Re: [tor-talk] Why make bad-relays a closed mailing list?

2014-07-30 Thread Philipp Winter
On Wed, Jul 30, 2014 at 11:33:05PM +, Nusenu wrote: > I raised this question already some time ago [1] but I guess the > discussion there ended with the busy PETS week ;) Sorry, I must have missed that email. First of all, thanks for your feedback and for putting so much thought into this! >

Re: [tor-talk] 'How to report bad relays' (blog entry)

2014-07-30 Thread Philipp Winter
On Wed, Jul 30, 2014 at 11:03:03PM +, Nusenu wrote: > > If it's reproducible, we attempt to get in touch with the relay > > operator > > Does this imply that you try to fix the issue with an confirmed "bad > relay" before assigning them the badexit flag? > (opposed to flagging them first - whi

[tor-talk] Why make bad-relays a closed mailing list?

2014-07-30 Thread Nusenu
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Hi, I raised this question already some time ago [1] but I guess the discussion there ended with the busy PETS week ;) I believe it would be beneficial if a broader audience can receive and review bad-relay reports [2]. One important property woul

[tor-talk] 'How to report bad relays' (blog entry)

2014-07-30 Thread Nusenu
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Hi, quoting from [1]. > If it's reproducible, we attempt to get in touch with the relay > operator Does this imply that you try to fix the issue with an confirmed "bad relay" before assigning them the badexit flag? (opposed to flagging them first

[tor-talk] Question about the myfamily variable in torrc

2014-07-30 Thread Cypher
I'm about to fire up another exit relay and I want to make sure users are protected from picking both of my relays in the same chain. So I came across the MyFamily variable in the torrc file. I have two questions about how to properly set this variable: 1. In the docs, it says NOT to use your

Re: [tor-talk] Cancelled black hat talk

2014-07-30 Thread Nusenu
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 > On Wed, Jul 30, 2014 at 10:05:20PM +, Nusenu wrote: >> Surprised to see the fix of a bug that was worth a tor security >> advisory to be in the "Minor bugfixes" section of the changelog. > > The security advisory was that somebody had attacke

Re: [tor-talk] Cancelled black hat talk

2014-07-30 Thread Roger Dingledine
On Wed, Jul 30, 2014 at 10:05:20PM +, Nusenu wrote: > Surprised > to see the fix of a bug that was worth a tor security > advisory to be in the "Minor bugfixes" section of the changelog. The security advisory was that somebody had attacked real Tor users and perhaps deanonymized some of them,

Re: [tor-talk] Cancelled black hat talk

2014-07-30 Thread Nusenu
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 >> I think I have a handle on what they did, and how to fix it. >> We've been trying to find delicate ways to explain that we think >> we know what they did, but also it sure would have been smoother >> if they'd opted to tell us everything. The main

Re: [tor-talk] Tor DNS

2014-07-30 Thread Ondrej Mikle
Hi, On 07/30/2014 01:43 PM, Mike Fikuart wrote: > I am aware that there is a Project Idea (under > https://www.torproject.org/getinvolved/volunteer.html.en#improvedDnsSupport) > point q. Improved DNS support for Tor; I am the author of the proposal 219. If you want DNS, you can make it work toda

Re: [tor-talk] Finding relay Sybils / Groups [re: relay_early/blackhat]

2014-07-30 Thread Aymeric Vitte
Le 30/07/2014 20:10, grarpamp a écrit : There may be more questionable relays to be found. Probably not. We see in the description of this attack some subtle details, along with a list of papers/studies. The problem is that the Tor network is really too small in terms of efficient nodes,

[tor-talk] RPM packages available also for EL7 (RHEL 7, CentOS 7)

2014-07-30 Thread Ondrej Mikle
Hi, since the latest versions - 0.2.4.23 stable and 0.2.5.6 beta - there are EL7 packages available. I did some testing on CentOS 7 VM installation and they seem to work fine. Let me know if something is broken. The howto is added onto the usual RPM page: https://www.torproject.org/docs/rpms.htm

Re: [tor-talk] Finding relay Sybils / Groups [re: relay_early/blackhat]

2014-07-30 Thread Damian Johnson
Hi grarpamp. Actually we do have a rudimentary Sybil checker and it *did* pick up on those relays back in January... https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-consensus-health/2014-January/003954.html We had some internal discussions about them but the thread lost momentum before they were flagg

