On 09.03.2011 23:29, Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) wrote:
> It's not censorship but a chance to attract more TOR exit node
> maintainer by simplifying the costs and risks in running a TOR exit node.
I'd rather stay a middle/entry node than employing shady filters.
_
On 3/10/11 2:04 AM, Robert Ransom wrote:
> On Wed, 09 Mar 2011 23:29:16 +0100
> "Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)" wrote:
>
>> On 3/9/11 11:20 PM, Robert Ransom wrote:
>>> Try running "man tor |grep -C5 OutboundBindAddress".
>>
>> You didn't got the technical need, the need is to redirect only TOR-exit
>
* Greg Kalitnikoff [2011:03:10 07:56 +0200]:
> On Thu, 10 Mar 2011 01:43:20 +0100
> Erinn Clark wrote:
>
> > * Greg Kalitnikoff [2011:03:09 23:52 +0200]:
> > > Why does this official TorBrowser link
> > > {https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html.en} show version
> > > 1.3.18, whil
On Thu, 10 Mar 2011 01:43:20 +0100
Erinn Clark wrote:
> * Greg Kalitnikoff [2011:03:09 23:52 +0200]:
> > Why does this official TorBrowser link
> > {https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html.en} show version
> > 1.3.18, while this one
> > {https://archive.torproject.org/tor-package-ar
On Wed, 09 Mar 2011 23:29:16 +0100
"Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)" wrote:
> On 3/9/11 11:20 PM, Robert Ransom wrote:
> > Try running "man tor |grep -C5 OutboundBindAddress".
>
> You didn't got the technical need, the need is to redirect only TOR-exit
> traffic.
>
> OutboundBindAddress make *all*, in
* Greg Kalitnikoff [2011:03:09 23:52 +0200]:
> Why does this official TorBrowser link
> {https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html.en} show version
> 1.3.18, while this one
> {https://archive.torproject.org/tor-package-archive/torbrowser/} and
> this one {https://www.torproject.org/dist
On Wed, Mar 9, 2011 at 5:29 PM, Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)
wrote:
> Yes but that's more complex, with iptables you can redirect TCP ports,
> but from your TOR node not all traffic going for example to port 80 is
> http, but a lot of it it's TOR.
>
> If you redirect it to a transparent proxy you'll b
Why does this official TorBrowser link
{https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html.en} show version
1.3.18, while this one
{https://archive.torproject.org/tor-package-archive/torbrowser/} and
this one {https://www.torproject.org/dist/torbrowser/} have 1.3.19 and
even 1.3.20?
__
On 3/9/11 11:20 PM, Robert Ransom wrote:
> Try running "man tor |grep -C5 OutboundBindAddress".
You didn't got the technical need, the need is to redirect only TOR-exit
traffic.
OutboundBindAddress make *all*, including intra-tor, communications go
trough that IP address:
"Make all outbound conne
On Wed, 09 Mar 2011 19:23:15 +0100
"Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)" wrote:
> i've been thinking and playing a lot about the various possible risk
> mitigation scenarios for TOR exit node maintainer.
>
> Now i need to be able to pass all web traffic trough a transparent proxy
> in order to implement so
On 03/09/2011 12:47 PM, berta...@ptitcanardnoir.org wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 09, 2011 at 04:25:40PM +0100, Anders Andersson wrote:
>> On Wed, Mar 9, 2011 at 2:56 PM, wrote:
>>> Seems that there are already kind of a convention in the way it is
>>> written :
>>>
>>> - Lines starting with '## ' are des
On Wed, Mar 09, 2011 at 02:56:57PM +0100, berta...@ptitcanardnoir.org wrote:
> I'm thinking to write a Config::Model package for tor, that might be
> usefull in the futur for projects like freedombox or even just for debian
> packaging.
>
> Point is that the torrc file as in its current state lack
On Wed, Mar 9, 2011 at 12:32 PM, wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 09, 2011 at 07:00:50PM +0100, Moritz Bartl wrote:
>> Hi,
>>
>> On 09.03.2011 18:47, berta...@ptitcanardnoir.org wrote:
>> >> Also, "if it was applied correctly everywhere" will obviously break if
>> >> one allows the user to modify the file, a
On 3/9/11 7:35 PM, Gregory Maxwell wrote:
> [snip]
>
> If you start inspecting and screwing with third party traffic you will
> be bad-exited.
It depends on how you do it.
The important things is to be really careful not to create "collateral
damage" while you apply some kind of security.
Avoiding
On Wed, Mar 9, 2011 at 1:23 PM, Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)
wrote:
> Hi all,
> i've been thinking and playing a lot about the various possible risk
> mitigation scenarios for TOR exit node maintainer.
>
> Now i need to be able to pass all web traffic trough a transparent proxy
> in order to implement
On Wed, Mar 09, 2011 at 07:00:50PM +0100, Moritz Bartl wrote:
> Hi,
>
> On 09.03.2011 18:47, berta...@ptitcanardnoir.org wrote:
> >> Also, "if it was applied correctly everywhere" will obviously break if
> >> one allows the user to modify the file, and if the user modifications
> >> are valid synt
Hi all,
i've been thinking and playing a lot about the various possible risk
mitigation scenarios for TOR exit node maintainer.
Now i need to be able to pass all web traffic trough a transparent proxy
in order to implement some kind of filters to prevent specific
web-attacks, web-bruteforce, etc,
Hi,
On 09.03.2011 18:47, berta...@ptitcanardnoir.org wrote:
>> Also, "if it was applied correctly everywhere" will obviously break if
>> one allows the user to modify the file, and if the user modifications
>> are valid syntax.
> That's why taking care of comments has some interests too, keeping u
On Wed, Mar 09, 2011 at 04:25:40PM +0100, Anders Andersson wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 9, 2011 at 2:56 PM, wrote:
> > Seems that there are already kind of a convention in the way it is
> > written :
> >
> > - Lines starting with '## ' are descriptions of a block of items
> > - Lines starting with '#' ar
On Wed, Mar 9, 2011 at 2:56 PM, wrote:
> Seems that there are already kind of a convention in the way it is
> written :
>
> - Lines starting with '## ' are descriptions of a block of items
> - Lines starting with '#' are commented items.
> - Items are in the form of 'Item value'
> - Items sometim
Hi,
I'm thinking to write a Config::Model package for tor, that might be
usefull in the futur for projects like freedombox or even just for debian
packaging.
Point is that the torrc file as in its current state lacks a bit of
consistency, and that makes it quite hard to parse it automatically.
S
As with Tor, I2P and others... Phantom is a project serving the
strong anonymity space.
It offers similar capabilities to Tor (when Tor is in non-exit relay
+ HS mode only), and I2P. Of course, as with I2P, OpenVPN or other
tunnel mechanisms could allow exiting from Phantom as well.
It provides a
>> cause truly TCP new connections to use a new exit.
Oops, there's word swap in there :)
>> I've commonly seen exits reused within a certain period
>> of time after issuing a NEWNYM.
>>
>> For the users that have such a need, it would be nice if Tor could
>> optionally keep a historical bucket o
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