On 1/4/2014 1:28 PM, Артур Истомин wrote:
> On Sat, Jan 04, 2014 at 09:57:19AM -0800, Bobby Brewster wrote:
>> I see that Vidalia is no longer part of the TBB.
>>
>> What is the best way to monitor bandwith throughput? I always found this
>> helpful when assessing the quality of the connection.
>
On Sat, Jan 4, 2014 at 11:37 PM, Lunar wrote:
> > If this is just about transforming the URL, couldn't you use an HTTPS
> > Everywhere rule? Then you wouldn't have to install ( and audit :) )
> > Greasemonkey.
>
> I had more in mind of locating the “normal” video window, and replacing
> it with a
How I would have handled it, is that it does not matter whether they are caught
or not. The disruption to the campus by how the threat was handled was the only
actual crime committed, not the threat itself. If you choose to investigate it
at all you can interview the students affected. There was
I can only speak for the United States, like all other evil countries or
empires, with a Constitution which says a lot of lovely things, and which is
completely ignored by the Nazis who came to power in 2000, even allegedly
calling it just a g-d piece of paper.
There are legal, constitutional w
On 1/4/14 10:39 PM, Bobby Brewster wrote:
What is an "IRC bounce"?
There exists specialized software to persist your IRC sessions:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BNC%20(software)
Alternatively, just SSH into a remote (and possibly anonymously setup)
server and connect to IRC there. Your presen
Greg Norcie:
> Had the perp not invoked his right to remain silent, I'm pretty sure he
> wouldn't have been convicted.
You mean the opposite, right: if he *had* invoked his right to remain
silent?
As a hypothetical, how should law enforcement have handled it if the
perpetrator had not confessed?
On Sat, Jan 4, 2014 at 10:53 PM, Bobby Brewster
wrote:
>
>>>Correct. Bridge addresses are not public, but it's easy to check if an
> IP address is a Tor bridge.
>
> How? Do you just request constant bridges until the IP address the target
> used shows up?
You can try to connect with Tor or you c
>>Correct. Bridge addresses are not public, but it's easy to check if an
IP address is a Tor bridge.
How? Do you just request constant bridges until the IP address the target used
shows up?
On Saturday, January 4, 2014 10:26 PM, Runa A. Sandvik
wrote:
On Sat, Jan 4, 2014 at 9:42 PM, Bobb
Alexander Dietrich:
> >I am not an expert in Firefox tweaks, but it was my understanding that
> >Greasemonkey could be used to turn nice hacks into scripts. We could
> >then maybe improve the situation for all Tor Browser Bundle users by
> >shipping the script with the bundle.
>
> If this is just
>> The adversary I had in mind was a malicious exit node administrator.
>> If all e-mail accounts are accessed using the same circuit, it seems
>> the exit node would see the near simultaneous connections (assume
>> encrypted) to various e-mail servers, and even with one occurrence
>> suspicion cou
Had the perp not invoked his right to remain silent, I'm pretty sure he
wouldn't have been convicted.
- Greg
On 1/4/14, 4:42 PM, Bobby Brewster wrote:
>
>
>>> the perp confessed to guilt during interview. not sure if there's been
> any further action since then.
>
> My point was that presumabl
dhanlin:
> Mix+TB Test:
>> dhanlin:
>>> The adversary I had in mind was a malicious exit node administrator.
>>
>> The exit node admin should only be able to see which email services you
>> are talking to, not the address you are using (assuming end-to-end
>> encryption). An even then they are only
On Sat, Jan 4, 2014 at 9:42 PM, Bobby Brewster
wrote:
> Also, am I right to think that if he had used a bridge then the IP logged
> would have been the bridge IP rather than the Tor entry node IP? Is this
> traceable? Are bridge addresses public?
Correct. Bridge addresses are not public, but
Thank you for your comments.
Presumably if Hammond (or anyone) had used a VPN to hide his use of Tor then no
connection could have been made to him (unless, somehow, the authorities could
acquire the logs of the VPN provider which would prove he accessed Tor).
Also:
What is an "IRC bounce"?
M
>>the perp confessed to guilt during interview. not sure if there's been
any further action since then.
My point was that presumably the authorities assumed that the perp would be
using the university network to make the threats and hence checked to see who
had connected to a known Tor IP entr
K. Raven:
>> The adversary I had in mind was a malicious exit node administrator.
>> If all e-mail accounts are accessed using the same circuit, it seems
>> the exit node would see the near simultaneous connections (assume
>> encrypted) to various e-mail servers, and even with one occurrence
>> sus
Il 04.01.2014 13:32 Bobby Brewster ha scritto:
See
http://freejeremy.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/jeremy-hammond-federal-complaint.pdf
The search function doesn't work but look at the detail on Pages 30-33.
The point is that Hammond's IP was accessing Tor at the same time as
he was in his res
Bobby Brewster:
> Three points about this story.
>
> First, if the student had used a VPN then the network would only have seen
> his VPN IP not the entry node IP. Right?
right.
> Second, who is to say that the 'real' perp was not using a different
> non-University network?
the perp confes
On Sat, Jan 04, 2014 at 09:57:19AM -0800, Bobby Brewster wrote:
> I see that Vidalia is no longer part of the TBB.
>
> What is the best way to monitor bandwith throughput? I always found this
> helpful when assessing the quality of the connection.
>
It can be installed separately from
https://
See
http://freejeremy.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/jeremy-hammond-federal-complaint.pdf
The search function doesn't work but look at the detail on Pages 30-33.
The point is that Hammond's IP was accessing Tor at the same time as he was in
his residence and / or in contact with CW-1 (Monsegur
I see that Vidalia is no longer part of the TBB.
What is the best way to monitor bandwith throughput? I always found this
helpful when assessing the quality of the connection.