[tor-talk] Finding relay Sybils / Groups [re: relay_early/blackhat]

2014-07-30 Thread grarpamp
As a project then to production development, someone should go back through the entire history of descriptors and look for groups coming online... dates, IP's, contacts, tor/OS versions, nicknames, ISP's, geoip, numbers coming online over sliding timeframes, correlation to 'news events', etc. There

Re: [tor-talk] the problem

2014-07-30 Thread Mirimir
On 07/30/2014 10:02 AM, alireza arl78 wrote: > your server doesn't allow me to enter the website Meet People on Blendr, Make > New Friends, Chat, Flirt for security reasons.please let me enter this > website. Are you spam? The problem is Blendr's, not Tor's ;) Try using https://www.hidemyass.c

Re: [tor-talk] the problem

2014-07-30 Thread alireza arl78
your server doesn't allow me to enter the website Meet People on Blendr, Make New Friends, Chat, Flirt for security reasons.please let me enter this website. On Wednesday, July 30, 2014 8:12 PM, alireza arl78 wrote: your server doesn't allow me to enter the website Meet People on Blendr,

Re: [tor-talk] Spoofing a browser profile to prevent fingerprinting

2014-07-30 Thread Joe Btfsplk
On 7/29/2014 4:35 PM, Ben Bailess wrote: But here are some numbers that I just collected that perhaps could be of use to you. This test was done with the latest TBB (3.6.3) and Firefox versions on Linux (Fedora), with both JS on and off: FF (private browsing) / JS disabled = 16 bits (not "unique

[tor-talk] Tor Weekly News — July 30th, 2014

2014-07-30 Thread Lunar
Tor Weekly News July 30th, 2014 Welcome to the thirtieth issue of Tor Weekly News in 2014, the weekly newslette

[tor-talk] Tor DNS

2014-07-30 Thread Mike Fikuart
Tor, I am not sure if this the correct forum for this question and if not would you direct me there; however: I am aware that there is a Project Idea (under https://www.torproject.org/getinvolved/volunteer.html.en#improvedDnsSupport) point q. Improved DNS support for Tor; however has there bee

Re: [tor-talk] Cancelled black hat talk

2014-07-30 Thread Roger Dingledine
On Mon, Jul 21, 2014 at 06:58:44PM -0400, Roger Dingledine wrote: > I think I have a handle on what they did, and how to fix it. We've been > trying to find delicate ways to explain that we think we know what they > did, but also it sure would have been smoother if they'd opted to tell > us everyth

Re: [tor-talk] how many verify their tbb ?

2014-07-30 Thread intrigeri
Hi, mick wrote (29 Jul 2014 19:02:39 GMT) : > But it begs the question - what proportion of the the monthly total > downloads from all the mirrors that represents. Any idea? No idea: we've never asked the people operating our mirrors to collect such stats. If anyone wants to think of it, draft a

[tor-talk] Tor 0.2.5.6-alpha is out

2014-07-30 Thread Roger Dingledine
Tor 0.2.5.6-alpha brings us a big step closer to slowing down the risk from guard rotation, and fixes a variety of other issues to get us closer to a release candidate. https://www.torproject.org/dist/ Changes in version 0.2.5.6-alpha - 2014-07-28 o Major features (also in 0.2.4.23): - Make

[tor-talk] (FWD) Tor 0.2.4.23 is released

2014-07-30 Thread Roger Dingledine
Here's a reminder for those of you who aren't on tor-announce to be on it. --Roger - Forwarded message from Roger Dingledine - Date: Wed, 30 Jul 2014 03:42:20 -0400 From: Roger Dingledine To: tor-annou...@lists.torproject.org Subject: Tor 0.2.4.23 is released Tor 0.2.4.23 brings us a

Re: [tor-talk] Spoofing a browser profile to prevent fingerprinting

2014-07-30 Thread Georg Koppen
Mirimir: > With scripts allowed globally, Panopticlick sees another 2-3 bits. I > suspect that much of the additional information is also the same for all > Tor browsers, given what I've read about Tor-specific tweaks. If that's > the case, this isn't a major issue. That's not necessarily the case