On Fri, Jul 15, 2011 at 3:16 PM, Nick Jones wrote:
>
>
> On Wednesday, July 13, 2011 at 8:02 PM, Brandon Wiley wrote:
>
> >
> > Cool stuff. I like how the system can be automated and self-funding.
> >
> > With regards to bootstrapping, giving out one node at a time is not a
> useful defense becaus
On Wednesday, July 13, 2011 at 8:02 PM, Brandon Wiley wrote:
>
> Cool stuff. I like how the system can be automated and self-funding.
>
> With regards to bootstrapping, giving out one node at a time is not a useful
> defense because requests can be parallelized. [1] Moving nodes is similarly
Cool stuff. I like how the system can be automated and self-funding.
With regards to bootstrapping, giving out one node at a time is not a useful
defense because requests can be parallelized. [1] Moving nodes is similarly
useless because the attacker can continually map the network using free
para
On Wednesday, July 13, 2011 at 4:58 PM, Aaron wrote:
> I have a few questions
>
> Q1: Regarding network bootstrap protocol: Consider the scenario where
> a censor mines the boostrap node list and blocks these nodes. Do you
> implement any mechanisms to prevent a censor from obtaining the entire
I have a few questions
Q1: Regarding network bootstrap protocol: Consider the scenario where
a censor mines the boostrap node list and blocks these nodes. Do you
implement any mechanisms to prevent a censor from obtaining the entire
set of bootstrap nodes? Similarly, aren't public directory server
Hi All,
I'm a graduate student at Princeton, and our research group has recently
submitted a paper proposing a design for cloud based onion routing. The goal of
our research is to securely perform onion routing on cloud based infrastructure
(like Amazon EC2 and Rackspace) while allowing users