Thanks.
--
tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
To unsubscribe or change other settings go to
https:/
Three points about this story.
First, if the student had used a VPN then the network would only have seen his
VPN IP not the entry node IP. Right?
Second, who is to say that the 'real' perp was not using a different
non-University network? The fact that the e-mail was sent from a Tor exit no
Are there any NNTP-servers with tor access? I tried
reader443.eternal-september.org
and news.aioe.org. Both rejected me posting due to tor using.
Thanks.
--
tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
To unsubscribe or change other settings go to
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/ma
That awkward moment when YouPorn has better HTML5 support than Google.
Alexander Dietrich said:
If this is just about transforming the URL, couldn't you use an HTTPS
Everywhere rule? Then you wouldn't have to install ( and audit :) )
Greasemonkey.
True, though that would remove many of the
On Fri, 3 Jan 2014 21:10:59 +
Nunostc allegedly wrote:
> A thing I normally do when browsing the web using Debian that does no
> support HTML5 is install the plugin Download Helper to download the
> videos so I can watch them offline. That works very good. I would like
> to know if there is a
Hi,
> The adversary I had in mind was a malicious exit node administrator.
> If all e-mail accounts are accessed using the same circuit, it seems
> the exit node would see the near simultaneous connections (assume
> encrypted) to various e-mail servers, and even with one occurrence
> suspicion co
Alexander Dietrich:
> If this is just about transforming the URL, couldn't you use an HTTPS
> Everywhere rule? Then you wouldn't have to install ( and audit :) )
> Greasemonkey.
the "embed" url tweak is a very quick and dirty work around. you lose a
number of other youtube features with it, such a
Mix+TB Test:
> dhanlin:
>> Sebastian G. :
>>> 04.01.2014 09:05, dhanlin:
>>> It also depends on where and who your adversary is.
>>
>> The adversary I had in mind was a malicious exit node administrator. If
>> all e-mail accounts are accessed using the same circuit, it seems the
>> exit node wou
I have tried, all unsuccessfully:
https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/0F5947D45EFC5013226AD46E569C1C2A712B89AD
https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/1B9FACF25E17D26E307EA7CFA7D455B144B032E5
https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/332895D092C2524A3CDE8F6E1498FFE665EBFC34
https://atlas.torproject.or
I am not an expert in Firefox tweaks, but it was my understanding that
Greasemonkey could be used to turn nice hacks into scripts. We could
then maybe improve the situation for all Tor Browser Bundle users by
shipping the script with the bundle.
If this is just about transforming the URL, couldn
> NYPA
> riseup.net
really?
--
tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
To unsubscribe or change other settings go to
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
dhanlin:
> Sebastian G. :
>> 04.01.2014 09:05, dhanlin:
>> It also depends on where and who your adversary is.
>
> The adversary I had in mind was a malicious exit node administrator. If
> all e-mail accounts are accessed using the same circuit, it seems the
> exit node would see the near simulta
Sebastian G. :
> 04.01.2014 09:05, dhanlin:
> It also depends on where and who your adversary is.
The adversary I had in mind was a malicious exit node administrator. If
all e-mail accounts are accessed using the same circuit, it seems the
exit node would see the near simultaneous connections (as
On Sat, Jan 4, 2014 at 10:50 AM, Lunar wrote:
> Tempest:
> > don't use a plugin. i've had success with a simple url tweak in the
> > instances where youtube claims flash is required. you just need to place
> > "embed" in the url at the right place.
> >
> > for example, if you wanted to watch
> >
Tempest:
> don't use a plugin. i've had success with a simple url tweak in the
> instances where youtube claims flash is required. you just need to place
> "embed" in the url at the right place.
>
> for example, if you wanted to watch
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AHsM10hhmIU and got the error
04.01.2014 09:05, dhanlin:
> Hello,
>
> If you check multiple e-mail accounts simultaneously with TorBirdy,
> would that make it easy for an adversary to correlate the accounts?
Without being able to evaluate the risk:
It also depends on where and who your adversary is. If all account are
at the
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
NYPA
- --
scarp | A4F7 25DB 2529 CB1A 605B 3CB4 5DA0 4859 0FD4 B313
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJSx8wdAAoJEF2gSFkP1LMTUMoP/1vZenQfJcVmdpEDq4TxNvWw
x+NMIwvyISBGrnUt49GQKwIjpz/i0uUjpd2ar41XL+ZLmHn1kmmQjhYRqD6b3Yr1
CQu5veR5egGCe3cLpU
Add eBay (https://www.ebay.com) to the list of businesses blocking Tor
(whether intentionally or not). The connection and presumably
unauthenticated browsing aren't disallowed, but login is. Upon
successful username/password entry, you are told your computer is not
recognized and are prompted to
On 4/01/2014 6:23 pm, tor-admin wrote:
> On Friday 03 January 2014 18:25:32 C B wrote:
>> Incomplete list
>>
>> Blocking access from Tor Browser
>>
>>
>> Also blocking access from Tor exit nodes
>>
>> https://www.healthcare.gov/ https://www.kohls.com/
>
> I can access both with TorBrowser via
Hello,
If you check multiple e-mail accounts simultaneously with TorBirdy,
would that make it easy for an adversary to correlate the accounts?
My concern is that I have several accounts that are identifying and a
few that are intended to be anonymous (e.g., this one). If I check all
the accounts
On Friday 03 January 2014 18:25:32 C B wrote:
> Incomplete list
>
> Blocking access from Tor Browser
>
>
> Also blocking access from Tor exit nodes
>
> https://www.healthcare.gov/
> https://www.kohls.com/
I can access both with TorBrowser via this exit:
https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/B
41 matches
Mail list logo
