Razvan Dragomirescu:
> Hey Evan, your hidden service appears to be down. Are there any mirrors of
> the code or can you bring it back online? My project is starting to take
> shape (took your advice and I'm using OpenPGP for now - may move to my own
> implementation in the future, but I want to cre
Hey Evan, your hidden service appears to be down. Are there any mirrors of
the code or can you bring it back online? My project is starting to take
shape (took your advice and I'm using OpenPGP for now - may move to my own
implementation in the future, but I want to create a small MVP ASAP).
Thank
Razvan Dragomirescu:
> Thanks Evan for the .onion links, I'll take a look. I'm still collecting
> data, testing hardware, etc. BTW, one of the cheapest options for this is
> http://www.ftsafe.com/product/epass/eJavaToken - $12 at
> http://javacardos.com/store/smartcard_eJavaToken.php . Unfortunatel
Thank you Evan, Donncha,
Regarding 1024-bit RSA support, take a look at
http://www.fi.muni.cz/~xsvenda/jcsupport.html - almost all JavaCard cards
support that.
I'm a Java developer but it looks like I'm going to have to switch to (and
learn) Python for this since almost all Tor utilities appear t
Hello Donncha!
Donncha Ó Cearbhaill:
> However his code was integrating with a smartcard at a very low
> level by sending AT commands manually. I don't think that is the
> best approach for compatibility.
>
> I think a better way would be to interface with the tokens via the
> PKCS#11 protocol.
Hey Razvan and tor-dev@!
Razvan Dragomirescu:
> I wanted to revisit this subject and actually start writing some
> code, but it looks like Ivan Markin's GitHub account is gone,
> together with all the code there. Ivan, are your modifications to
> OnionBalance still available anywhere?
Thanks f
Razvan Dragomirescu:
> Hello again,
>
> I wanted to revisit this subject and actually start writing some code, but
> it looks like Ivan Markin's GitHub account is gone, together with all the
> code there. Ivan, are your modifications to OnionBalance still available
> anywhere?
>
> Thank you,
> Ra
This may be not quite what you want, but the Estonia E-resident card
supports basic crypto with the private key on the smart card---i.e.,
you have to physically have the card to be able to read the encrypted
mail.
There are probably more elegant solutions than plugging into the
Estonia E-resident
Hello again,
I wanted to revisit this subject and actually start writing some code, but
it looks like Ivan Markin's GitHub account is gone, together with all the
code there. Ivan, are your modifications to OnionBalance still available
anywhere?
Thank you,
Razvan
--
Razvan Dragomirescu
Chief Tech
Yes, that's precisely the point - if the card is stolen, the service is
stolen with it. I'm not trying to prevent that, I'm trying to _tie_ the
service to the card - whoever has the card runs the service. If you see
that the card is gone, you know your service is gone too. If the card is
still ther
On Tue, Oct 20, 2015 at 3:05 PM, Ivan Markin wrote:
> No, I will be secure. An adversary could sniff your PIN and sign
> whatever they want to, true. But revealing the PIN != revealing the key.
> In this case your identity key is still safe even if your PIN is
> "compromised".
Yes the private key
grarpamp:
> Yes if you intend to patch tor to use a smartcard as a
> cryptographic coprocessor offloading anything of interest
> that needs signed / encrypted / decrypted to it. The card
> will need to remain plugged in for tor to function.
As I said before, only thing that actually needs to be pr
You mentione...
> I have Tor running on the USBArmory by InversePath (
> http://inversepath.com/usbarmory.html ) and have a microSD form factor card
> made by Swissbit (
> www.swissbit.com/products/security-products/overwiev/security-products-overview/
> ) up and running on it.
Good that USBarmor
On Sat, Oct 17, 2015 at 5:46 PM, Razvan Dragomirescu
wrote:
> Exactly, you ask the smartcard to decrypt your traffic (and sign data if
> needed), it never tells you the key, it's a blackbox - it gets plaintext
> input and gives you encrypted (or signed) output, without ever revealing the
> key it'
Razvan Dragomirescu:
> Ivan, if I understand
> https://onionbalance.readthedocs.org/en/latest/design.html#next-generation-onion-services-prop-224-compatibility
> correctly, the setup I've planned will no longer work once Tor switches to
> the next generation hidden services architecture, is this co
Razvan Dragomirescu:
> Thank you Ivan!
You're welcome!
> Ah, I understand now! That actually makes perfect sense for my application.
> If I understand it correctly, I can simply let Tor register the HS by
> itself (using a random HS name/key), then fetch the introduction points and
> keys and re-r
Ivan, if I understand
https://onionbalance.readthedocs.org/en/latest/design.html#next-generation-onion-services-prop-224-compatibility
correctly, the setup I've planned will no longer work once Tor switches to
the next generation hidden services architecture, is this correct? Will
there be any back
Thank you s7r! I think I'm going to start by simply using a mechanism
similar to OnionBalance - I'm going to let Tor do its HS registration with
a random HS name (and with a key that the host knows), then read the
introduction points and keys and re-register them (a la OnionBalance) with
a new HS n
Thank you Ivan!
