On 2013-05-29 5:48 AM, Philipp Winter wrote:
On Tue, May 28, 2013 at 07:55:45PM -0400, Tariq Elahi wrote:
2. Can manipulate (add, delete, change) said traffic in time and data
dimensions.
The challenge is to predict what can actually be done with these three simple
atoms. Be it terminating non
On Tue, May 28, 2013 at 07:55:45PM -0400, Tariq Elahi wrote:
> 2. Can manipulate (add, delete, change) said traffic in time and data
> dimensions.
The challenge is to predict what can actually be done with these three simple
atoms. Be it terminating non-whitelisted TCP connections after 60 second
On Tue, May 28, 2013 at 02:33:40PM -0400, Tom Ritter wrote:
> I have another idea. (Not "another" in the sense of "do this instead", but
> "another" in the sense of "maybe do this additionally").
>
> Can a country block SSH? Surely state-sponsored network operations take
> place over SSH, so I s
On 2013-05-28 4:42 PM, adrelanos wrote:
The more pluggable transports, the better.
Maybe if there are enough transports, the other side just gives up.
My interest is piqued by this statement and similar sounding ones that I
hear, and myself also think, when talking about censorship.
I suspect
Tom Ritter:
> On 28 May 2013 14:51, adrelanos wrote:
>
>> How good are SSH connections with hiding what's inside?
>>
>> Website fingerprinting has demonstrated, that SSH connections may hide
>> communication contents, but which website was visited, could be guessed
>> with a fairly good results.
On Tue, May 28, 2013 at 02:33:40PM -0400, Tom Ritter wrote:
> Can a country block SSH? Surely state-sponsored network operations take place
> over SSH, so I suspect a country cannot block it quickly, easily, and without
> internal retaliation from it's legitimate users. Bureaucracy.
There woul
On 28 May 2013 14:51, adrelanos wrote:
> How good are SSH connections with hiding what's inside?
>
> Website fingerprinting has demonstrated, that SSH connections may hide
> communication contents, but which website was visited, could be guessed
> with a fairly good results.
>
> Tor isn't a websi
On Tue, May 28, 2013 at 03:59:15PM +0100, Steven Murdoch wrote:
> Hi Chang,
>
> We've been discussing how to build better pluggable transports for Tor as
> part of your application to Google Summer of Code. Now that you've been
> accepted, I thought it would be good to bring this discussion to t
How good are SSH connections with hiding what's inside?
Website fingerprinting has demonstrated, that SSH connections may hide
communication contents, but which website was visited, could be guessed
with a fairly good results.
Tor isn't a website, but if SSH leaks which website has been visited
e
I have another idea. (Not "another" in the sense of "do this instead", but
"another" in the sense of "maybe do this additionally").
Can a country block SSH? Surely state-sponsored network operations take
place over SSH, so I suspect a country cannot block it quickly, easily, and
without internal
Hi Chang,
We've been discussing how to build better pluggable transports for Tor as part
of your application to Google Summer of Code. Now that you've been accepted, I
thought it would be good to bring this discussion to tor-dev so that others can
contribute.
The basic idea behind the project
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