On 04/18/2012 02:07 PM, Kyle Williams wrote:
> So I guess nobody remembers or knows about my brief 15 minutes at Blackhat
> a few years back where I warned about much more than what is being
> disclosed here in regards to Ultrasurf or GIFC.
>
> Here's the Audit I did from years ago.
> http://www.j
On 04/18/2012 11:40 PM, torsi...@tormail.net wrote:
>> On Wed, Apr 18, 2012 at 4:56 AM, Maxim Kammerer wrote:
>>> On Wed, Apr 18, 2012 at 11:37, Robert Ransom
>>> wrote:
Which version of wget did you audit? What information leaks did you
check for during your audit?
> Hi,
>
> How can
> On Wed, Apr 18, 2012 at 4:56 AM, Maxim Kammerer wrote:
>> On Wed, Apr 18, 2012 at 11:37, Robert Ransom
>> wrote:
>>> Which version of wget did you audit? What information leaks did you
>>> check for during your audit?
Hi,
How can I check what information wget is transmitting? I used wireshark
So I guess nobody remembers or knows about my brief 15 minutes at Blackhat
a few years back where I warned about much more than what is being
disclosed here in regards to Ultrasurf or GIFC.
Here's the Audit I did from years ago.
http://www.janusvm.com/Ultrasurf_audit.zip
Includes Video's of the a
On Wed, Apr 18, 2012 at 4:56 AM, Maxim Kammerer wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 18, 2012 at 11:37, Robert Ransom wrote:
>> Which version of wget did you audit? What information leaks did you
>> check for during your audit?
>
> I should have known I would get useless replies with zero informative
> content
If you want to to do thoroughly like Robert Ransom, it all comes back to this
ticket.
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5553
__
powered by Secure-Mail.biz - anonymous and secure e-mail accounts.
___
In theory smart adversary can reduce anonimity set with statisticaly profiling
any non-TBB downloaders on the service side or through intercepting exit node
traffic. Wget'll get a different responce than standart TBB or another
downloaders to cookies and active elements injection, fonts manipula
On Wed, Apr 18, 2012 at 5:54 AM, Tichodroma wrote:
> Hi,
> might be of interest:
> http://ultrasurf.us/Ultrasurf-response-to-Tor-definitive-review.html
This is of more interest then their 'response' itself:
http://b.averysmallbird.com/entries/the-need-for-community-participation-and-clear-disclos
Hi,
might be of interest:
http://ultrasurf.us/Ultrasurf-response-to-Tor-definitive-review.html
Tichodroma
--
XMPP: tichodr...@jabber.ccc.de
IRC: Tichodroma
___
tor-talk mailing list
tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/m
Hi everyone,
The Tor Cloud [1] images for all the seven regions have been updated to
include the latest cloud image for stable Ubuntu release 10.04 LTS
(Lucid Lynx). These new images are available on the Tor Cloud website.
If you are already running a Tor Cloud bridge, you will need to either
man
On Wed, Apr 18, 2012 at 11:37, Robert Ransom wrote:
> Which version of wget did you audit? What information leaks did you
> check for during your audit?
I should have known I would get useless replies with zero informative
content to that summary. Wget does not resolve hostnames when it uses
a p
On 2012-04-18, Maxim Kammerer wrote:
> TL;DR: wget is 100% safe to use with Tor and it does not leak DNS
> (also true for curl, by the way).
Which version of wget did you audit? What information leaks did you
check for during your audit?
Which SSL library did you configure wget to use? Which
On Wed, Apr 18, 2012 at 3:05 AM, wrote:
> Hello,
Hi,
> While I was managing my Amazon account I was doing some routine
> terminations of bridges in preparation to launch fresh instances from the
> https://cloud.torproject.org/ website. Now for some reason whenever on
> click on any of the publi
On Tue, Apr 17, 2012 at 10:52 PM, Maxim Kammerer wrote:
> ...
> My tests show that wget does not leak DNS requests when HTTP(S)
> proxies are specified via environment variables.
if:
1. using environment variables correctly
2. using command line parameters correctly
set http_proxy but not HTTPS_
14 matches
Mail list logo
