice the control
> and flexibility offered by running Tor on a computer for
On Monday 03 November 2014 17:58:56 mic...@michaelblizek.twilightparadox.com
wrote:
> > WiFi clients are isolated from each other so no - if someone break Wi-Fi
> > security they can access the Tor network (or the internet - depending on
> > which Wi-Fi network they break), but in order to sniff
i've seen snippets of post-silk road "how to securely run a hidden
service" [1] [2] but i haven't found a large list of steps needed to be
taken that would tremendously help to prevent de-anonymisation.
can someone point me to a large list of things that should be done (or
make one!) to preven
On 3 November 2014 17:05, Mike Perry wrote:
> I also have an OpenWRT configuration I can give you to monitor for proxy
> leaks on an upstream router, but you need to be able to configure Tor
> Bridges to make use of it.
Same idea, but I use a full linux machine as a router rather than an
OpenWRT
i've seen snippets of post-silk road "how to securely run a hidden
service" [1] [2] but i haven't found a large list of steps needed to be
taken that would tremendously help to prevent de-anonymisation.
can someone point me to a large list of things that should be done (or
make one!) to preven
Cyrus Katrak:
> https://github.com/kr36/seaturtle
>
> At a high level:
> - Process per tab security model, with each tab owning it's own in-memory
> state (cache, cookies, local storage, hsts db etc...).
We've been going for URL bar domain isolation in Tor Browser to avoid
divergence with how use
On Mon, Nov 03, 2014 at 06:37:47PM +, raiogam mestri wrote:
>
> Position yourself against the Bolivarian communist expansion in Brazil
> promoted by the administration of Dilma RousseffOn 10/26, Dilma Rousseff was
> reelected, and will continue his party's plan to establish a communist regim
thats a ridiculous campaign and you should ashame yourself for doing it.
On Mon, Nov 3, 2014 at 6:25 PM, raiogam mestri wrote:
> dilma is criminal bitch its a like send to cuba american territory and i
> a'm a br
>
> From: raio...@hotmail.com
> To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
> Subject: go imp
How about finding a list of people who WANT TO HEAR about Brasil?
This is a list interested in privacy software.
> -Original Message-
> From: raio...@hotmail.com
> Sent: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 20:25:53 +
> To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
> Subject: Re: [tor-talk] go impeachman go 2
>
> dil
dilma is criminal bitch its a like send to cuba american territory and i a'm a
br
From: raio...@hotmail.com
To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
Subject: go impeachman go 2
Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 18:37:47 +
Position yourself against the Bolivarian communist expansion in Brazil promoted
In your passion you missed the fact that Dilma Roussef is a woman.
--
tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
To unsubscribe or change other settings go to
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
On 11/3/14, Cyrus Katrak wrote:
> https://github.com/kr36/seaturtle
cool :)
> At a high level:
> - Process per tab security model, with each tab owning it's own in-memory
> state (cache, cookies, local storage, hsts db etc...).
do you use any stream isolation per tab behavior? (perhaps via the
please stop vomiting, you clearly dont know what you re talking about.
what does have white house to do with it? will they promote the democracy
in Brazil as they promoted in Lybia, Syria, Iraq, etc?
shut the fuck up!
On Mon, Nov 3, 2014 at 4:37 PM, raiogam mestri wrote:
>
>
>
>
> Position your
Position yourself against the Bolivarian communist expansion in Brazil promoted
by the administration of Dilma RousseffOn 10/26, Dilma Rousseff was reelected,
and will continue his party's plan to establish a communist regime in Brazil -
the Bolivarian molds propounded by the Foro de São Pau
https://github.com/kr36/seaturtle
At a high level:
- Process per tab security model, with each tab owning it's own in-memory
state (cache, cookies, local storage, hsts db etc...).
- Efficiently integrated HTTPS Everywhere rules.
- Addresses some fingerprint-ability issues: Disabled geolocation, we
Hi,
I have set Tor Browser as standard (which is ignored by Thunderbir by
the way).
If for xfce4 programs I try to get the online help I get the following
error message:
Firefox is already running, but is not responding. To open a new window,
you must first close the existing Firefox process, o
On 11/2/14, Lars Boegild Thomsen wrote:
> ...
> In the case of a standard Cloak (as least as it is envisioned right now)
> that is not a problem for Cloak then. Cloak _will_ be the Wireless Access
> Point, it will enforce client isolation at Wi-Fi level and it will hand out
> separate address to
21 matches
Mail list logo
