> On 20 Nov 2015, at 12:21, Tim Wilson-Brown - teor wrote:
>
> ...
>
> A full list of changes is:
> ...
> * randomise revision-counter to avoid information leaks
> …
I just pushed a fixup to this commit: the revision-counter requires a minimum
increment of 1 (not 0).
Tim
Tim Wilson-Brown (
Hi George,
Please see below for a spec patch covering this email thread and various issues
discussed on Trac and tor-dev@
> On 20 Nov 2015, at 00:13, George Kadianakis wrote:
>
> Tim Wilson-Brown - teor mailto:teor2...@gmail.com>>
> writes:
>
>> Hi All,
>>
>> prop224 salts the encrypted por
Tim Wilson-Brown - teor writes:
> Hi All,
>
> prop224 salts the encrypted portion of each descriptor with a random value.
> If we use the same "salt" for every replica/spread, the encrypted portions of
> the descriptor will be identical.
> (In the spec, it looks like the same encrypted descripto
Hi All,
prop224 salts the encrypted portion of each descriptor with a random value.
If we use the same "salt" for every replica/spread, the encrypted portions of
the descriptor will be identical.
(In the spec, it looks like the same encrypted descriptor / salt is used for
each replica / spread,
Hi all,
I think we can make next-generation onion (hidden) services (proposal #224)
more resilient against certain kinds of DoS / client discovery attacks, by
using a different blinded public key for each HSDir.
Attack Summary:
Once a malicious HSDir receives a descriptor, it can locate other
