On Tue, Mar 25, 2014 at 3:41 PM, Mike Perry
wrote:
> For control, it would be nice to know what we would be giving up if we
> used that same T=2000 cutoff with three guards and compare that to
> T=2000 with just one guard. Is it easy for you to rerun just that
> comparison (since you seem to be su
Roger Dingledine writes:
> On Thu, Mar 13, 2014 at 10:21:38PM +, George Kadianakis wrote:
>> From {2}, we see that the Tor network has 6000MiB/s advertised guard
>> bandwidth (orange line), but supposedly is only using the 3500MiB/s
>> (yellow line). This means, that supposedly we are only us
On Thu, Mar 13, 2014 at 10:21:38PM +, George Kadianakis wrote:
> From {2}, we see that the Tor network has 6000MiB/s advertised guard
> bandwidth (orange line), but supposedly is only using the 3500MiB/s
> (yellow line). This means, that supposedly we are only using 3/5ths of
> our guard capaci
Roger Dingledine:
> On Tue, Mar 25, 2014 at 01:41:43PM -0700, Mike Perry wrote:
> > Nicholas Hopper:
> > > I modified Aaron Johnson's TorPS simulator to
> > > simulate 50K clients
>
> > ** The reason I ask is because I suspect there is actually an interplay
> > between the current circuit build t
On Tue, Mar 25, 2014 at 01:41:43PM -0700, Mike Perry wrote:
> Nicholas Hopper:
> > I modified Aaron Johnson's TorPS simulator to
> > simulate 50K clients
> ** The reason I ask is because I suspect there is actually an interplay
> between the current circuit build timeout code and the pool of 3 gu
Nicholas Hopper:
> On Thu, Mar 13, 2014 at 5:21 PM, George Kadianakis
> wrote:
> > tl;dr: analysis seems to indicate that switching to one guard node
> > might not be catastrophic to the performance of Tor. To improve
> > performance some increased guard bandwidth thresholds are proposed
> > that
On Thu, Mar 13, 2014 at 5:21 PM, George Kadianakis
wrote:
> tl;dr: analysis seems to indicate that switching to one guard node
> might not be catastrophic to the performance of Tor. To improve
> performance some increased guard bandwidth thresholds are proposed
> that seem to help without complet
tl;dr: analysis seems to indicate that switching to one guard node
might not be catastrophic to the performance of Tor. To improve
performance some increased guard bandwidth thresholds are proposed
that seem to help without completely destroying the anonymity of the
network. Enjoy the therapeutic q
