Re: [tor-dev] DNSSEC

2014-09-01 Thread merc1984
On Mon, Sep 1, 2014, at 11:54, Mike Cardwell wrote: > The exit nodes do the DNS requests. The client doesn't see an IP address. > It connects to the Tor SOCKS interface and says, "connect me to hostname > example.com on port N". It doesn't look up the IP address of > "example.com" > and *then* conn

Re: [tor-dev] DNSSEC

2014-09-01 Thread merc1984
On Mon, Sep 1, 2014, at 10:19, Артур Истомин wrote: > On Mon, Sep 01, 2014 at 04:33:34PM +, David Stainton wrote: > > > > Dear merc1...@f-m.fm, > > > > Is DNSSEC is not evil? To me it seems like the 1984 of domain name > > systems... > > Please take a good look at the political implications

[tor-dev] DNSSEC

2014-09-01 Thread merc1984
I am surprised to find that there is no form of DNSSEC associated with TOR. I am running dnscrypt, but find that I fail the DNSSEC test at http://dnssec.vs.uni-due.de/ when using the TBB. I have unbound chained to dnscrypt which is on a rotary to 5 trusted DNS resolvers. How can you not understa

[tor-dev] DNSSEC

2014-08-30 Thread merc1984
Does anyone know why TOR does not use DNSSEC? The only documentation I found on the TORProject website for DNS does not actually explain how DNS works on TOR. I infer it must be TCP, as TOR can not do UDP, and I imagine that relay nodes must be the resolvers in order to resolve .onion domains.