On Tue, Oct 4, 2011 at 1:05 PM, Steven Murdoch
wrote:
> From a first look at 176 it looks good. Some comments and suggestions inline:
Thanks, Steven!
>> Terminological note: I use "client" below to mean the Tor
>> instance (a client or a bridge or a relay) that initiates a TLS
>> connec
>From a first look at 176 it looks good. Some comments and suggestions inline:
>Terminological note: I use "client" below to mean the Tor
>instance (a client or a bridge or a relay) that initiates a TLS
>connection, and "server" to mean the Tor instance (a bridge or a
>relay) that
On Wed, Sep 21, 2011 at 1:58 PM, Nick Mathewson wrote:
I'm thinking of a few more tweaks to this proposal, based on implementation.
Here's one:
> I think on reflection that we should change the TLSSECRETS field from
> optional to required in all AUTHENTICATE cells. Only relays need to
> send i
On Tue, Sep 20, 2011 at 2:13 PM, Roger Dingledine wrote:
Hi! I'm going to snip every point where I agree with you, and just
patch the proposal accordingly.
> On Mon, Jan 31, 2011 at 09:50:06PM -0500, Nick Mathewson wrote:
[...]
>> 2) We should make it harder to probe for a Tor server. Rig
On Mon, Jan 31, 2011 at 09:50:06PM -0500, Nick Mathewson wrote:
> 1) We should make it easier to use self-signed certs, or maybe
> even existing HTTPS certificates, for the server side
> handshake, since most non-Tor SSL handshakes use either
> self-signed certifica