On 19/10/2018 16:05, Leif Ryge wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 17, 2018 at 07:27:32PM +0100, Michael Rogers wrote:
> [...]
>> If we decided not to use the key blinding trick, and just allowed both
>> parties to know the private key, do you see any attacks?
> [...]
>
> If I'm understanding your proposal corr
On 19/10/2018 14:01, George Kadianakis wrote:
> Michael Rogers writes:
>> A given user's temporary hidden service addresses would all be related
>> to each other in the sense of being derived from the same root Ed25519
>> key pair. If I understand right, the security proof for the key blinding
>>
On Wed, Oct 17, 2018 at 07:27:32PM +0100, Michael Rogers wrote:
[...]
> If we decided not to use the key blinding trick, and just allowed both
> parties to know the private key, do you see any attacks?
[...]
If I'm understanding your proposal correctly, I believe it would leave
you vulnerable to
Michael Rogers writes:
> On 18/10/2018 13:26, George Kadianakis wrote:
>> Michael Rogers writes:
>>
>>> Hi George,
>>>
>>> On 15/10/2018 19:11, George Kadianakis wrote:
Nick's trick seems like a reasonable way to avoid the issue with both
parties
knowing the private key.
>>>
>>>
On 18/10/2018 13:26, George Kadianakis wrote:
> Michael Rogers writes:
>
>> Hi George,
>>
>> On 15/10/2018 19:11, George Kadianakis wrote:
>>> Nick's trick seems like a reasonable way to avoid the issue with both
>>> parties
>>> knowing the private key.
>>
>> Thanks! Good to know. Any thoughts a
Michael Rogers writes:
> Hi George,
>
> On 15/10/2018 19:11, George Kadianakis wrote:
>> Nick's trick seems like a reasonable way to avoid the issue with both parties
>> knowing the private key.
>
> Thanks! Good to know. Any thoughts about how to handle the conversion
> between ECDH and EdDSA key
Hi George,
On 15/10/2018 19:11, George Kadianakis wrote:
> Nick's trick seems like a reasonable way to avoid the issue with both parties
> knowing the private key.
Thanks! Good to know. Any thoughts about how to handle the conversion
between ECDH and EdDSA keys?
If we decided not to use the key
Michael Rogers writes:
> Hi all,
>
> The Briar team is working on a way for users to add each other as
> contacts by exchanging links without having to meet in person.
>
> We don't want to include the address of the user's long-term Tor hidden
> service in the link, as we assume the link may be o
On 28/09/2018 02:40, Nick Mathewson wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 27, 2018 at 9:26 AM Michael Rogers
> wrote:
>>
>> Hi all,
>>
>> The Briar team is working on a way for users to add each other as
>> contacts by exchanging links without having to meet in person.
>>
>> We don't want to include the address o
Hi Chad,
On 27/09/2018 20:02, Chad Retz wrote:
> I am no expert here, but I'm confused by "the client connecting to the
> service knows the service's private key". Why not just create an onion
> service (per contact) and then use the client authentication feature
> to ensure they share the same se
In this realm, perhaps https://github.com/warner/magic-wormhole could be
used to construct a solution?
Some person has to "initiate" the wormhole and pass the (short) code to
the other person -- this could be via some established channel, like
"over the phone" (the codes exchanged are only usable
On Thu, Sep 27, 2018 at 9:26 AM Michael Rogers wrote:
>
> Hi all,
>
> The Briar team is working on a way for users to add each other as
> contacts by exchanging links without having to meet in person.
>
> We don't want to include the address of the user's long-term Tor hidden
> service in the link
I am no expert here, but I'm confused by "the client connecting to the
service knows the service's private key". Why not just create an onion
service (per contact) and then use the client authentication feature
to ensure they share the same secret? Client auth is built in to
discovery and from what
Hi all,
The Briar team is working on a way for users to add each other as
contacts by exchanging links without having to meet in person.
We don't want to include the address of the user's long-term Tor hidden
service in the link, as we assume the link may be observed by an
adversary, who would th
14 matches
Mail list logo
