Hi. I was wondering if setting the connection padding setting in torrc
to 1 instead of auto has any benefit in protecting against a passive
adversary outside the Tor network.
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Thanks Cecylia for your great explanation.
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Hi. We are rolling out the vanguard plugin for our users and wanted to
understand some options we can enable.
* In many parts of the Security README setting *circ_max_megabytes* is
recommended. Though it is discouraged for usecases involving Onionshare
and Securedrop which we support. What is a re
Goal: We (Whonix) are researching optional bridge hosting for our users
to thwart web fingerprinting. Snowflake makes the most sense since no
NAT hole-punching is needed. Correct me if I'm wrong here because if
that was possible with obfs4 or meek it would save a lot of work.
We now know acting a
Hi. We are considering allowing users to run their daemon (optionally)
as a bridge in addition to client mode for increased traffic
fingerprinting resistance [1].
Does running a bridge prevent you from using a bridge yourself? I've
seen it mentioned that using bridges can protect users in event of
Hi I was wondering what the mathematical probability of guessing an
onion v3 address that is kept secret.
Or asked differently: what is the entropy of v3 addresses if an
adversary decides to bruteforce the entire keyspace?
I am struggling to come up with a usecase for authenticated v3 services
wh
Hi. We aim to make enhanced sandboxing for Tor Browser widely available
on Linux that's well maintained in the long term. We would appreciate it
if TBB team provides the currently developed Apparmor and firejail
profiles below from your repos and run unit testing and check/fix any
breakages with up
*On Sat, 17 Aug 2019 at**21:17, Tom Ritter* mailto:tor-dev%40lists.torproject.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5Btor-dev%5D%20TBB%20Memory%20Allocator%20choice%20fingerprint%20implications&In-Reply-To=%3CCA%2BcU71%3DPeZGCAJNsPQy9QpKY9%3Dwz3vPdW8QKruF_ZwyanoyYzQ%40mail.gmail.com%3E>>
wrote:
> On Sat, 17 Aug 20
Question for the Tor Browser experts. Do you know if it is possible to
remotely fingerprint the browser based on the memory allocator it is
using? (via JS or content rendering)
We are thinking of switching Tor Browser to use the minimalist and
security oriented hardened_malloc written by Daniel Mi
