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On 09/01/15 14:40, Yawning Angel wrote:
> I believe most of BuFLO's shortcomings documented in Cai, X.,
> Nithyanand, R., Johnson R., "New Approaches to Website
> Fingerprinting Defenses" 5.A. apply to the currently proposed
> defense, though some
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On 08/01/15 11:25, Mike Perry wrote:
> You might also like the "Adaptive Padding" defense:
> http://freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/ShWa-Timing06.pdf. It
> implements pretty much what you describe here. It is one of my
> current low-resource favorites.
On Mon, Jan 19, 2015 at 6:08 PM, Michael Rogers
wrote:
> Thanks for the explanation.
I think I have more comment address this subsection...
>> If anyone knows of networks (whether active, defunct or
>> discredited) that have used link filling, I'd like a reference.
>> Someone out there has to ha
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On 08/01/15 06:03, grarpamp wrote:
>> If that's what you're suggesting, then what happens if a client
>> wants to extend a circuit from relay A to relay B, but A and B
>> aren't exchanging chaff with each other?
>
> This doesn't happen. You have a l
On Thu, 8 Jan 2015 03:25:52 -0800
Mike Perry wrote:
> I am unfortunately not optimistic about simple low-overhead padding
> being successful here. At the very least, this problem will require
> something more like a congestion-sensitive "always pad if there is
> spare capacity available to grow t
Michael Rogers:
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>
> On 25/11/14 12:45, George Kadianakis wrote:
> > Yes, integrating low-latency with high-latency anonymity is a very
> > interesting probleml. Unfortunately, I haven't had any time to
> > think about it.
> >
> > For people who
On Mon, Jan 5, 2015 at 2:17 PM, Michael Rogers wrote:
> To be clear, are you suggesting that each relay and each client should
> pick some relays from the consensus and exchange chaff with them, and
> clients should also exchange chaff with their guards?
I'm saying you definitely have to have you
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On 04/01/15 09:45, grarpamp wrote:
>> That tells you how much chaff to send in total, but not how much
>> to send on each link.
>
> No. Buy or allocate 1Mbit of internet for your tor. You now have to
> fill that 1Mbit with tor. So find enough nodes
On Thu, Jan 1, 2015 at 9:24 AM, Michael Rogers wrote:
> Are you proposing that chaff would be sent end-to-end along circuits?
No. That wouldn't work. Crypto of circuits would blind middles
to any end to end padding, and not able to contribute control
back to you, let alone anonymously without kno
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Resurrecting a thread from last year...
On 11/12/14 16:05, grarpamp wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 11, 2014 at 8:26 AM, Michael Rogers
> wrote:
>> * Which links should carry chaff?
>
> First you need it to cover the communicating endpoints entry links
> a
On Thu, Dec 11, 2014 at 8:26 AM, Michael Rogers
wrote:
> * Which links should carry chaff?
First you need it to cover the communicating endpoints entry links
at the edges.
But if your endpoints aren't generating enough traffic to saturate
the core, or even worse if there's not enough talking clie
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On 10/12/14 00:14, grarpamp wrote:
> Guilty of tldr here, yet similarly, with the easily trackable
> characteristics firstly above, I'm not seeing a benefit to
> anything other than filling all links with chaff which then hides
> all those parameter
On Tue, Dec 9, 2014 at 4:40 PM, Michael Rogers wrote:
> On 25/11/14 12:45, George Kadianakis wrote:
>> Yes, integrating low-latency with high-latency anonymity is a very
>> interesting probleml. Unfortunately, I haven't had any time to
>> think about it.
>>
>> For people who want to think about it
I’m interested in helping out with this, mostly because we’ll want it for Pond
: https://pond.imperialviolet.org/
I’ve read the alpha-mixing paper, but not the others, so I’ll check em’ out.
Jeff
On 9 Dec 2014, at 16:40, Michael Rogers wrote:
> Signed PGP part
> On 25/11/14 12:45, George
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On 25/11/14 12:45, George Kadianakis wrote:
> Yes, integrating low-latency with high-latency anonymity is a very
> interesting probleml. Unfortunately, I haven't had any time to
> think about it.
>
> For people who want to think about it there is t
Michael Rogers writes:
> On 09/11/14 18:33, Mansour Moufid wrote:
>> Has there been research on integrating high-latency message
>> delivery protocols with the hidden service model of location
>> hiding? The SecureDrop or Pynchon Gate protocols sound like good
>> starting points. I would love to
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On 09/11/14 18:33, Mansour Moufid wrote:
> Has there been research on integrating high-latency message
> delivery protocols with the hidden service model of location
> hiding? The SecureDrop or Pynchon Gate protocols sound like good
> starting point
Hi everyone,
Operation Onymous, the anecdotes about it (I don't think the DoS was a
DoS), the wording of the related legal documents, and the previous CMU
research... make me think that traffic confirmation attacks are now
widely used in practice. Other, cat-and-mouse implemetation
vulnerabilitie
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