Re: [tor-dev] Evaluating rendezvous circuit build up CPU usage

2020-01-17 Thread Valentin Franck
Hello, thanks for you mail. my comments are below. On 1/15/20 6:17 PM, juanjo wrote: > Hi, thanks for working on it. > > At first I thought about using a PoW on the Introduction Point (I.P.) > side. > > Maybe a dynamic PoW? I mean only ask for PoW under load (Hidden > services sets the INTRO1s/s

Re: [tor-dev] Evaluating rendezvous circuit build up CPU usage

2020-01-15 Thread juanjo
Hi, thanks for working on it. At first I thought about using a PoW on the Introduction Point (I.P.) side. Maybe a dynamic PoW? I mean only ask for PoW under load (Hidden services sets the INTRO1s/second on the I.P.) or ask for every new circuit. Then I thought that we need to fix the Rendezvo

Re: [tor-dev] Evaluating rendezvous circuit build up CPU usage

2020-01-14 Thread David Goulet
On 13 Jan (13:39:37), Valentin Franck wrote: > Hello tor-devs, Hi Valentin! > > I am currently working on a DoS mitigation system aiming to protect the > availability of onion services flooded with INTRO2 cells. My idea is > using a (Privacy Pass like) token based approach as suggested in > http

[tor-dev] Evaluating rendezvous circuit build up CPU usage

2020-01-13 Thread Valentin Franck
Hello tor-devs, I am currently working on a DoS mitigation system aiming to protect the availability of onion services flooded with INTRO2 cells. My idea is using a (Privacy Pass like) token based approach as suggested in https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/31223#comment:6 For the eva