On Tue, Apr 08, 2014 at 02:15:12PM -0500, Nicholas Hopper wrote:
> > 4. Interface
> >
> >To use this feature, a router should rename its secret_id_key
> >file to secret_id_key_OLD. The first time that Tor starts and
> >finds a secret_id_key_OLD file, it generates a new ID key if one
>
On Tue, Apr 8, 2014 at 2:15 PM, Nicholas Hopper wrote:
> To clarify here: does "router[s] descriptors signed by the old
> identity" include the old-id field? That is, in case an identity key
> is compromised is there a race to claim the old-id mapping? If not,
> how should the authorities/client
On Tue, Apr 8, 2014 at 1:50 PM, Nick Mathewson wrote:
> Filename: 230-rsa1024-relay-id-migration.txt
> Title: How to change RSA1024 relay identity keys
> Authors: Nick Mathewson
> Created: 7 April 2014
> Target: 0.2.?
> Status: Draft
>
> 1. Intro and motivation
>
>Some times, a relay would lik
Here's a design for what to do to support a massive RSA1024 relay key
migration, if we need to do another one in the future.
(I'm not sure whether this is timely for responding to CVE-2014-0160
or not; possibly not.)
Filename: 230-rsa1024-relay-id-migration.txt
Title: How to change RSA1024 relay
