> > I would be pleased to use my *dsl/cable home-router with fixed-IP
> > address to do a port-mapping to a known and stable tor-relay.
> >
> > Being able to "setup a bridge" by simply:
> > - opening a port-forward on my router
> > - submitting it to a web-interface
> >
> > would be a very cool w
On Tue, Jun 12, 2012 at 12:55:24PM +0200, Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) wrote:
> And it would be very useful if we would allow an easy way to setup
> hundreds of "dumb briges", simple TCP forwarding proxy that goes in a
> random order across all public relays.
No need to go in a random order across all
On 6/12/12 12:32 PM, Roger Dingledine wrote:
>> Any attacker who can extend circuits through a bridge can enumerate
>> the set of guard nodes which it routes its clients' circuits through.
>> A malicious middle relay can easily determine the set of entry guards
>> used by a hidden service, and over
On Thu, Oct 20, 2011 at 06:00:20PM +, Robert Ransom wrote:
> On 2011-10-20, Nick Mathewson wrote:
>
> > 4.3. Separate bridge-guards and client-guards
> >
> >In the design above, I specify that bridges should use the same
> >guard nodes for extending client circuits as they use for the
On 2011-10-20, Nick Mathewson wrote:
> 4.3. Separate bridge-guards and client-guards
>
>In the design above, I specify that bridges should use the same
>guard nodes for extending client circuits as they use for their own
>circuits. It's not immediately clear whether this is a good id
On Thu, Oct 20, 2011 at 10:54 AM, Ian Goldberg wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 19, 2011 at 08:09:17PM -0400, Nick Mathewson wrote:
>> Note that this design does not require that our stream cipher
>> operations be transitive, even though they are.
>
> Did you mean "commutative"?
Indeed so. Fixing.
th
On Wed, Oct 19, 2011 at 08:09:17PM -0400, Nick Mathewson wrote:
>Note that this design does not require that our stream cipher
>operations be transitive, even though they are.
Did you mean "commutative"?
- Ian
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tor-dev
Filename: 188-bridge-guards.txt
Title: Bridge Guards and other anti-enumeration defenses
Author: Nick Mathewson
Created: 14 Oct 2011
Status: Open
1. Overview
Bridges are useful against censors only so long as the adversary
cannot easily enumerate their addresses. I propose a design to make
