George Kadianakis writes:
> George Kadianakis writes:
>
>> Hello there,
>>
>> I inline a copy of a proposal we've been working on lately. Discussion
>> can be found in the "Feedback on obfuscating hidden-service statistics"
>> thread.
>>
>> The proposal suggests that Tor relays add some stats ab
On 11/12/14 15:45, Karsten Loesing wrote:
Sorry for double-posting!
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On 11/12/14 14:31, A. Johnson wrote:
>> Can you be more explicit with regard to privacy guarantees of the
>> obfuscation schema that is currently implemented: 1) binning,
>> 2) add Laplace noise, 3) no second binning.
>
> I’ll discuss this in terms o
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On 11/12/14 14:31, A. Johnson wrote:
>> Can you be more explicit with regard to privacy guarantees of the
>> obfuscation schema that is currently implemented: 1) binning,
>> 2) add Laplace noise, 3) no second binning.
>
> I’ll discuss this in terms o
> Can you be more explicit with regard to privacy guarantees of the
> obfuscation schema that is currently implemented: 1) binning, 2) add
> Laplace noise, 3) no second binning.
I’ll discuss this in terms of attacks on the stats of the number of HS
descriptors.
Binning: Suppose an adversary know
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On 10/12/14 15:37, A. Johnson wrote:
>> But I don't see the value of binning the result once more. In a
>> sense, we're already binning signal + noise by cutting off the
>> float part. I don't see what we gain by reducing resolution
>> even more.
> But I don't see the value of binning the result once more. In a
> sense, we're already binning signal + noise by cutting off the float
> part. I don't see what we gain by reducing resolution even more. It
> seems just unnecessary.
In principle releasing the number could result in different
d
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On 09/12/14 20:20, A. Johnson wrote:
>> This indeed seems plausible under the powerful assumption that
>> the underlying stat is constant.
>
> Actually it applies to any known relative pattern, for example,
> that the number increases by 1 each time.
> This indeed seems plausible under the powerful assumption that the
> underlying stat is constant.
Actually it applies to any known relative pattern, for example, that the number
increases by 1 each time.
> where the additive noise is applied to the center of the first bin?
Yes, you can look a
"A. Johnson" writes:
> Hi George,
>
Hello!
> I recommend a change to the way that these statistics are
> obfuscated. The problem is that new noise is used every day, and from
> the distribution of the reported bins, the exact location within the
> bin (assuming the stat stats constant) can be r
Hi George,
I recommend a change to the way that these statistics are obfuscated. The
problem is that new noise is used every day, and from the distribution of the
reported bins, the exact location within the bin (assuming the stat stats
constant) can be reported.
So instead of this
>
George Kadianakis writes:
> Hello there,
>
> I inline a copy of a proposal we've been working on lately. Discussion
> can be found in the "Feedback on obfuscating hidden-service statistics"
> thread.
>
> The proposal suggests that Tor relays add some stats about hidden
> service usage. We believe
Hello there,
I inline a copy of a proposal we've been working on lately. Discussion
can be found in the "Feedback on obfuscating hidden-service statistics"
thread.
The proposal suggests that Tor relays add some stats about hidden
service usage. We believe that these stats are not dangerous and ca
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