On Feb 12, 2012, at 11:38 PM, eliaz wrote:
> I have a few novice questions about a normal bridge I've set up. I've
> not found answers in the documentation.
>
> * Opposite the one country that's so far listed in the usage summary,
> the #Client column shows "1-8". What does this mean exactly? 1
2012/2/13 John Case :
> These are the "entry guards" that the doc refers to later, right ?
No, these are called "Introduction points", entry guards are something else.
> - If all of the random relays that I announce to initially go away, will I
> see that in logs/errors/messages, or be alerted
--- On Sun, 2/12/12, pro...@tormail.net wrote:
> Can you leave please a copy in the
> wiki? In case the pastbin gets deleted,
> it makes sense to have a copy.
>
> And if updates are needed, it's easier to cooperate.
Good idea. I added it to the wiki via the "cypherpunks" account so anyone can
On 2/12/2012 6:53 PM, Ted Smith wrote:
The problem I see in Tor adopting AdBlock as a default-installed
plugin is that it allows the controller of that list to censor
websites without oversight. I think if AdBlock is installed by default
in the Tor Browser Bundle, the list configured should be
I've read through /docs/hidden-services.html.en a few times over and I
need some points clarified, if someone would be so kind ...
- Can I choose more than 3 random relays to announce my hidden service to
? These are the "entry guards" that the doc refers to later, right ?
- If all of the
On Sun, 12 Feb 2012 07:53:17 -0800 (PST)
Brian Franklin wrote:
> 1. Privacy. Fairly obvious why we do this. Stopping ads and ad
> tracking is consistent with the privacy mission of the Tor Project.
In general, I'm going to defer to Mike Perry, as he's our expert here.
Stopping ads is not the goal
On Sun, 2012-02-12 at 07:53 -0800, Brian Franklin wrote:
> The Adblock should be configured to work and not need setup. Select a
> few good lists and have them automatically in. This will save users
> the time of doing it themselves and help people who don't know how.
For on this list who are not
I think Ghostery + Adblock Plus + No Script is overkill. Choose one. They
all pretty much do the same thing. Block nasty javascript. No Script seems
appropriate for the Tor Browser due to it's default aggressive stance on
any javascript.
But just curious, which part of Ghostery is closed source, b
Agreed about the dangers of add-ons and info here
https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/
"The Design and Implementation of the Tor Browser [DRAFT]"
not sure if maintaining ghostery or adblock via Tor is worth the trouble as
they might/might not improve the user experience but the
On Mon, 13 Feb 2012 00:31:28 -
pro...@tormail.net wrote:
> Same goes for Adblock Plus. If it's safe, it should come preinstalled
> with TBB. Ads over Tor make no sense, you can not buy those things
> anonymously and ads and tracking waste Tor's and users bandwidth.
Actually, you can buy stuff
On 2012-02-12, Duncan Patton a Campbell wrote:
>
> Howdy? I just started in trying to build this and am
> getting errors that indicate problems with SSL:
>
> $ git clone https://git.torproject.org/obfsproxy.git
> Cloning into obfsproxy...
> error: SSL certificate problem, verify that the CA cert
On 2/12/2012 3:00 PM, Patrick Mézard wrote:
For me, a more basic question is whether installing extensions from a
fresh Tor installed is (sufficiently) safe. I do not know the details
of the process but it probably involves some HTTPS connections to
addons.mozilla.org. If the exit node can perf
Can you leave please a copy in the wiki? In case the pastbin gets deleted,
it makes sense to have a copy.
And if updates are needed, it's easier to cooperate.
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Ghostery should not be added to TBB, it's not Free Software. No source
code available. TBB would rely on a single company.
If all that would not be the case, and if it's safe to implement, I'd be
happy to see it in TBB.
Same goes for Adblock Plus. If it's safe, it should come preinstalled with
TBB
Hey, all. I put together a quick how to guide based off of some of the
resources posted here, and various others on the net, to try and make it easier
for the less experienced to get an obfuscated Tor Bridge running for Iran. It
can be found at http://pastebin.com/09A1WgXc at the moment. If a
Howdy? I just started in trying to build this and am
getting errors that indicate problems with SSL:
$ git clone https://git.torproject.org/obfsproxy.git
Cloning into obfsproxy...
error: SSL certificate problem, verify that the CA cert is OK. Details:
error:14090086:SSL routines:SSL3_GET_SERVER
Hello,
I've spent some time creating Ubuntu AppArmor profiles for the Tor
Browser Bundle and its components and related apps. I've based them upon
publicly available profiles that needed some dusting off, updating, and
adapting to Tor.
For the unfamiliar, AppArmor is a least privilege access cont
I have a few novice questions about a normal bridge I've set up. I've
not found answers in the documentation.
* Opposite the one country that's so far listed in the usage summary,
the #Client column shows "1-8". What does this mean exactly? 1 client?
eight? 1 client eight times?
