d of attack.
Also we have to take into account that many users use private bridges, that will
never be known by BridgeDB and we don't want to scare the private bridges users.
Is the only reliable way to connect to Tor for some people.
[0]https://metrics.torproject.org/collector/recen
anning a QR code or
visiting a bridge URI should not delete the other bridges known by the users by
default. Maybe it should ask if the bridge should be added to (the default
option) or should replace the existing ones.
--
meskio | https://meskio.net/
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Quoting Torsten Grote (2022-07-19 14:54:01)
> On Monday, 18 July 2022 13:47:21 -03 meskio wrote:
> > What do you think of the proposal? How can we improve it?
>
> A slightly unrelated question:
>
> Was there any consideration about deanonymization attacks by giving th
40189
--
meskio | https://meskio.net/
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My contact info: https://meskio.net/crypto.txt
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Nos vamos a Croatan.
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tor-dev mailing lis
Quoting Alec Muffett (2020-06-16 14:10:24)
>On Tue, 16 Jun 2020 at 12:15, meskio <[1]mes...@sindominio.net> wrote:
>
> I'm wondering if it will make sense to use Onion-Location in V2 onion
> services
> to advertise the V3 onion. So existing known
> this kind of thing ;)).
I'm wondering if it will make sense to use Onion-Location in V2 onion services
to advertise the V3 onion. So existing known V2 services can use it to upgrade
their users to V3.
AFAIK right now tor-browser ignores the Onion-Location header if is already
coming fr
