Re: [tor-dev] [Tails-dev] Tails vs the capacity of the Meek bridges

2020-03-24 Thread anonym
Iain Learmonth: > Hi, > > On 20/03/2020 15:30, sajolida wrote: >>> In Tails' threat model it is assumed that adversaries monitor the default >>> bridges provided by the Tor Browser, and that our users want to avoid >>> detection of that, so we are not interested in adding the default bridges >>

Re: [tor-dev] [Tails-dev] Tails vs the capacity of the Meek bridges

2020-03-24 Thread Iain Learmonth
Hi, On 20/03/2020 15:30, sajolida wrote: >> In Tails' threat model it is assumed that adversaries monitor the default >> bridges provided by the Tor Browser, and that our users want to avoid >> detection of that, so we are not interested in adding the default bridges to >> Tails > > We're not

Re: [tor-dev] [Tails-dev] Tails vs the capacity of the Meek bridges

2020-03-20 Thread sajolida
anonym: > In Tails' threat model it is assumed that adversaries monitor the default > bridges provided by the Tor Browser, and that our users want to avoid > detection of that, so we are not interested in adding the default bridges to > Tails We're not offering the default bridges in Tails also