When trying to fetch about 50 onions at a time, Tor eats up all of
a P4 1.8GHz CPU. And only about a tenth of the HTTP requests that
are expected to resolve and return data ever do return said data.
Further, using Tor as an exit (whether via polipo or SOCKS) also
becomes less than useful.
I'm not
> Very interesting read.
"
Resnick: The recent article in Wired describes where and how the NSA plans to
store its share of collected data. But as the article explains, the Utah
facility will have another important function: cryptanalysis, or
code-breaking, as much of the data cycling through
Tor 0.2.4.1-alpha lets bridges publish their pluggable transports to
bridgedb; lets relays use IPv6 addresses and directory authorities
advertise them; and switches to a cleaner build interface.
This is the first alpha release in a new series, so expect there to
be bugs. Users who would rather tes
On 2012-09-05, at 6:16 AM, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> http://nplusonemag.com/leave-your-cellphone-at-home
>
> Sarah Resnick
>
> Leave Your Cellphone at Home
>
> Interview with Jacob Appelbaum
>
> From OCCUPY Gazette 4, out May 1.
Very interesting read.
I'm not sure I buy the theories for the new d
Tor 0.2.3.21-rc is the fourth release candidate for the Tor 0.2.3.x
series. It fixes a trio of potential security bugs, fixes a bug where
we were leaving some of the fast relays out of the microdescriptor
consensus, resumes interpreting "ORPort 0" and "DirPort 0" correctly,
and cleans up other smal
Hi,
i have a couple of questions about current status of TorHS and the
ability for client and server to select path for the circuit selection.
A) Would it possible to specify the path up to the rendezvous point when
connecting to a Tor Hidden service on a Tor Client (via the Tor Control
Port) ?
Hi,
How comes stream isolation into play with hidden services, if at all?
Please provide some information.
Is it possible to stream isolate (multiple) hidden services from each
other and/or from other client traffic?
Is this required or is this the case by Tor default?
Cheers,
adrelanos
___
http://nplusonemag.com/leave-your-cellphone-at-home
Sarah Resnick
Leave Your Cellphone at Home
Interview with Jacob Appelbaum
From OCCUPY Gazette 4, out May 1.
Earlier this year in Wired, writer and intelligence expert James Bamford
described the National Security Agency’s plans for the Utah
On Sep 5, 2012, at 3:15 AM, Andreas Krey wrote:
> On Wed, 05 Sep 2012 02:15:21 +, Justin Aplin wrote:
> ...
>> ExitPolicy accept 127.0.0.1:*
>> ExitPolicy reject *:*
>>
>> This will allow exiting (connecting) to the local machine (where the hidden
>> service should be listening) on all ports
> On Sep 4, 2012, at 3:57 PM, John Kipper wrote:
>
> Do you mean you're running a hidden service, and only want other people to be
> able to access your hidden service (and nothing else) through your node?
No I mean I want my 'client' to only connect to hidden services, i.e. my
browser only lo
On Wed, 05 Sep 2012 02:15:21 +, Justin Aplin wrote:
...
> ExitPolicy accept 127.0.0.1:*
> ExitPolicy reject *:*
>
> This will allow exiting (connecting) to the local machine (where the hidden
> service should be listening) on all ports, and reject all other traffic.
No, you don't need an Exi
On Sep 4, 2012, at 3:57 PM, John Kipper wrote:
> Is there a configuration option available in Tor that will disable internet
> browsing and only allow connections to .onion hidden services?
> Or a simple modification in the source code to achieve the same thing?
Do you mean you're running a hidd
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