Re: [tor-dev] [RFC] Proposal: A First Take at PoW Over Introduction Circuits

2020-09-25 Thread tevador
On Tue, Sep 22, 2020 at 2:10 PM George Kadianakis wrote: > > if you have a GPU-enabled box, so that we can get some benchmarks > from GPUs as well > Someone would have to write a GPU benchmark for that. My code is CPU-only. > > tevador do you have the graphing code somewhere

Re: [tor-dev] [RFC] Proposal: A First Take at PoW Over Introduction Circuits

2020-07-01 Thread tevador
Hi all, On Mon, Jun 22, 2020 at 4:52 PM George Kadianakis wrote: > Also, tevador let me know if you'd like me to add you as a co-author on the > proposal based on all your great feedback so far. Thanks for the update. Yes, you can add me as a co-author. > During our performance m

Re: [tor-dev] [RFC] Proposal: A First Take at PoW Over Introduction Circuits

2020-06-10 Thread tevador
Hi George, Thanks for the update. On Wed, Jun 10, 2020 at 2:05 PM George Kadianakis wrote: > > Tevador, thanks a lot for your tailored work on equix. This is fantastic. > I have a question that I don't see addressed in your very well written > README. In your initial emai

Re: [tor-dev] [RFC] Proposal: A First Take at PoW Over Introduction Circuits

2020-06-07 Thread tevador
n a certain way, otherwise the solution is invalid. See: https://github.com/tevador/equix/blob/master/src/equix.c#L14-L23 ___ tor-dev mailing list tor-dev@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev

Re: [tor-dev] [RFC] Proposal: A First Take at PoW Over Introduction Circuits

2020-06-07 Thread tevador
On Sun, Jun 7, 2020 at 8:42 AM wrote: > > One way is to include the target effort in requests, and include both > the server-provided nonce and the target effort as the x in Hx. Then > only check that the real effort comes out no less than the target > effort, but use the target effort for everyt

Re: [tor-dev] [RFC] Proposal: A First Take at PoW Over Introduction Circuits

2020-06-06 Thread tevador
On Mon, May 18, 2020 at 1:01 PM wrote: > > When a cell with a small effort in the queue has any chance of getting > selected, the optimal strategy for a legitimate client would be to > compute nonces and send as many nonces as possible until it causes > congestion on his network. Instead when onl

Re: [tor-dev] [RFC] Proposal: A First Take at PoW Over Introduction Circuits

2020-06-06 Thread tevador
I've been working on a custom PoW algorithm specifically for this proposal. It is 10x faster to verify than RandomX-Tor and doesn't require any memory for verification. Full write-up is here: https://github.com/tevador/equix/blob/master/devlog.md Especially the comparison table in th

Re: [tor-dev] [RFC] Proposal: A First Take at PoW Over Introduction Circuits

2020-05-13 Thread tevador
Hi Mike, My apologies. I thought this later email from 14th April had the latest version of the proposal: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2020-April/014225.html > In short, we let the queue grow at a faster rate than we serve, and we > trim it occasionally. What is the benefit of

Re: [tor-dev] [RFC] Proposal: A First Take at PoW Over Introduction Circuits

2020-05-10 Thread tevador
Hi teor, On Sun, May 10, 2020 at 6:36 AM teor wrote: > > There are two possible issues with this design: > > Division is expensive on some platforms, including ARM-based devices. > But there might be a way to calculate an approximate value without division. > (For example, bit shifts, or multiply

Re: [tor-dev] [RFC] Proposal: A First Take at PoW Over Introduction Circuits

2020-05-09 Thread tevador
On 08 May, 21:53, tevador wrote: > In particular, the following parameters should be set differently from > Monero: > > RANDOMX_ARGON_SALT = "RandomX-TOR-v1" > > The unique RandomX salt means we do not need to use a separate salt as PoW &

Re: [tor-dev] [RFC] Proposal: A First Take at PoW Over Introduction Circuits

2020-05-08 Thread tevador
to verify a single hash is around 400-500 μs. A mid-range GPU has a similar performance as a single CPU core. Most CPUs made since 2011 have similar per-core performance except of low-end CPUs without hardware AES support. References: [REF_BIRTHDAY]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Birthday_attack#Mathemat