On Sun, Oct 18, 2015 at 1:44 AM, Ivan Markin wrote:
> Not exactly. The trick is that keys are not the same. For more details
> have a look at the specifications [1]. There is a "permanent key"
> ("holds the name", signs descriptors) and an "onion key" [2] for each
> Introduction
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256
Hello Razvan,
What you try to achieve is possible. It can be done, but requires code
to be written. If you are really interested about this feature you can
either sponsor someone to write the code for it either code it yourself.
The 1024 bit RSA pr
Razvan Dragomirescu:
> Ivan, according to https://www.torproject.org/docs/hidden-services.html.en
> (maybe I misunderstood it), at Step 4, the client sends an _encrypted_
> packet to the hidden service, so the hidden service needs to be able to
> decrypt that packet. So the key on the card needs to
Exactly, you ask the smartcard to decrypt your traffic (and sign data if
needed), it never tells you the key, it's a blackbox - it gets plaintext
input and gives you encrypted (or signed) output, without ever revealing
the key it's used. It can also generate the key internally (actually a
keypair,
Ivan, according to https://www.torproject.org/docs/hidden-services.html.en
(maybe I misunderstood it), at Step 4, the client sends an _encrypted_
packet to the hidden service, so the hidden service needs to be able to
decrypt that packet. So the key on the card needs to be used both for
signing the
Ken Keys:
>> > The point is that one can't[*] extract a private key from a smartcard
>> > and because of that even if machine is compromised your private key
>> > stays safe.
> If the machine is going to use the HS key, the actual HS key has to be
> visible to it.
Nope. If the machine is going to
On 10/17/2015 12:27 PM, Ivan Markin wrote:
> Ken Keys:
>> If the tor process is going to use the key, at some point the
>> unencrypted key has to be visible to the machine running it. You would
>> in any case have to trust the machine hosting the tor node. A more
>> secure setup would be to run the
Ken Keys:
> If the tor process is going to use the key, at some point the
> unencrypted key has to be visible to the machine running it. You would
> in any case have to trust the machine hosting the tor node. A more
> secure setup would be to run the tor node inside an encrypted VM and use
> your s
If the tor process is going to use the key, at some point the
unencrypted key has to be visible to the machine running it. You would
in any case have to trust the machine hosting the tor node. A more
secure setup would be to run the tor node inside an encrypted VM and use
your smartcard/dongle/what
Razvan Dragomirescu:
> Thank you Ivan, I've taken a look but as far as I understand your project
> only signs the HiddenService descriptors from an OpenPGP card. It still
> requires each backend instance to have its own copy of the key (where it
> can be read by an attacker). My goal is to have the
Tamper resistance. And the fact that an attacker with access to the machine
running Tor can read your encrypted thumb drive (you need to decrypt it at
some point to load the key into the Tor process since the encrypted
thumbdrive doesn't run crypto algos internally). A smartcard is a small
embedded
What is the advantage of a smart card over a standard encrypted thumb drive?
On 10/17/2015 11:19 AM, Razvan Dragomirescu wrote:
> Thank you Ivan, I've taken a look but as far as I understand your
> project only signs the HiddenService descriptors from an OpenPGP card.
> It still requires each back
Thank you Ivan, I've taken a look but as far as I understand your project
only signs the HiddenService descriptors from an OpenPGP card. It still
requires each backend instance to have its own copy of the key (where it
can be read by an attacker). My goal is to have the HS private key
exclusively i
Thank you grarpamp, but that's not what I'm trying to prevent/achieve. I
simply want to host the private key for a hidden service inside a secure
element (a smartcard) to ensure that only the hardware that has direct
access to my smartcard can publish the descriptors for the service and
decrypt inc
Hello,
Razvan Dragomirescu:
> I am not sure if this has been discussed before or how hard it would be to
> implement, but I'm looking for a way to integrate a smartcard with Tor -
> essentially, I want to be able to host hidden service keys on the card. I'm
> trying to bind the hidden service to a
On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 4:08 PM, Razvan Dragomirescu
wrote:
> essentially, I want to be able to host hidden service keys on the card. I'm
> trying to bind the hidden service to a hardware component (the smartcard) so
> that it can be securely hosted in a hostile environment as well as
> impossible
Hello,
I am not sure if this has been discussed before or how hard it would be to
implement, but I'm looking for a way to integrate a smartcard with Tor -
essentially, I want to be able to host hidden service keys on the card. I'm
trying to bind the hidden service to a hardware component (the smar
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