Re: [tor-dev] Even more notes on relay-crypto constructions

2012-10-12 Thread unknown
>On Thu, 11 Oct 2012 19:17:22 +0000 >unknown wrote: > On Tue, 9 Oct 2012 00:28:38 -0400 > Nick Mathewson wrote: > > > So to be concrete, let me suggest a few modes of operation. I believe > > I'm competent to implement these: > > I think (IMHO) Keccak m

Re: [tor-dev] Even more notes on relay-crypto constructions

2012-10-11 Thread unknown
On Tue, 9 Oct 2012 00:28:38 -0400 Nick Mathewson wrote: > So to be concrete, let me suggest a few modes of operation. I believe > I'm competent to implement these: I think (IMHO) Keccak makes many (most?) symmetric encryption modes obsolete in the near future. Now Keccak-Hash is SHA-3 winner.

Re: [tor-dev] Analysis of the Relative Severity of Tagging Attacks

2012-03-12 Thread unknown
On Mon, 12 Mar 2012 09:40:18 -0500 Watson Ladd wrote: > On Mon, Mar 12, 2012 at 9:04 AM, Robert Ransom wrote: > > On 2012-03-12, Watson Ladd wrote: > >> On Sun, Mar 11, 2012 at 10:45 PM, Robert Ransom > >> wrote: > > > >>> (The BEAR/LION key would likely be different for each cell that a > >>>

Re: [tor-dev] SHA-3 isn't looking so hot to me (was: Draft sketch document with ideas for future crypto ops)

2011-11-02 Thread unknown
On Tue, 1 Nov 2011 14:51:00 -0700 coderman wrote: > On Tue, Nov 1, 2011 at 1:20 PM, Zooko O'Whielacronx wrote: > > ... > > Therefore, in the context of whether we can expect SHA-3 and/or > > SHA-256 circuits to come built into our chips in the future, the fact > > that SHA-256 can be implemented

Re: [tor-dev] Draft sketch document with ideas for future crypto ops

2011-11-02 Thread unknown
On Mon, 31 Oct 2011 23:59:55 -0500 Watson Ladd wrote: > What about this for modification resistance? > We keep a count of all cells passing and use AES in CTR mode with a 2 part > counter: the first part the cell counter, the second one a block counter. > Then to authenticate the cell we can use