I agree with Michael's idea of core parts vs replaceable parts (such as the
type of cover traffic) since I feel much of the censorship circumvention
still relies on how the landscape looks like and that there isn't a clear
cut, theory-based solution to the problem (in the way you argue for example
On 03/03/15 16:54, Tariq Elahi wrote:
> What I am getting at here is that we ought to figure out properties of
> CRSs that all CRSs should have based on some fundamentals/theories
> rather than what happens to be the censorship landscape today. The
> future holds many challenges and changes and get
Hey Leeroy,
On your last point: yeah a traffic capture follows by TCP packet
reconstruction and thus reconstruction of the bittorrent messages and a
check against the original checksums of the pieces (as specified in the
torrent file) will show that a connection was not genuine (very likely it
was
> It's a mistake to say that if something doesn't
> work in China (or any other single concrete
> threat environment), then it's useless.
Out of respect for the work you've done I'm not going to assume you're
taking typed-word out of context incorrectly.
I'm concerned that this PT exchanges one
Hi Brandon,
Yeah that would be great, thanks! I'll do the packet capture when i get
back home from work.
A nice! Have fun at the conference!
On Tue, Mar 3, 2015 at 4:58 AM, Brandon Wiley wrote:
> Hi Dan. Very cool. Would you like some analysis of how well your pluggable
> transport mimicks r
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On 15-03-03 10:10 AM, David Fifield wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 02, 2015 at 07:10:55PM -0800, Dan Cristian Octavian
> wrote:
>> If I understand correctly, you are arguing that my assumption
>> that bittorrent is unlikely to be blocked is faulty. I don't have
On Mon, Mar 02, 2015 at 07:10:55PM -0800, Dan Cristian Octavian wrote:
> If I understand correctly, you are arguing that my assumption that bittorrent
> is unlikely to be blocked is faulty. I don't have a strong argument against
> this, other than that it would be a very drastic move since for that
Hi Dan. Very cool. Would you like some analysis of how well your pluggable
transport mimicks real BitTorrent traffic?
I don't have time to install bitsmuggler myself right now as I am currently
at a conference. However, if you send me a .pcap file recorded with tcpdump
or Wireshark of bitsmuggler
Hi Leeroy,
If I understand correctly, you are arguing that my assumption that
bittorrent is unlikely to be blocked is faulty. I don't have a strong
argument against this, other than that it would be a very drastic move
since for that part of the world bittorrent is the main way to get access
to me
Good point about joining the swarm. This is a part of the design that i'm
not confident about, it's definitely questionable.
Suppose a non-bitsmuggler peer joins the swarm. If he starts torrenting the
file, he will get a correct copy (no checksum fails on the pieces) of it
because all bitsmuggler
Hi,
I'm wondering about a particular case--let me explain. From your
threat model you assume that the adversary has suspicions about
encrypted traffic and may block them without strong justification. You
also take as given that the adversary may be state-level. From the
adversary objective this is
Also interesting is that BitTorrent has its own family of obfuscation
transports. I think they are designed to evade throttling by ISPs, which
is a threat model similar to the censorship one.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BitTorrent_protocol_encryption
MSE (Message Stream Encryption) is a little
On Sat, Feb 28, 2015 at 10:46:03AM -0800, Dan Cristian Octavian wrote:
> My name is Dan, I've been working on a pluggable transport for Tor based on
> bittorrent as cover traffic and wanted to let you know about it.
>
> https://github.com/danoctavian/bit-smuggler
>
> In a nutshell, I'm tunnelling
Hello!
My name is Dan, I've been working on a pluggable transport for Tor based on
bittorrent as cover traffic and wanted to let you know about it.
https://github.com/danoctavian/bit-smuggler
In a nutshell, I'm tunnelling a data stream through a bittorrent peer
connection that is created by real
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