* When I do have
For me, a more basic question is whether installing extensions from a fresh Tor
installed is (sufficiently) safe
Very real problem
see -
https://www.blackhat.com/html/bh-usa-09/bh-usa-09-archives.html#Marlinspike
watch the slides from 140 onward. Firefox/thunderbird case study
detailing jus
Le 12/02/12 16:53, Brian Franklin a écrit :
> Adblock Plus and Ghostery should be included in Tor bundle
>
> Two reasons
>
> 1. Privacy. Fairly obvious why we do this. Stopping ads and ad
> tracking is consistent with the privacy mission of the Tor Project.
>
> 2. Network health. Congestion has
--- On Sun, 2/12/12, Runa A. Sandvik wrote:
> Have you tried the client instructions (Step 2a) on
> https://www.torproject.org/projects/obfsproxy-instructions.html.en
> ?
Yes. I found the issue. Wrong version of Tor daemon was still running.
Thanks for the quick reply.
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On Fri Feb 10 21:05:59 UTC 2012 Sebastian Hahn wrote:
> On Feb 10, 2012, at 9:47 PM, eliaz wrote:
> > Upon the last TBB update, Aurora 9 was replaced by FFox 10, the same
> > FFox that I use for my clear browsing. Both have the same icon,
> > which makes it a bother to be sure I'm in the correct br
On Sun, Feb 12, 2012 at 6:22 PM, Low-Key² wrote:
> I'm running into an issue involving obfsproxy. I've followed the
> instructions provided by Jacob. From a friend's machine at a different IP
> address, if I use Vidalia and point the bridge and the ORPort at 9001, it
> works without any issue
From an article at:
http://publicintelligence.net/do-you-like-online-privacy-you-may-be-a-terrorist/
February 1, 2012 in News
Public Intelligence
A flyer [1] designed by the FBI and the Department of Justice to promote
suspicious activity reporting in internet cafes lists basic tools used
for on
On 2/12/2012 10:41 AM, Brian Franklin wrote:
Unknown makes a good point. The options should be set globally for all users of
the Tor Bundle to avoid any profiling. Those who have a need for further
configuration do so at their own risk.
Good point. Originally, at least part of the Tor design
I'm running into an issue involving obfsproxy. I've followed the instructions
provided by Jacob. From a friend's machine at a different IP address, if I use
Vidalia and point the bridge and the ORPort at 9001, it works without any
issues. However, if I point the bridge to the port setup by ob
On Feb 10, 2012, at 12:10 AM, Mike Perry wrote:
> As far as I know, no one has ever tried it. Some academics once pointed
> out that proof-of-work would not work for email, but that was primarily
> because email is often one-to-many. They did not consider one-to-one
> activity (like web page acce
Unknown makes a good point. The options should be set globally for all users of
the Tor Bundle to avoid any profiling. Those who have a need for further
configuration do so at their own risk.
Tracking is a danger and bandwidth is scarce. Something has to be done about
the ad problem.
Discoura
i tend to agree, but i guess theres several things to keep in mind:
- Usability. Ghostery is _very_ user friendly, but still it can break
widget based sites, e.g. iGoogle.
- Endorsement. If a Plugin is included into the TBB, that may be
considered as "the Tor guys think this is very safe!"
i run
On Sun, 12 Feb 2012 17:00:59 +0100
Martin Hubbard wrote:
> RefControl set to spoof referrer as host webroot is also useful, I think.
> - Original Message -
> From: Brian Franklin
> Sent: 02/12/12 09:53 AM
> To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
> Subject: [tor-talk] Adblock Plus and Ghostery
RefControl set to spoof referrer as host webroot is also useful, I think.
- Original Message -
From: Brian Franklin
Sent: 02/12/12 09:53 AM
To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
Subject: [tor-talk] Adblock Plus and Ghostery should be included in Tor bundle
Adblock Plus and Ghostery should be
Adblock Plus and Ghostery should be included in Tor bundle
Two reasons
1. Privacy. Fairly obvious why we do this. Stopping ads and ad tracking is
consistent with the privacy mission of the Tor Project.
2. Network health. Congestion has always been a problem on Tor. Installing
these plugins to
On Sun, Feb 12, 2012 at 4:12 AM, Michael J.J. Tiffany
wrote:
> Would a tremendous number of new nodes with the obfsproxy code, running on
> EC2/Rackspace/random-cloud-provider, be helpful at this point? If so, how
> much is too much?
Hi,
We have a lot of obfsproxy bridges running at the moment.
On Sun, Feb 12, 2012 at 3:30 AM, Michael Van Veen wrote:
> Hello!
Hi,
> I just followed the directions on this page:
> https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-February/023070.html,
> having first picked up the link on hacker news.
>
> I had to tweak things a little bit to work, but
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