Re: [tor-dev] Entry guards, primary guards, dir guards

2016-02-10 Thread Ola Bini
Ah, good point. So, it seems N_PRIMARY_GUARDS is an argument to the algorithm. Cheers -- Ola Bini (https://olabini.se) "Yields falsehood when quined" yields falsehood when quined. signature.asc Description: PGP signature ___ tor-dev mailing list to

Re: [tor-dev] Entry guards, primary guards, dir guards

2016-02-10 Thread George Kadianakis
Ola Bini writes: > Hi, > >> So maybe the simple answer here is that if prop247 is enabled (this could be >> a >> NumGuards=N argument to our algorithm), instead of always returning the first >> reachable guard, we instead build a list of the first N reachable guards, and >> randomly choose one o

Re: [tor-dev] Entry guards, primary guards, dir guards

2016-02-09 Thread George Kadianakis
Ola Bini writes: > Hey, > > Maybe I misunderstood the hard part - I thought the problem was to > choose the NUM longlived vanguards - since there are only ever NUM > possible guards at each level, not to choose which one to use among > the NUM guards. For the first, it felt like using 259 would w

Re: [tor-dev] Entry guards, primary guards, dir guards

2016-02-08 Thread George Kadianakis
Ola Bini writes: > Hey, > > Thanks- this is very helpful. > > When it comes to vanguards, I've already read through the > proposal. I'm not exactly sure I understand how much different 259 > would need to be to support the 247 needs. It seems we should be able > to just run the algorithm NUM_SECO

Re: [tor-dev] Entry guards, primary guards, dir guards

2016-02-08 Thread George Kadianakis
Ola Bini writes: > Hi again, > > Two questions - first, hopefully I simple one. What are directory > guards, exactly? > > Second, we found a weird behavior in the current code > base. Specifically, when Tor first downloads the microdescriptors, it > chooses 3 guards for this with the V2Dir flag.