I've blocked Mike's known nodes from my configs
as I simply do not agree with his apparent ethos
in this regard. That being themes of censorship, policing, etc.
It's better individuals decide for themselves, or upon
peer input, than upon hard forms of tracking prevail. There
is a lot of oppurtunity
>
> (Aside: I think this thread is unrelated enough to tor-dev at this point
> that I'm going to make this my last reply.)
>
That's too bad - I was only answering questions you posed yourself. Happy
to continue debating off list. Still, I think discussion of features that
could increase usage are
(Aside: I think this thread is unrelated enough to tor-dev at this point
that I'm going to make this my last reply.)
On Tue, 2014-07-22 at 14:42 +0200, Mike Hearn wrote:
> Regardless of the moral arguments you put forward, which I
> will not
> comment on, it seems like this
>
> Regardless of the moral arguments you put forward, which I will not
> comment on, it seems like this idea would never be implemented because
> none of the Tor developers have a desire to implement such a dangerous
> feature.
>
I can argue that the lack of it is also dangerous, actually. It amo
On Mon, 2014-07-21 at 11:48 +0200, Mike Hearn wrote:
> One of my first concerns would be that this would build in a
> very easy
> way for a government (probably the US government) to compel
> Tor to add
> in a line of code that says "If it's this hidden servi
On 07/21/2014 12:34 AM, Mike Hearn wrote:
> Tor provides exit policies to let exit relay operators restrict traffic
> they consider to be unwanted or abusive. In this way a kind of
> international group consensus emerges about what is and is not
> acceptable usage of Tor. For instance, SMTP out is
>
> This isn't about 'acceptable usage of Tor', this is necessary compromise
> to limit exit operators' exposure to ISP harrassment.
>
Even if we accept your premise that no exit operator cares about internet
abuse, it's still the same thing. ISP's define what is acceptable usage of
their internet
>
> One of my first concerns would be that this would build in a very easy
> way for a government (probably the US government) to compel Tor to add
> in a line of code that says "If it's this hidden service key, block
> access."
>
And people who run Tor could easily take it out again, what with it
On Sun, Jul 20, 2014 at 6:34 PM, Mike Hearn wrote:
> Hello,
>
> As we know, hidden services can be useful for all kinds of legitimate things
> (Pond's usage is particularly interesting), however they do also sometimes
> get used by botnets and other problematic things.
>
> Tor provides exit polici
One of my first concerns would be that this would build in a very easy
way for a government (probably the US government) to compel Tor to add
in a line of code that says "If it's this hidden service key, block
access."
After all - it's a stretch to say "You must modify your software to
support blo
On Mon, Jul 21, 2014 at 12:34:50AM +0200, Mike Hearn wrote:
> Hello,
>
> As we know, hidden services can be useful for all kinds of legitimate
> things (Pond's usage is particularly interesting), however they do also
> sometimes get used by botnets and other problematic things.
>
> Tor provides e
Hello,
As we know, hidden services can be useful for all kinds of legitimate
things (Pond's usage is particularly interesting), however they do also
sometimes get used by botnets and other problematic things.
Tor provides exit policies to let exit relay operators restrict traffic
they consider to
12 matches
Mail list logo
