Re: [tor-dev] Key revocation in Next Generation Hidden Services

2014-01-29 Thread Nicholas Hopper
On Wed, Jan 29, 2014 at 11:04 AM, George Kadianakis wrote: > On the other hand, if we wanted to use the HSDirs, we could imagine > the HS sending some sort of revocation message to the responsible > HSDirs so that they stop serving descriptors with compromised > keys. Unfortunately, this scheme tr

[tor-dev] Key revocation in Next Generation Hidden Services

2014-01-29 Thread George Kadianakis
To achieve offline key storage in the new HS design, hidden service are using three layers of keys: (Skip the next three paragraphs if you know this stuff) Each hidden service has a "long-term master identity key". This is the key that is encoded in its onion address. Using the long-term identit